



**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**NOW IS THE TIME FOR CVE-2. UPDATING AND
IMPLEMENTING A REVISED U.S. NATIONAL
STRATEGY TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM**

by

Thomas J. Davis

September 2014

Thesis Co-Advisors:

Nadav Morag
Kathleen Kiernan

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Reissued 5 Jan 2015 to revise content on p. 66.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE September 2014	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE NOW IS THE TIME FOR CVE-2. UPDATING AND IMPLEMENTING A REVISED U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM		5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Thomas J. Davis		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number <u>N/A</u> .		
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)		
<p>The United States (U.S.) national strategy countering violent extremism (CVE) has yet to be updated and currently does not provide the necessary national framework to best combat self-radicalization and violent extremism (VE) in the United States. If people subscribe that the need for an updated strategy is evident, then the question is "What are the necessary and effective components of the national U.S. CVE strategy that best prevent self-radicalization and VE in the United States?"</p> <p>This research examined the concepts and strategies surrounding extremism and self-radicalization in the U.S., the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia. Through this analysis, multiple findings and recommendations were made. One such finding was the identification of overarching elements that, if implemented, would increase the effectiveness and applicability of the U.S. CVE strategy. These elements include: 1) identifying the federal agency in charge of administering the U.S. CVE strategy, 2) developing a more robust and actionable national CVE framework, 3) refocusing the federal government on support and not local engagement of CVE, 4) requiring all CVE related terms be defined in every document, and 5) requiring regular evaluations and updates of the U.S. CVE strategy. The details of these and other findings are contained in this thesis.</p>		

14. SUBJECT TERMS Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, Strategic Implementation Strategy Plan (SIP) for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, Terrorism, Countering Violent Extremism, CVE, Extremism, Counterterrorism, Radicalization, Self Radicalization, Counter Radicalization, De-Radicalization, Ideology, al-Qaeda	15. NUMBER OF PAGES 205		
16. PRICE CODE			
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

**NOW IS THE TIME FOR CVE-2. UPDATING AND IMPLEMENTING A
REVISED U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COUNTER VIOLENT
EXTREMISM**

Thomas J. Davis
Captain, Snohomish County Sheriff's Office, Everett, WA
B.S., Henry Cogswell College, 2004

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 2014**

Author: Thomas J. Davis

Approved by: Nadav Morag
Thesis Co-Advisor

Kathleen Kiernan
Thesis Co-Advisor

Mohammed Hafez
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

The United States (U.S.) national strategy countering violent extremism (CVE) has yet to be updated and currently does not provide the necessary national framework to best combat self-radicalization and violent extremism (VE) in the United States. If people subscribe that the need for an updated strategy is evident, then the question is “What are the necessary and effective components of the national U.S. CVE strategy that best prevent self-radicalization and VE in the United States?”

This research examined the concepts and strategies surrounding extremism and self-radicalization in the U.S., the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia. Through this analysis, multiple findings and recommendations were made. One such finding was the identification of overarching elements that, if implemented, would increase the effectiveness and applicability of the U.S. CVE strategy. These elements include: 1) identifying the federal agency in charge of administering the U.S. CVE strategy, 2) developing a more robust and actionable national CVE framework, 3) refocusing the federal government on support and not local engagement of CVE, 4) requiring all CVE related terms be defined in every document, and 5) requiring regular evaluations and updates of the U.S. CVE strategy. The details of these and other findings are contained in this thesis.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	PROBLEM STATEMENT	3
B.	RESEARCH QUESTION	4
C.	HYPOTHESIS.....	5
D.	RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY	5
E.	CHAPTER OVERVIEW	6
II.	COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM— A REVIEW OF ASSOCIATED TERMS AND THE LITERATURE ASSOCIATED WITH COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM	11
A.	DEFINING THE TERMS TERRORISM, RADICALIZATION AND EXTREMISM	12
1.	Terrorism.....	12
2.	Radicalization and Extremism.....	16
B.	UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY AND OTHER MOTIVATORS TO RADICALIZATION, AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS TO COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM	20
1.	Ideology	21
2.	Four Functions of Ideology	27
a.	<i>Naturalizing Function of Ideology</i>	27
b.	<i>Obscuring Function of Ideology</i>	28
c.	<i>Universalizing Function of Ideology</i>	29
d.	<i>Structuring Function of Ideology</i>	29
3.	Other Notable Motivating Factors	30
C.	A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ASSOCIATED WITH COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM	31
1.	Countering Violent Extremism—The Concept.....	32
2.	Countering Violent Extremism—Defining the Term	34
3.	Countering Violent Extremism—The Programmatic Environment Going Forward	35
4.	Analysis and Gaps in Reviewed Literature	37
D.	OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS	38
E.	CONCLUSION	39
III.	AN EXAMINATION OF TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES	41
A.	BRIEF OVERVIEW OF TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES.....	42
1.	The Current Perception of Terrorism in the United States.....	42
2.	A Brief Overview of Terrorism in the United States—1970 to 2000.....	44
3.	A Brief Overview of Terrorism in the United States—2001 to Present.....	47

4.	The Perception of Terrorism in the United States—Future Challenges.....	48
B.	RELEVANT U.S. SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES—THE PROGRESSION TOWARDS COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM.....	50
1.	<i>The National Security Strategy—A Brief History and Review of the 2002, 2006, and 2010 Strategies.....</i>	50
2.	<i>Other Relevant National Strategies—2001 to 2011</i>	52
a.	<i>The National Strategy for Homeland Security—A Review of the 2002 and 2007 Strategies.....</i>	53
b.	<i>The 2012–2016 Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan—A Recognition of Countering Violent Extremism.....</i>	55
c.	<i>The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism—A Review of the 2003 and 2006 Strategies.....</i>	56
d.	<i>A Review of the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism.....</i>	59
C.	CONCLUSION	60
IV.	AN OVERVIEW OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES AND AN EXAMINATION OF THE CURRENT U.S. STRATEGIES FOR COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM	61
A.	THE RECOGNITION OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND SELF-RADICALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES.....	62
1.	<i>The Internet—An Effective Method of Recruitment Towards Self Radicalization and Violent Extremism.....</i>	63
B.	CURRENT U.S. STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM—BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW.....	67
1.	<i>Development of the 2010 Countering Violent Extremism Working Group.....</i>	67
2.	<i>Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States—An Overview.....</i>	70
3.	<i>The Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States</i>	74
C.	AN EXAMINATION OF THE CURRENT U.S. CVE STRATEGY.....	76
1.	<i>The Evolution towards a CVE Strategy in the United States</i>	76
2.	<i>Examination of the U.S. CVE Strategy—Background.....</i>	78
3.	<i>Examination of the U.S. CVE Strategy—Effectiveness and Application.....</i>	80
a.	<i>The Strategy Framework</i>	81
b.	<i>The Relationship between Countering Violent Extremism and the Muslim Community</i>	81
c.	<i>The Role of Federal Law Enforcements Agencies in Countering Violent Extremism—Counterterrorism vs. Counter Radicalization</i>	83
d.	<i>Intelligence Gathering vs. Community Policing.....</i>	85

e.	<i>The Role of U.S. Attorneys in Countering Violent Extremism</i>	86
f.	<i>The Responsibility for Countering Violent Extremism at the Federal Level</i>	87
g.	<i>Training</i>	88
D.	CONCLUSION	89
V.	THE UNITED KINGDOM	91
A.	OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED KINGDOM	91
1.	Ethos.....	92
2.	Governance.....	92
3.	Policing Structure	93
B.	AN ANALYSIS OF THE UK'S COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS ...95	
1.	A Long History of Strategy and Doctrine.....	95
2.	A Brief History of CONTEST.....	96
a.	<i>PREVENT—A Revised Focus on Community Support</i>	99
3.	Channel—A Localized Community-Based Partnership Program in Support of <i>Prevent</i>	102
a.	<i>Overview</i>	102
b.	<i>A Guide for Local Partnerships</i>	104
c.	<i>A Vulnerability Assessment Framework</i>	106
d.	<i>Referral Data</i>	108
C.	AREAS OF CONCERN	110
1.	Expansive Terrorism Legislation	110
2.	Interaction with Muslim Communities	111
D.	CONCLUSION	113
VI.	THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA	115
A.	OVERVIEW OF AUSTRALIA	116
1.	Ethos.....	117
2.	History and Governance.....	118
3.	Policing Structure	120
B.	TERRORISM CHALLENGES IN AUSTRALIA—PAST TO PRESENT	123
1.	Australia's Immigration Policy—Understanding Its Relevance to Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism	123
2.	Terrorism—1978 to Present.....	124
3.	The Syrian Conflict and Its Threat to the Security of Australia.126	
4.	The View Ahead—Future Terrorism Challenges for Australia..128	
C.	AUSTRALIA'S DOMESTIC COUNTERTERRORISM DOCUMENTS	129
1.	The Evolution from SAC-PAV to NCTC	129
2.	The NCTP—Australia's Domestic Counterterrorism Plan.....	131
a.	<i>1st Edition NCTP—2002 to 2005</i>	131
b.	<i>2nd Edition NCTP—2005 to 2012</i>	131
c.	<i>3rd Edition NCTP—2012 to Present</i>	132

D.	COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM—SPECIFIC PROGRAMMATIC STRATEGIES	135
1.	The Attorney—General’s Role in CVE Efforts and the CVE Unit.....	136
2.	Building Community Resilience (BCR) Grants Program.....	138
E.	AREAS OF CONCERN	140
F.	CONCLUSION	141
VII.	CONCLUSION	143
A.	A RESTATEMENT—THE APPLICATION OF THE PROBLEM SPACE, HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH QUESTION	143
1.	Problem Space.....	143
2.	Hypothesis.....	144
3.	Research Question	144
B.	FINAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS	145
C.	RECOMMENDATIONS.....	148
1.	2010 HSAC CVE Working Group Recommendations.....	149
2.	Identify Who Is in Charge of Counteracting Violent Extremism at the Federal Level—and Not U.S. Attorneys or the FBI	150
3.	Develop An Actionable National CVE Framework.....	152
4.	The Federal Government Must Re-Focus on the <i>Support</i> of Counteracting Violent Extremism and Not Attempt to <i>Engage</i> in Counteracting Violent Extremism at the Local Level	153
5.	Define the Terms and Terminologies in Every Document.....	153
6.	VE and CVE Training and Education	155
D.	OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH	156
E.	CONCLUSION	158
	LIST OF REFERENCES	163
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	179

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	The Structure of Terror	57
Figure 2.	Visual Incorporation of Malcolm X’s Words and a Young Muslim	65
Figure 3.	Bipartisan Policy Center Counterterrorism-Community Policing-Counter- Radicalization Relationship Model.....	84
Figure 4.	The Channel Process.....	108
Figure 5.	Number of Referrals to Channel, April 2006 through March 31, 2013.....	109
Figure 6.	Data on Referrals Accepted to Channel vs. Other Services, 2007 through 2013.....	109

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Comparative Analysis of Relevant CVE Program Attributes—United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia.....	145
----------	---	-----

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

2003 NSCT 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
2006 NSCT 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

AA	American Airlines
ACLU	American Civil Liberties Union
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ACT	Australian Capital Region
ADF	Australian Defence Force
AFP	Australian Federal Police
AGD	Attorney-General's Department (Australia)
AQAP	Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
ASD	Australian Signals Directorate
ASIO	Australian Security Intelligence Organization
ASIS	Australian Secret Intelligence Service
BCR	Building Communities of Resilience (Australia)
BSS	British Security Service (also known as MI5)
CAF	common assessment framework
CHDS	Center for Homeland Defense and Security
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIKR	critical infrastructure key resource
COAG	Council of Australian Governments
COIN	counter-insurgency
CONTEST	Counterterrorism Strategy (UK)
CRCL	Civil Rights Civil Liberties
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CT	counterterrorism
CVE	countering violent extremism
DCDC	Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIAC	Department of Immigration and Citizenship (Australia)
DIO	Defense Intelligence Organization
DIS	Defense Intelligence Staff
DOJ	Department of Justice
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FOI	Freedom of Information

GAO	Government Accountability Office
GCHQ	government communications headquarters
GCTF	global counterterrorism forum
GO	governmental organization
GWOT	global war on terror
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
HR	house resolution
HSAC	Homeland Security Advisory Council
HUMINT	human intelligence
IDG	International Deployment Group
IGA	intergovernmental agreement
INP	Indonesian National Police
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ISE	information sharing environment
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
JDP	joint doctrine publication
JTAC	Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre
LAPD	Los Angeles Police Department
MAPPA	multi-agency public protection arrangements
MCDP	marine corps doctrine publication
MI5	British Security Service (also known as BSS)
MI6	UK Secret Intelligence Service (also known as SIS)
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MOVES	modeling, virtual environments and simulation
MPAC	Muslim Public Advisory Council
NCTC	National Counter-Terrorism Committee
NCTP	National Counterterrorism Plan
NGO	non-governmental organization
NSHS	National Strategy for Homeland Security
NSS	National Security Strategy (United Kingdom)
OSCT	Office of Security and Counter Terrorism
P3	Public Private Partnership
PEO	Prevent Engagement Officer
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
PRAC	Prevention, Rehabilitation, and After Care Program—Saudi Arabia
QHSR	Quadrennial Homeland Security Review

SAC-PAV	Standing Advisory Committee on Commonwealth and State Cooperation for Protection Against Violence
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SIP	Strategic Implementation Plan
SIS	Secret Intelligence Service (also known as MI6)
SIT	social identity theory
SPOC	single point of contact
TA 2006	UK Terrorism Act 2006
TPP	tactics, techniques and procedures
U.S.	United States
UA	United Airlines
UK	United Kingdom
VE	violent extremism
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WRAP	Workshop to Raise Awareness of <i>Prevent</i>

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Between September 12, 2001 and July 2013, 49 publicly known thwarted and successful homegrown radicalized terrorist plots were perpetrated against the United States (U.S.).¹ These plots included people who were “American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized predominately in the United States.”² Nearly one-fifth of these self-radicalized plots occurred in 2009 alone.³

Unprecedented at the time, these plots indicated a new development whose magnitude was largely unseen prior to 2009—self-radicalized or recruited U.S. individuals attacking Americans on U.S. soil.⁴ It was another two years before the U.S. government initially addressed the concern of domestic self-radicalization and violent extremism (VE) with the implementation of the August 2011 *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, and its partner document, the December 2011 *Strategic Implementation Strategy Plan (SIP) for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*.

However, a full three years after implementation, these strategy documents have yet to be updated, and still remain in their original versions that do not provide the necessary relevant and applicable national framework to best combat self-radicalization and VE in the United States. Missing are tangible resources and guidance for the American people to understand the potential causal factors of VE, as well as any truly actionable programmatic strategies for communities to partner together their public and private sectors to detect, prevent, and combat self-radicalization, and VE in a trusted and collaborative environment. In its current 2011 iteration, the U.S. countering violent extremism (CVE) strategy does not fully leverage the potential of community-based resources nor does it support a full engagement of CVE strategies at the local level. As

¹ Jessica Zuckerman, Steven Bucci, and James Carafano, “60 Terrorist Plots Since 9/11: Continued Lessons in Domestic Counterterrorism,” *The Heritage Foundation*, July 31, 2013, 1.

² Ibid., 2.

³ Bruce Hoffman, “American Jihad,” *The National Interest Online*, April 20, 2010, 4.

⁴ Ibid.

recently as February 2014, it was unclear which federal agency manages the U.S. CVE strategy or what evaluative criteria should even be considered to assess the effectiveness of the strategy.⁵ Compounding this concern is that the threat of self-radicalization and VE in the United States—largely due to the Internet—is more significant today than it was even just five years ago.⁶ This state of affairs adds to the critical importance of delivering an updated and more effective U.S. CVE strategy in the near term.

If people subscribe that the need for an updated strategy is evident, then the question is “What are the necessary and effective components of the national U.S. CVE strategy that best prevent self radicalization and VE in the United States?”

This thesis examined many of the broader concepts surrounding extremism, self-radicalization, and strategies to counter VE in the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), and Australia. The research then progressed with a specific review of the CVE strategies and concepts in place in these three countries. Through this case study analysis, several effective overarching CVE elements and concepts were identified. As a result of this analysis, ensuing recommendations have also been made. These recommendations include identifying the federal agency in charge of administering the U.S. CVE strategy, developing a more robust and actionable national CVE framework, refocusing the federal government on *support* and not local *engagement* of CVE, requiring all CVE related terms be defined in every document, as well as regular evaluations and updates of the U.S. CVE strategy. The details of these and other findings and recommendations are contained in this thesis.

Through this research, this thesis argues that the creation and implementation of an updated national CVE strategy, which incorporates many of the CVE components, identified in the United Kingdom and Australia, would increase the effectiveness and applicability of the U.S. CVE strategy. The ensuing U.S. strategy will then be able to offer better support for local agencies to deliver effective localized CVE programs. The result will generate collaboration between law enforcement and community

⁵ Jerome P. Bjelopera, *Countering Violent Extremism in the United States* (CRS Report No. R42553) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 19, 2014), 26–28.

⁶ Seth Jones, email message to author, June 29, 2014 and July 17, 2014.

organizations, and thereby, increase community awareness, preparedness, and resiliency to VE within the United States. If the United States develops and implements a detailed CVE strategy supported by the strong core foundational principles that these countries' CVE strategies have succeeded upon, then it stands to reason that the United States will also enjoy a robust CVE program that ensures the best chances of successfully countering VE within its borders.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I must first and foremost thank my wife, Kris, who is simply the most wonderful person I have ever known. Your support of me, not only throughout this program, but also throughout my entire career, is a large part of why I am able to pursue my many interests and whims. Thank you for your continuously unwavering support and for agreeing to tag along on this journey. If you had refused, I would have likely starved long ago.

Thank you to my two wonderful sons, Craig and Conner, for your patience and teaching me much more about the truly important things in life than I could ever hope to teach you. I am very proud of the fine young men you both have become. Keep pursuing your dreams!

Thank you to Dr. Nadav Morag for your willingness to guide my research and writing throughout the entire Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) program. Your constructive feedback and support over the last 18 months has directly contributed to my development as a student. You have furthered my appreciation of the importance of looking at the entire globe for answers to this nation's homeland security challenges. For these reasons, you were a logical choice as an advisor on this project. I have come to appreciate your instruction and advising style, both of which have significantly contributed to my success in this program.

Thank you to Dr. Kathleen Kiernan for your help in leading me toward a relevant and important topic that adds value to the homeland security profession. Your willingness to serve as a co-advisor and your support throughout the process has significantly contributed to the success of this project.

Thank you to Dr. Mark Baird for your interest in my thesis topic and agreeing to serve as a reader on this project. Your generosity, patience, and friendship have contributed immeasurably to the success of this project and enriched my educational experience. I especially appreciate your willingness to read my drivel at all hours of the day or night.

Finally, thank you to all the indispensable faculty and staff at CHDS and my CHDS classmates. You have provided me with a fantastic experience I will not soon forget. You each are truly professionals.

I. INTRODUCTION

Until the attacks on the United States (U.S.) on September 11, 2001—indelibly known as 9/11—the awareness of terrorism and the realization of any physical impacts it could have on the American public within the boundaries of the United States were relatively minimal. Concern of any real significance was relegated to an international level. Further, terrorism related intelligence and information sharing was largely confined to matters that had little direct involvement with U.S. citizens.

As noted by Adrienne Butler, Allison Panzer, and Lewis Goldfrank, the enormous degree of impact of the 9/11 attacks, coupled with the fact it occurred on such a level never before experienced, and therefore, unprecedented and unfamiliar to the United States, caused a high degree of fear, anxiety, and sense of lack of control over terrorism at that moment.¹ As a result, the idea that large-scale terrorist acts could occur on American soil became self-evident and the topic of intelligence and information collection and sharing was now destined for the forefront of topics that would impact the relationship between the American people and its government. This relationship was essentially predicated on two elements, fear and expectation, the fear of terrorism and the expectation that the government would do something about it without eroding the rights and freedoms of U.S. citizens.

Another result of the 9/11 attacks was that the American public was also introduced to a newly formed perception of what a terrorist represented and of the religiosity of terrorism. Both of which—to some degree—have been mischaracterized over the years, contributing to the notion that Americans hold a unique perspective on terrorism. While their conceptualization of this terrorism phenomenon typically initiates from the iconic events of 9/11, many only see counterterrorism (CT) efforts through the global prism of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

¹ Adrienne Butler, Allison M. Panzer, and Lewis R. Goldfrank, ed., *Committee on Responding to the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism, Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism: A Public Health Strategy*, National Research Council (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2003), 45.

Although immediately following the 9/11 attacks, fear of another imminent attack occurring on U.S. soil was palpable, that particular fear was quickly overshadowed by the then declared Global War on Terror (GWOT). Any actions and concerns related to domestic CT efforts were primarily focused on keeping terrorists out of the United States at its borders. The impact to the American people now surrounded the issue of freedom of movement and the government's intelligence gathering efforts. The United States, believing that radicalization and recruitment within its borders was not conceivable, implemented an outward facing strategy and engaged in battles abroad.²

According to the Heritage Foundation, as of July 2013, 60 publicly known terrorist plots were identified—including both thwarted and successful—against the United States since 9/11.³ Of these 60 plots, 49 are considered to be “homegrown,” defined by the Heritage Foundation as “[O]ne or more of the actors were American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized predominately in the United States.”⁴ In 2009, no less than 10 known domestic terrorist plots—including both successful and thwarted—were revealed.⁵ Most notably was the November 2009 Fort Hood attack by Major Nidal Hasan, who killed 13 people and wounded 32 others, self-admittedly in support of the Taliban.⁶ Unprecedented at the time, this attack indicated a new development whose magnitude was largely unseen prior to 2009—self-radicalized or recruited U.S. individuals attacking Americans on U.S. soil.⁷ It was not until two years later that the U.S. government initially addressed this domestic self-radicalization and VE issue with the president’s implementation of the August 2011 *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* and its partner document, the

² Bruce Hoffman, “American Jihad,” *The National Interest Online*, April 20, 2010, 4.

³ Jessica Zuckerman, Steven Bucci, and James Carafano, “60 Terrorist Plots Since 9/11: Continued Lessons in Domestic Counterterrorism,” *The Heritage Foundation*, July 31, 2013, 1.

⁴ Ibid., 2.

⁵ Hoffman, “American Jihad,” 4.

⁶ Chelsea J. Carter, “Nidal Hasan Convicted in Fort Hood Shootings; Jurors Can Decide Death,” *CNN*, last updated Friday August 23, 2013, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/23/justice/nidal-hasan-court-martial-friday/index.html>.

⁷ Hoffman, “American Jihad,” 4.

December 2011 *Strategic Implementation Strategy Plan (SIP) for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*.

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

As is described in more detail in a later chapter, these two documents stop well short of their potential. For example, a year after implementation of these two documents, some federal agencies—including the Department of Justice (DOJ)—were not able to demonstrate how they were meeting their responsibilities under the national countering violent extremism (CVE) strategy.⁸ In its recent February 2014 report to Congress, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) noted, “There is no single agency managing all of the individual activities and efforts of the (CVE) plan.”⁹ Additionally, no specific eligible federal CVE grant programs or correlating criteria are identified and no criteria have been established to evaluate the effectiveness—outputs—of the CVE strategies.¹⁰

Missing are tangible resources and guidance for the American people to understand the potential causal factors of VE, as well as any truly actionable programmatic strategies for communities to partner together its public and private sectors to detect, prevent, and combat self-radicalization and VE in a trusted and collaborative environment. In its present 2011 iteration, the U.S. CVE strategy does not provide a current and adequate national CVE framework, and thereby, does not fully leverage the potential of community-based resources necessary to promote and support a full engagement of CVE strategies at the local level. This observation is represented by the fact that these documents are overly vague and do not contain actual, substantial programmatic strategies, exemplified by a program lead agency, specific CVE programs, or CVE approved grants or other available resources.

⁸ Government Accountability Office, *Report to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Countering Violent Extremism: Additional Actions Could Strengthen Training Efforts* (GAO-13-79) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2012), 9.

⁹ Jerome P. Bjelopera, *Countering Violent Extremism in the United States* (CRS Report No. R42553) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 19, 2014), 27.

¹⁰ Ibid., 26, 28.

B. RESEARCH QUESTION

The research question established for this thesis acts as a foundation for inquiry into multiple national level CVE strategies and their potential effectiveness as a programmatic strategy for the purpose of better preparing the United States and its communities to counter self-radicalization and VE.¹¹ The lack of an actionable and community-oriented counter-radicalization strategy—essential to information and intelligence sharing in local communities as an effective component of CT efforts—is reflective of the absence of a detailed, clear, and actionable strategy framework at the national level. Given that the need for such a strategy is evident, the research question proposed is, “What are the necessary and effective components of the national U.S. CVE strategy that best prevent self radicalization and VE in the United States?” The elements identified and collated within this national strategy should be articulated as guidelines, regulations and tactics, and techniques and procedures (TTPs), and act as the foundation from which these partnerships implement their actions and interactions in support of the national objective to prepare local governments and communities satisfactorily in this realm. To accomplish this objective, a clearly articulated and relevant national level CVE strategy must exist that facilitates community-based participation with the common objectives of both decreasing the risk of VE and increasing the level of community resiliency should an act of VE occur.

The current U.S. CVE strategy—discussed in detail throughout this thesis—does not contain these necessary strategic components and is not a truly strategic document. Developing a national standardized and actionable strategy to counter self-radicalization and VE, and then delivering this strategy through a deliberative process to local communities, is a necessary course of action to protect the United States and its citizens better from the danger of self-radicalized terrorism within its borders.

¹¹ It is acknowledged that the private sector also plays a significant role in natural disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. However, although these tangible benefits may be noted periodically throughout this document, this thesis does not focus on that role to any detail.

C. HYPOTHESIS

As of 2011, the United States has possessed a framework for countering VE within its borders exemplified by three generally recognized documents. These documents are the June 2011 *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*, the August 2011 *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, and the December 2011 *Strategic Implementation Strategy Plan (SIP) for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*.

These documents are a good start and demonstrate the government's awareness of the importance of countering VE within this nation's borders. However, these documents are vague and do not contain an actual, substantial programmatic strategy, exemplified by a program lead agency, specific CVE programs, CVE approved grants, or other available resources. Due to this void, federal, state, and local agencies, along with their private sector partners, are left to develop individualized criteria that can be inconsistent in design, poorly constructed, ineffective in their implementation, and short lived. As a result, local governments and their communities are left to feel their way through the minefields of crafting relationships and processes for sharing and utilizing information within an arguably sensitive subject area.

This thesis asserts that the creation and programmatic implementation of an updated national CVE strategy will offer support for local agencies to deliver effective localized CVE programs, which can generate collaboration between law enforcement and community organizations, and thereby, increase community awareness, preparedness, and resiliency to VE within the United States. If the United States develops a detailed CVE strategy supported by the strong core foundational principles that other countries' CVE strategies have succeeded upon, then it stands to reason that the United States will also enjoy a robust CVE program that ensures the best chances of countering VE within its borders.

D. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The research, which complements this thesis, is comprised of three main elements.

- LITERATURE REVIEW—An examination of the literature surrounding VE and CVE, and a review of associated terms relevant to the concepts of radicalization, extremist ideology, and religiosity are conducted in an effort to understand the application of these terms better within social science to provide the reader with a foundational understanding of VE and CVE. This understanding is necessary to examine and judge better the content presented in the case studies and review of U.S. strategy.
- U.S. CVE STRATEGY REVIEW—An examination of the perception of terrorism and a brief review of the CT strategies in place in the United States prior to 9/11 allow the reader an opportunity to recognize better that Americans hold a unique perspective and conceptualization of terrorism stemming from the iconic events of 9/11. This offers the reader a framework for the evaluation of the subsequent U.S. CVE strategy review, as well as the UK and Australian case studies. A review of the current U.S. VE environment—and its challenges—along with the relative application and effectiveness of the CT and CVE strategies in place since 2011, provides the reader with a basic awareness of VE in the United States and its approach to domestic CVE applications since 2011.
- CASE STUDY ANALYSES—A study of the United Kingdom and Australia related to their development and implementation of programmatic strategies to counter VE within their borders and the applicability of those principles to the United States is presented.

These varied research methodologies allow for thorough well-rounded research intended to identify the most essential environmental and organizational attributes that may lead to a more effective CVE programmatic strategy in the United States going forward.

E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Chapter I is an introduction to CVE. It identifies the problem statement and research question developed as the foundation for this thesis. The process undertaken to establish these two criteria helps to understand the problem space best and then determine the appropriate question with which to conduct the research. The varied research methodologies utilized throughout this project are intended to help ascertain the most beneficial recommendations provided at the end of this research. The chapter also outlines the content of the remaining chapters of this work.

Chapter II reviews existing academic literature on the definition of terrorism and the concept of CVE to allow for a broader understanding of the complexity of the subject.

This complexity is evident in the diverse application of CVE programmatic strategies by various countries of both Muslim and non-Muslim majority populations, which offers an opportunity to view the causal factors surrounding self-radicalization and extremism, and the non-linear path that can lead to the utilization of violence as a means to further that ideology. This chapter includes a brief discussion of terms generally associated with terrorism, VE and CVE, for purposes of terminological clarification. While this thesis makes every effort to use terms within their intended meaning, attempts at agreeing upon universally accepted key definitions and concepts for such terms are still frequently contested by pundits and scholars.¹² Therefore, the intent of this review of terminology is not to debate the definitions themselves but rather to understand their frequent universal—albeit at times incorrect—application in describing certain societal and individualized conditions associated with terrorism and VE. This review presents an analysis of the overall CVE framework, an analysis of the gaps in reviewed literature, and concluding remarks and opportunities for future analysis.

Chapter III provides an examination of the history of terrorism and CT in the United States, the perception of terrorism by the American public as a result of 9/11, and the progression—both philosophically and practically—towards awareness of self-radicalization and VE as an emerging concern for U.S. security. This chapter provides a broad platform from which a comprehensive CVE strategy can be built.

Chapter IV offers a critical review of the 2011 *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* and the follow-on *Strategic Implementation Strategy Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*. This chapter then presents a brief look at the role the Internet has played in the furtherance of VE, and then concludes with a review of the 2010 CVE Working Group and its recommendations. This review provides a framework to understand better, the current U.S. paradigm as it relates to CVE and to guide the case study analyses of CVE programs internationally.

¹² Minerva Nasser-Eddine et al., Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review, *Australian Government Department of Defense* (Edinburgh, South Australia: Counter Terrorism and Security Technology Centre, 2011), 1.

Chapters V and VI provide case study and comparative analyses of the United Kingdom and Australia, respectively, to examine their use of well-established CT programmatic strategies that incorporate local community partnerships. This analysis allows for the determination of the qualitative attributes that may contribute to a similar CVE programmatic strategy in the United States. This research approach is important to identify which organizational factors—in the form of conditions, commonalities, attributes and impediments—exist at varying levels within these organizations and to determine further if these factors are present intentionally—by strategy and design—or even unintentionally. Further, this broad spectrum of cultural and bureaucratic diversity is necessary to ensure enough environmental differences exist to best discover and identify relevant organizational similarities and differences—the underlying causes, effects, and variables—that influence CVE programs.

Chapter VII first restates the problem space, hypothesis, and research problem to act as a framework for the remainder the chapter. Utilizing a comparable table, this chapter then presents the research and analysis of the U.S., UK and Australian CVE programs by focusing on those core components deemed necessary and effective for a national CVE strategy to prevent self-radicalization and VE effectively within its borders. It is presented in an attempt to answer the initial research question satisfactorily.

The chapter then progresses to the presentation of overarching recommendations—the output—for consideration toward the creation and implementation of an updated national CVE strategy to act as a model framework for communities to implement consistent CVE programs through this national guidance and support. The intended result is to increase organizational and community awareness, preparedness, and resiliency against acts of self-radicalization and VE. This chapter then provides a description of the limitations of this work, as well as an identification of areas in which additional research may be beneficial to the CVE topic.

Finally, this last chapter offers a formed conclusion by the author of the research results with the intent to assist policy makers, homeland security practitioners, and community leaders with a better understanding of how CVE programs should be supported at the national level and implemented at the local level. The goal of this

research is to add to the generalizable knowledge of CVE, generate recognition of the imminent concern, and to further the discussion on the issue. The desired result of which is to increase community capacity for CVE and decrease the capacity for VE.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

II. COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM— A REVIEW OF ASSOCIATED TERMS AND THE LITERATURE ASSOCIATED WITH COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Seemingly, volumes of available literature exist that discuss the many facets of terrorism, and to a lesser degree CVE, by utilizing a multiplicity of associated terms, along with their variations. However, much of the literature fails to first establish the definition and intended use of such terms. While ostensibly rudimentary, the nuances within the meaning of words, as well as their own definitional transformation over time, leave readers to either wonder about the application of the term or—more often—to inject their own understanding and biases into the meaning of the terms used.¹³ As a result, the intended meaning of the literature can be significantly altered.

This chapter first examines the literature surrounding many terms and terminologies used in the discourse on CVE and the broader discourse on terrorism overall. Some of the more frequently used terms include terrorism and CVE themselves, radicalization, VE, and ideology. Some differentiate themselves as only nuanced variations of other closely related terms, which are applied—correctly or incorrectly—as interchangeable terms. Once this foundation has been established, this chapter then looks at the literature encompassing CVE. This review includes the literature associated with defining CVE, researching CVE, and the programs associated with CVE.

The goal of this chapter is to define and clarify the intended application of the terms and terminologies—the expression of terms—used in the following research to allow the reader an opportunity to place these terms in context, and thereby, better understand the narrative surrounding their use. The result is a more thorough analysis of the strategies presented in this thesis. While the research primarily focuses on the literature associated with CVE, it is important to first begin with a review of the terminology more broadly associated with terrorism, and then focus on the literature more aligned with CVE in particular.

¹³ See, for example “What Is Terrorism: Key Elements and History” by Scott Gerwehr and Kirk Hubbard and “Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature,” by Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman.

A. DEFINING THE TERMS TERRORISM, RADICALIZATION AND EXTREMISM

1. Terrorism

The term “terrorism” itself, along with its ubiquitous use, has come to prominence since 9/11.¹⁴ However, scholars, pundits, and societies as a whole have yet to come to a consensus on a definition for terrorism. While some common definitional elements within the multiple meanings of terrorism do exist, the nuances are vast. Further complicating the understanding of the term is that the very word itself is used either explicitly or implicitly as a core element within the definitions of many other related terms.¹⁵ In addition, the term is used as part of other terminologies, such as political terrorism, cyber terrorism, environmental terrorism, and religious terrorism; the latter is used incorrectly, as argued by Manas Chatterji.¹⁶ Part of the obstacle may be that the very word conjures up vastly different images and interpretations among people. While Chatterji suggests the term itself has become better known since 9/11, the struggle to define terrorism dates back to well before 2001.

In their 1988 literature *Political Terrorism*, Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman present research they conducted in 1984 that revealed no fewer than 109 definitions of terrorism at the time.¹⁷ This observation was made 17 years before the 9/11 attacks upon the United States. Schmid and Jongman offer an explanation, opining, “The question of the definition of a term like terrorism cannot be detached from the question of who is the defining agency.”¹⁸ This nuance in scholar’s attempts to define the term adequately overlaps into the psychological realm as well. Viewing the term from a psychological rather than political perspective, Arie Kruglanski and Shira Fishman concur with Schmid

¹⁴ Manas Chatterji, “Understanding Terrorism: A Socio-Economic Perspective—Forward,” in *Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development* vol. 22, ed. Manas Chatterji (United Kingdom: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2014), ix.

¹⁵ Arie Kruglanski and Shira Fishman, “The Psychology of Terrorism: “Syndrome” Versus “Tool” Perspectives,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 2 (2006): 201, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546550600570119>.

¹⁶ Chatterji “Understanding Terrorism: A Socio-Economic Perspective—Forward,” ix.

¹⁷ Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), 5.

¹⁸ Ibid., 27.

and Jongman, and further suggest that an added difficulty in defining terrorism stems from the fact that the term has become highly pejorative over time, which furthers the desire to differentiate it from other forms of aggression that individuals wish to condone.¹⁹ As further evidence of this differentiation, they offer the well-known statement “[O]ne person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter” as an example of allowing a group’s personal motivations to dictate its definition of what constitutes an act of terrorism.²⁰ In their work related to extremist literature, Nasser-Eddine et al. concur with Kruglanski and Fishman that terrorism is a pejorative term.²¹ However, they elaborate deeper on this particular point by suggesting that the use of the term implies a moral judgment and that the ability to attach the label of terrorist to an opponent can indirectly persuade others to adopt this same moral viewpoint.²² This use suggests that the pejorative nature of the term may be, in part, the result of the intentional exploitation of the term in such a context. To do so may serve a strategic purpose but can also add to the confusion of the understanding of the term.

The literature reviewed thus far attempts to define terrorism by framing the broader environment of its use and focusing on the intent of its application by various user groups. This approach appears more as an exercise in social identity theory (SIT) and ingroup–outgroup behavior than an attempt to define terrorism from a scholarly perspective.²³

Professor Fathali Moghaddam offers a more detailed and scholarly meaning of the term defining terrorism as “[P]olitically motivated violence, perpetrated by individuals, groups, or state-sponsored agents, intended to bring about feelings of terror and helplessness in a civilian population in order to influence decision making and to change

¹⁹ Kruglanski and Fishman, “The Psychology of Terrorism: ‘Syndrome’ Versus ‘Tool’ Perspectives,” 201.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Nasser-Eddine et al., “Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review,” 5.

²² Ibid.

²³ Pioneered by the work of Henri Tajfel, social identity theory (SIT) and intergroup relations is generally recognized as the study of the relationship between individuals and their groups, as well as the social conflict between groups. See for example, Henri Tajfel, preface to *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, ed. Henri Tajfel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), xiii.

behavior.”²⁴ Moghaddam both concurs and dissents with elements of Kruglanski and Fishman’s application of the phrase “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter.” Moghaddam concurs that the phrase contributes to the confusion in defining the term terrorism overall, yet at the same time, counters the general acceptance of the phrase as useful in the discourse on terrorism.²⁵ In explaining this position, Moghaddam states that while certain social conditions give rise to the question of the morality of support for acts of terrorism, it is the actions of governments and their policies, the United States included, that further this appearance of legitimacy in the debate over whether one group defines a person as either a terrorist or a freedom fighter.²⁶ The labelers will always call their fighter’s “freedom fighters” and the enemy’s fighters “terrorists” regardless of the factors surrounding the issue, which suggests the phrase has become highly politicized, and therefore, virtually irrelevant.²⁷

The politicization of terms associated with terrorism is not necessarily avoidable, nor should it automatically be, and the recognition of the political element may be as important as the understanding of the terms themselves. Author Bruce Hoffman offers that in the most widely accepted use of the term terrorism is inherently political, and therefore, fundamentally a political concept.²⁸ Using power as a means to achieve political change, Hoffman defines terrorism in the following manner; “Terrorism is thus violence—or, equally important, the threat of violence—used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim.”²⁹ In their literature, “What is Terrorism,” Scott Gerwehr and Kirk Hubbard generally elucidate on Hoffman’s concepts of violence and political aim. They offer that terrorist violence is a means of communication intended to alter attitudes and perceptions, and political change is achieved through social influence—of which violence is one method—and therefore, conclude that terrorism is a form of social

²⁴ Fathali Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and Why They Come to Destroy Us* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 9.

²⁵ Ibid., 9–10.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 2.

²⁹ Ibid., 2–3.

influence.³⁰ Merriam-Webster defines terrorism as “[T]he use of violent acts to frighten the people in an area as a way of trying to achieve a political goal.”³¹ This definition closely mirrors Hoffman’s and offers itself as a broad yet succinct definition that captures the violence, fear, and political aim commonly associated with terrorism.

Governmental agencies also provide their own definitions for terrorism, which, upon review, seem to reflect the notion previously offered by Schmid and Jongman that the meaning is intrinsically connected to the defining agency.³² As an example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) states that its “top priority” is protecting the United States from terrorist attacks.³³ The FBI then chooses to define terrorism as an *activity* with three distinct characteristics; thereby, allowing the FBI the ability to engage in its priority mission. The FBI differentiates the term as either domestic terrorism or international terrorism, and offers two separate definitions based upon this bifurcation. The definitions offer the same first two characteristics: 1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law, 2) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping, and bifurcate the third characteristic differentiating between activities that occur either domestically—“primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.,,” or internationally—“primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S., or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.”³⁴

³⁰ Scott Gerwehr and Kirk Hubbard, “What Is Terrorism: Key Elements and History,” in *Psychology of Terrorism 2007*, ed. Bruce Bonger et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 87–88.

³¹ Merriam-Webster, “Terrorism,” accessed June 22, 2014, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/terrorism>.

³² Schmid and Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature*, 27.

³³ Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Terrorism,” accessed June 22, 2014, <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism>.

³⁴ Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Definitions of Terrorism in the U.S. Code,” accessed June 22, 2014, <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism-definition>.

With the exception of Moghaddam’s inclusion of “state-sponsored agents” in his definition of terrorism, and Kruglanski and Fishman’s reference to the desire to differentiate terrorism from other forms of aggression that people wish to condone, the majority of definitions do not distinguish between conventional military violence and unconventional violence, or between state and non-state actors. Rather, they appear to focus on the motivations and tactics, which offer an ideal interpretation and understanding of terrorism. Multiple definitions of terrorism are available, some of which are paragraphs in length. However, the detailed elements captured by Moghaddam, Hoffman, Merriam-Webster, and Gerwehr and Hubbard coalesce well to form an understanding of terrorism in its most fundamental form. This allows the truest understanding of the term without attaching the influences or biases of those defining it.

This examination of the term “terrorism” supports the notion that the term itself has undergone a definitional transformation over time and can still be subjectively applied today due to its wide-ranging interpretation. As used in this thesis, terrorism is understood to include an element of violence, which is committed with the intention to influence political or social change.

2. Radicalization and Extremism

According to Randy Borum, the overall result of this still emerging field of research on radicalization is that the professional literature is limited and that the literature that does exist primarily focuses on *why*—and to a lesser extent *how*—a person comes to adopt beliefs and behaviors that lead to violence, particularly toward civilians.³⁵ Moreover, much like the term terrorism, the term “radicalization” has been used more frequently since 9/11, and particularly in the period since 2005, a reflection of its use in relation to the emergence of homegrown terrorism.³⁶ As a result of this emergence, many Western European countries began implementing counter-radicalization programs during

³⁵ Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” *Journal of Strategic Security* 4, no. 4 (2011): 14, accessed July 10, 2014, <http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1139&context=jss>.

³⁶ Mark Sedgwick, “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 4 (2010): 479.

this period and radicalization became a familiar expression within the terrorism vernacular.³⁷

However, during this same period—2005 to 2009—the United States generally felt that American Muslims were “essentially immune to radicalization and therefore, did not begin pursuing a similar strategy until much later.”³⁸ In 2011, the United States implemented its own counter-radicalization strategy, yet within this document, it uses an even more emerging expression, “violent extremism,” as an interchangeable term with violent radicalization. Is counter-radicalization the same thing as CVE? Are the terms radicalization and extremism synonymous? In addition, more importantly, are the strategies to counter radicalization the same as the strategies to counter VE? Since this thesis research implements case study analysis of two Western democratic valued countries—the United Kingdom and Australia—with the intent of applying their positive attributes to an updated U.S. CVE strategy, these questions are essential to address at this juncture.

Again, in similar fashion to the term terrorism, complicating the understanding of radicalization is the fact that the term can be used in either a relative or an absolute application and that it is utilized as a central component in many other related terms. This use is particularly evident in the CVE realm and examples related to this area include terms such as self-radicalization, counter-radicalization, de-radicalization, cognitive radicalization, and violent radicalization. While these terms are referenced throughout this thesis, this section focuses on the root definition of radicalization and its application as a synonym to the term extremism. Understanding the term radicalization in this manner allows for a more productive understanding of the other terms referenced throughout this research. However, according to Nasser-Eddine et al., “Defining what radicalisation is or who radicals are is as difficult as defining terrorism.”³⁹

³⁷ Sedgwick, “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion,” 480.

³⁸ Lorenzo Vidino, *Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), 2.

³⁹ Nasser-Eddine et al., “Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review,” 13.

Merriam-Webster, in part, defines radical as a “a) very different from the usual or traditional; extreme, b) favoring extreme changes in existing views, habits, conditions, or institutions, c) associated with political views, practices, and policies of extreme change and d) advocating extreme measures to retain or restore a political state of affairs.”⁴⁰ To define the term radicalization requires a review of the term radicalize. Merriam-Webster defines the term radicalize as “to make radical” and then offers radicalization as a variant to the term radicalize—rather than as a stand-alone term—and describes it as a transitive verb, which supports the idea that radicalization is the process by which an individual becomes radical.⁴¹ Of note is the frequent use of the word “extreme” throughout the aforementioned definition for radical. A review of the definition of “extreme” also reveals, in part, that it means to “very great in degree, very serious or severe, very far from agreeing with the opinions of most people: not moderate” and “going to great or exaggerated lengths: radical, exceeding the ordinary, usual, or expected.”⁴² Due to its connection to terrorism and VE, the term radicalization, or labeling someone as a radical, carries a strong negative connotation. However, by the very definitions offered, extreme views and radicalized thinking can also lead to positive outcomes, such as innovations in research and solving socially complex problems.⁴³ It is, therefore, the resulting actions of radicalized individuals and groups that best contextualizes the term.

Based on their 2103 research on community perceptions of radicalisation in Australia, Hussein Tahiri and Michele Grossman found that radicalisation and extremism involve an element of “intolerance for the viewpoints of others and the imposition of one’s own truth claims on other people or on society as a whole.”⁴⁴ This added element of *imposition*—implying some type of action beyond the thought—of “one’s own truth

⁴⁰ Merriam-Webster, “Radical,” accessed June 22, 2014, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/radical?show=0&t=1404078073>.

⁴¹ Merriam-Webster, “Radicalize,” accessed June 22, 2014, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/radicalize>.

⁴² Merriam-Webster, “Extreme,” accessed June 22, 2014, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/extreme>.

⁴³ Mark Baird, email message to author, July 3, 2014.

⁴⁴ Hussein Tahiri and Michele Grossman, “Community and Radicalization: An Examination of Perceptions, Ideas, Beliefs and Solutions throughout Australia,” Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit, *Victoria Police and Victoria University*, September 2013, 8.

claims on other people or on society as a whole” is a deviation from those definitions of radicalization that focus solely on the extreme thoughts and beliefs. However, Tahiri and Grossman do not elucidate on the term imposition, which leaves people to wonder if their reference to the term—within the context of radicalization—is intended to imply violence. Instances, for example, in which the imposition of an individual’s radical beliefs upon others is conducted through the use of non violent means can be found; thereby, agreeing in concept with Tahiri and Grossman but expounding further the question of the necessity of violent action in defining radicalization. One such example is offered by the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) and contained within its important work in developing the Safe Spaces Initiative. MPAC suggests that the term “radicalization” is problematic and misunderstood, and therefore, the term “radical”—as used in the radicalization construct—is now perceived as a negative term.⁴⁵ MPAC then defines radical as “...someone who simply holds views that are unconventional or outside the majority’s opinions and/or behaviors. Radicals are not necessarily violent, nor negative.”⁴⁶

In similar fashion to the research surrounding VE, the field of research on radicalization is still developing.⁴⁷ According to Mark Sedgwick, in relative rather than absolute cases, the meaning of radical may be used as a synonym for extremist when used in support of an extreme position and an antonym for the term moderate.⁴⁸ These definitions suggest frequent overlap occurs between the various forms of the words radical and extreme. To some, they are synonymous and interchangeable. Another noteworthy observation is the lack of reference to violence, as either a necessity or consideration to define the terms. This distinction serves to enforce the notion that while all terrorists are presumed to be radical in some respect—that can include views, as well

⁴⁵ “Safe Spaces Initiative: Tools for Developing Healthy Communities,” *Muslim Public Affairs Council*, 2014, 30.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Nasser-Eddine et al., “Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review,” 1.

⁴⁸ Sedgwick, “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion,” 481.

as actions—not all radicals become terrorists.⁴⁹ While not controversial, it is relative to the understanding of the terms presented.

Interestingly, when defining the term “radical,” most scholars and researchers fail to qualify it in terms of the social environment in existence at the time the label is applied. What was deemed radical by yesterday’s standards may be socially acceptable by today’s standards, and just as notably, what was socially acceptable by yesterday’s standards may be deemed radical by today’s standards. Whether or not scholars and researchers imply this concept, this important distinction should be formally acknowledged when discussing VE and CVE within the social construct. One noteworthy exception to this observation is offered by MPAC. Elaborating on its definition of radicalization, MPAC offers the example of Dr. Martin Luther King as a person who held “radical” views and engaged in non-violent behavior during the civil rights movement; views that are today considered acceptable by the majority of society.⁵⁰

The research indicates the terms radicalization and extremism—along with their variations—are synonymous and often used interchangeably. Further, in this native form, they neither require nor imply violence as a defining element. Following the general definition offered by Merriam-Webster, the terms radicalization and extremism, as inserted throughout this thesis, are used interchangeably and do not refer to actions involving violence. However, understanding that radicalization and extremism can follow a non-linear path towards violence, the result can be violent radicalization or VE. When this issue is discussed, the term is preceded by the appropriate adjective clearly delineating it as such.

B. UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY AND OTHER MOTIVATORS TO RADICALIZATION, AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS TO COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

When beginning to understand that terrorism includes an element of violence committed with the purpose to influence political or social change, it is possible to gain

⁴⁹ Sedgwick, “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion,” 483.

⁵⁰ “Safe Spaces Initiative: Tools for Developing Healthy Communities,” 30.

greater insight into the rationale behind its use and the motivators that may drive the transition to radicalization. RAND Researcher Kim Cragin suggests that motivations toward terrorism can be generally classified into three broad categories: ideology, politics, or poverty.⁵¹ Hussein Tahiri and Michelle Grossman describe motivators to terrorism as “drivers of violent actions” and categorize them as personal, socio-cultural, and political factors.⁵² Notable terrorism scholar Peter Neumann also offers three drivers: grievance, ideology, and mobilization, which transform people’s beliefs to radicalization.⁵³ The drivers offered by Neumann incorporate similar elemental concepts of the drivers offered by Cragin, Tahiri, and Grossman. Neumann then cautions that while these drivers are a necessary part of the radicalization discourse, they are by themselves “not sufficient as explanations for extremist violence.”⁵⁴ In the case of ideology, Neumann concurs with Cragin on its significance as a categorical topic. In the case of politics, Tahiri and Grossman concur with Cragin that it is a categorical topic and further that politics—as discussed in this thesis and in the “review of terms...” in section A above—is a familiar component to terrorism.

Overall, this suggests that while the names of the categories offered by these researchers may vary slightly, the descriptions contained within the individual category narratives are extremely similar. Understanding the motivators that can lead to VE is as necessary to the research as understanding the terms associated with VE.

1. Ideology

Ideology, a standalone category according to Cragin, and an identified factor under political factors according to Tahiri and Grossman, is a term frequently used in the discourse on terrorism, radicalization, VE, and CVE. It is also regularly discussed as a

⁵¹ Kim Cragin, *Understanding Terrorist Motivations, Testimony Presented before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment on December 15, 2009* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2009), 5.

⁵² Tahiri and Grossman, “Community and Radicalization: An Examination of Perceptions, Ideas, Beliefs and Solutions throughout Australia,” 10.

⁵³ Peter Neumann, *Preventing Violent Radicalization in America* (Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center: National Security Preparedness Group, June 2011), 15.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

significant challenge in the CVE literature. The “terrorist organization’s ideology,” the “ideological motivation of the self radicalized individual,” and conversely, the efforts to “counter the terrorists narrative” (a reference to ideology), are all broadly applied phrases in this discussion as well. The terms ideology or ideologies are also referenced frequently in the U.S. 2011 CVE *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*.⁵⁵ Therefore, it is prudent to discuss ideology briefly to understand the term better, its role in forming actions of individuals and groups, and its influence in both the radicalization and counter-radicalization processes as an important element in the development of effective CVE programs.

Central to a comprehensive understanding of ideology is the recognition that the term itself is not pejorative in nature. While some may attempt to frame ideology in a negative context, it is neither good nor bad.⁵⁶ Ideology represents the thoughts and ideas that comprise people’s beliefs, goals, and actions. It governs how they see not only their environment but also their place within that environment. Understanding this representation of ideology allows it to be separated from religion and extremism to allow the reader an opportunity to examine each in isolation beforehand to then better understand how they interrelate with one another within the broader terrorism framework. This understanding allows people the opportunity to contextualize the information offered and to understand the role ideology plays in VE and CVE, the latter as a counter-radicalization strategy and not as a broader CT strategy.

Merriam-Webster defines ideology as “visionary theorizing; a systematic body of concepts especially about human life or culture; a manner or the content of thinking characteristic of an individual, group, or culture; the integrated assertions, theories and aims that constitute a sociopolitical program.”⁵⁷ This definition appears overly broad, and it is actually the synonymous terms *doctrine* and *dogma*, which provide more insight

⁵⁵ This statement is based upon the authors’ review of both strategies.

⁵⁶ Angela Trethewey, Steven Corman, and Bud Goodall, “Out of Their Heads and into Their Conversation: Countering Extremist Ideology,” *Arizona State University Consortium for Strategic Communication*, September 14, 2009, 3.

⁵⁷ Merriam-Webster, “Ideology,” accessed June 22, 2014, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ideology>.

towards an understanding of ideology. Briefly looking at these terms suggests ideology is more than a belief itself. It allows ideology to be the interpretation and communication mechanism to assert that theory or belief. Ideology can be thought of as an ongoing communication process, or the dialogue of a belief system.⁵⁸ As a synonym to ideology, doctrine is defined as a position or principle, or the body of principles, within a branch of knowledge or belief system, developed through past decisions and experiences, which is intended to be shared with others as a matter governing policy.⁵⁹ Dogma is also synonymous with the term ideology; however, dogma typically refers to a position or principle, or the body of principles, within a branch of knowledge or belief system being held as authoritative but *without evidence or proof*.⁶⁰

While the majority of contemporary literature in this realm is grounded in Islamist extremism—which is also the primary focus of the U.S. CVE strategy—it is important to recognize that ideology itself is neither a religious nor an extremist term. One such example of the broader non-religious application of ideology is Marxism. According to Stevenson and Haberman, Karl Marx, a German philosopher, economist, sociologist, and eventual atheist, whose theories on socialism and capitalism led to what is known today as Marxism, suggested that ideology plays a significant role in a society’s economic structure.⁶¹ This viewpoint supports the previous notion that ideology is neither good nor bad, and therefore, requires a supporting narrative to determine the context of its application.⁶² The overall virtue of its application largely resides with the ideology of the person making that determination. Professor Randy Borum notes that many known terrorists, including those who espouse a militant jihad ideology, are not particularly religious, and often only have a rudimentary understanding of the religious ideology they

⁵⁸ Trethewey, “Out of Their Heads and into Their Conversation: Countering Extremist Ideology,” 9.

⁵⁹ Merriam Webster, “Doctrine,” accessed September 11, 2013, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/doctrine>.

⁶⁰ Merriam Webster “Dogma,” accessed September 11, 2013, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dogma>.

⁶¹ Leslie Stevenson and David Haberman, *Ten Theories of Human Nature*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 136.

⁶² Trethewey, “Out of Their Heads and into Their Conversation: Countering Extremist Ideology,” 10.

represent.⁶³ This realization requires researchers and practitioners to look further into other motivations to develop a menu of effective CVE strategies.

Even so, a concurrent pragmatic approach should also remain focused on countering violent ideologies of an individual's interpretation of religion. It is an important distinction that a religion does not direct people to violence but rather it is the *interpretation* of that religion by these individuals or groups. While some may choose to state otherwise, religion—regardless of whether that religion is Islam, Judaism, or Christianity—is not synonymous with terrorism. According to studies referenced by Professor Jim Breckenridge of the Naval Postgraduate School, no corollary exists between religiosity and support for terrorism.⁶⁴ Further elaborating on this position, Breckenridge adds that religion is not the actual motivator to terrorism. Rather, it is the dissatisfaction with U.S. policies and in their own governments that correlates to the support of terrorism.⁶⁵

Although many examples of religion are used as justification for terrorism, it is not the religion itself that should be viewed as a doctrine for violence. Stevenson and Hagerman offer a definition that represents a more nuanced sociological aspect of ideology by defining it as “A system of beliefs that is held by some group of people as giving rise to their way of life...”⁶⁶ The definition of ideology offered by *The Collaborative International Dictionary of English* synthesizes these collective concepts by stating ideology is

A set or system of theories and beliefs held by an individual or group, especially about sociopolitical goals and methods to attain them; in common usage, ideology is such a set of beliefs so strongly held by their adherents as to cause them to ignore evidence against such beliefs, and

⁶³ Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” 30.

⁶⁴ Jim Breckenridge, “Overview of Module 6: Radicalization and Terrorism in a Global Context—A Discussion between Jim Breckenridge and Fathali Moghaddam,” *U.S. Naval Postgraduate School—Center for Homeland Defense and Security*, June 19, 2014, https://www.chds.us/coursefiles/NS4133/video/breckenridge_ali/breckenridge_ali_01.html.

⁶⁵ Jim Breckenridge, “The Psychology of Terrorism,” (lecture, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, July 9, 2014).

⁶⁶ Stevenson and Haberman, *Ten Theories of Human Nature*, 9.

thus fall into error—in this sense it is viewed as a negative trait; contrasted to pragmatism, and distinct from idealism.⁶⁷

This definition suggests ideology is best placed within the broader sociological context and directly affects interactions among societies as a result of competing ideologies.

This recognition provides a more accurate lens to view the terrorist and their organizations, and perhaps better understand—not to imply an agreement with—many of the ideological motivations discussed in the previous paragraphs. This recognition is not only necessary; it is fiscally and morally responsible. Continuously committing resources and implementing actions and strategies to combat terrorism without first developing an accurate understanding of terrorists themselves is a waste of billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of people dedicated to this effort.⁶⁸

The influence of ideology in the radicalization process is present in many instances, and recognizing that presence is an important step in countering VE. According to Lydia Khalil, visiting fellow at the Australia Strategic Policy Institute, “[B]elief in the ideology is a precursor to action for those who commit violence in the name of jihad,” and if not addressed directly, “[H]ome-grown radicalisation will continue to appeal to the alienated and continue to be a matter of concern for American policymakers.”⁶⁹ However, not all scholars agree that ideology is a precursor. Borum dissents with Khalil’s position on this matter by stating, “To focus narrowly on ideological radicalization risks implying that radical beliefs are a proxy—or at least a necessary precursor—for terrorism, though we know this not to be true.”⁷⁰ Borum further supports his position on ideology by adding, “Ideology and action are sometimes connected, but not always” and “[M]any known terrorists—even many of those who

⁶⁷ The Collaborative International Dictionary of English-Free Dictionary, “Ideology,” accessed June 22, 2014, <http://www.freddiectionary.org/?Query=ideology>.

⁶⁸ Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and Why They Come to Destroy Us*, 2.

⁶⁹ Lydia Khalil, “U.S. Counter-Radicalisation Strategy: The Ideological Challenge,” *Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, January 11, 2012, 2.

⁷⁰ Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” 7.

carry a militant jihadi banner—are not especially pious and have only a cursory understanding of the radical religious ideology they claim to represent.”⁷¹ These statements demonstrate the importance of understanding that ideology is only one of the potential drivers, and interpreting its significance as *an* element—not *the* element—of CVE strategies is essential. Further, while ideology may be a significant driver, this attempt to understand it is not intended to imply that practitioners should focus solely on ideology-based CVE strategies to the exclusion of other strategies. Consequently, it is the practitioners’ own conception of an ideology that frames their approach to countering an ideology.⁷² Therefore, when developing CVE programs, policies, and strategies, how a person comes to understand and then interpret a particular ideology is just as important as the ideology itself.

Not all radicalized or extremist views lead to acts of violence. As defined in the previous section, radicalized views are those views recognized as extreme and typically held outside the norm of society, and as such, are not generally considered illegal in the United States. In fact, it can be argued that a group of radicals, who in fact, did choose violence as a means to support their radical views, founded the United States. Nonetheless, although VE by its very name is a form of extremism that has transformed into violence, not all circumstances of extremism turn into violence. Therefore, it is, important to keep in perspective that the extremist ideology itself does not cause the violence. Rather, it is the frustration over being unable to further the tenets of that ideology through socially acceptable and non-violent means.⁷³ As an example, Hamas—which has even managed to get elected and function as part of government—is still unable (or unwilling through these traditional and non-violent means) to bring about the changes it wishes to see based upon its ideology, and as a result, continues to terrorize Israeli citizens in an effort to influence the government to act in a manner favorable to its cause.⁷⁴

⁷¹ Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” 30.

⁷² Trethewey, Corman, and Goodall, “Out of Their Heads and into Their Conversation: Countering Extremist Ideology,” 3.

⁷³ Baird, email message to author.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

This differentiation is best labeled as “cognitive radicalization” and “violent radicalization.”⁷⁵ Policies to prevent cognitive radicalization will differ from policies to prevent violent radicalization and the selection of community partners will be most instrumental in this effort.⁷⁶ This important distinction recognizes that radicalization is not a linear process and just because a person becomes radicalized does not mean that violence is inevitable.⁷⁷ The confluence of ideology or one of the other motivators to terrorism and the means to carry out violence, are two components needed for terrorism to occur, and it is prior to this blending of components that offers the best opportunity for these prevention, intervention, and disengagement strategies. To understand these causes better may allow policy makers an opportunity to design programmatic strategies that can eliminate, or even counter, these contributors.

2. Four Functions of Ideology

This discussion has established that ideology itself is neither good nor bad, neither religious nor extremist. Therefore, it requires a supporting narrative in order to determine the context of its application.⁷⁸ Regardless, the significance of the application of ideology to an extremist’s interpretation of religion and its use as a power and control tactic to attract and guide members of particular groups cannot be dismissed.⁷⁹ When applied in this manner, ideology serves the functions of naturalizing, obscuring, universalizing, and structuring.⁸⁰ Each of these elements is discussed in its context with ideology as follows.

a. Naturalizing Function of Ideology

The role of naturalizing is to turn socially constructed and politically motivated ideas into generally accepted assumptions and beliefs to give them the appearance of

⁷⁵ Neumann, *Preventing Violent Radicalization in America*, 7.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 15.

⁷⁸ Trethewey, Corman, and Goodall, “Out of Their Heads and into Their Conversation: Countering Extremist Ideology,” 10.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 4.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

naturally occurring and being self-evident.⁸¹ Thus, the extremist ideology is allowed to appear as if it is the description—rather than the creation—of the current condition. According to behaviorist Burrhus Skinner, in this context, religion can be viewed as a method for manipulating human behavior by exerting pressure on others to conform.⁸² Further, if this natural state appears to be in severe crisis, then the extreme methods used to respond to the crisis can be more easily justified.⁸³ Referring to it as “dominant ideology,” Professor Fathali Moghaddam suggests a comparative ideology that is shaped—socially constructed—by the ruling elite through selecting which ideological narratives to endorse in an effort to preserve the status quo.⁸⁴ This ideology also requires conformity to the commonly known and accepted narrative within the group.

b. Obscuring Function of Ideology

This ideological function allows for the denial, masking, or justification of seemingly contradictory narratives or actions.⁸⁵ One example of obscuring is “[E]xtremist ideology that makes jihad into a special situation where rules against killing Muslims don’t apply.”⁸⁶ If the narrative appears credible—supported by the scripture or religious clerics for example—then extremist groups can use violence while still demonstrating their commitment to an ideology, and thus, remaining authentic.⁸⁷

⁸¹ Trethewey, Corman, and Goodall, “Out of Their Heads and into Their Conversation: Countering Extremist Ideology,” 4.

⁸² Stevenson and Haberman, *Ten Theories of Human Nature*, 194.

⁸³ Trethewey, Corman, and Goodall, “Out of Their Heads and into Their Conversation: Countering Extremist Ideology,” 5.

⁸⁴ Fathali Moghaddam, “Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations,” *The American Psychological Association*, 2008, 79.

⁸⁵ Trethewey, Corman, and Goodall, “Out of Their Heads and into Their Conversation: Countering Extremist Ideology,” 6.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ St. George’s House Consultation and Quilliam Foundation, “Countering Violent Extremism Post Arab Spring,” November 14–16, 2013, 8, http://www.stgeorgehouse.org/index.php/download_file/562/226/.

c. Universalizing Function of Ideology

Universalizing frames the interests of extremists as the interests of all members of a group. This strategy is most evident in the framing of suicide bombing as an act of martyrdom, conducted for the best interests of all members of the community and not solely for the leaders of the organization.⁸⁸ This phenomenon is also represented in social psychology literature which suggests that in a group environment individuals will readily sacrifice their personal interests to the greater collective interests and perform in a manner that they would not otherwise have considered had they been alone.⁸⁹ Universalizing creates the appearance of an environment that offers itself as part of the collective greater good rather than one that serves the interests of a small group.

d. Structuring Function of Ideology

Once an organization achieves the ideological functions of naturalizing, obscuring, and universalizing, it must engage in the preservation of this overarching ideology through the structuring function, which involves the creation and enforcement of strict rules designed to reinforce the ideology.⁹⁰ In this capacity, ideology is used to justify the way of life for a particular group by placing pressure on individuals to continuously acknowledge it, which makes it difficult for members to consider it objectively.⁹¹ This process further strengthens the ideology by ensuring it is woven into its members' daily routines in everyday life.⁹²

⁸⁸ Trethewey, Corman, and Goodall, "Out of Their Heads and into Their Conversation: Countering Extremist Ideology," 7.

⁸⁹ Stephen Reicher, *The Determination of Collective Behavior*, ed. Henry Tajfel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982): 48.

⁹⁰ Trethewey, Corman, and Goodall, "Out of Their Heads and into Their Conversation: Countering Extremist Ideology," 8.

⁹¹ Stevenson and Haberman, *Ten Theories of Human Nature*, 13.

⁹² Trethewey, Corman, and Goodall, "Out of Their Heads and into Their Conversation: Countering Extremist Ideology," 8.

3. Other Notable Motivating Factors

Researchers utilize many approaches to analyze terrorism, and even more hypotheses exist surrounding the drivers of terrorism.⁹³ Terrorism is not a result of any single cause; more typically, it is the result of many causal factors generally categorized as being psychological and sociological.⁹⁴ Likewise, VE and radicalization tend to occur as the result of a confluence of multiple factors.⁹⁵ However, researchers recognize the presence of some common factors that may contribute toward the likelihood of a person becoming radicalized or prone to committing acts of terrorism.⁹⁶ These factors include the following.

- Feeling angry, alienated, or disenfranchised
- Believing that their current political involvement does not give them the power to effect real change
- Identifying with perceived victims of the social injustice they are fighting
- Feeling the need to take action rather than just talking about the problem
- Believing that engaging in violence against the state is not immoral
- Having friends or family sympathetic to the cause
- Believing that joining a movement offers social and psychological rewards, such as adventure, camaraderie, and a heightened sense of identity⁹⁷

The emergence of the role of self-radicalized and autonomously directed individuals in terrorism, along with the recruitment tactics targeted at these individuals by groups, such as al-Qaeda, provide a sense of exigency to understand the psychological

⁹³ Rex Hudson, “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?” *Federal Research Division, Library of Congress*, September 1999, 15–21.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 15.

⁹⁵ Sarah Canna, Carly St. Clair, and Abigail Chapman, “Neurobiological and Cognitive Science Insights on Radicalization and Mobilization to Violence: A Review,” *NSI: Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Team*, June 7, 2012, 13.

⁹⁶ Tori DeAngelis, “Understanding Terrorism,” *American Psychological Association* 40, no. 10 (November 2009): 60, <http://www.apa.org/monitor/2009/11/terrorism.aspx>.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

and sociological dynamics of terrorist groups and individuals better.⁹⁸ If radicalization can be considered one of the many roots of VE, these motivating factors can then be considered the seeds. Once planted, the emergence and growth of these factors is largely representative of the environment in which they develop. It is in that environment that CVE strategies should focus their resources. Organizations can thereby demonstrate their understanding that tending to the development of ideology and other motivating factors prior to radicalization through community partnerships and alignments with those institutions best positioned to engage in this effort will be more effective than traditional hard power strategies.

C. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ASSOCIATED WITH COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

The previous brief discussion of related complementary terminologies associated with CVE is an important first step in understanding the literature associated with CVE and in understanding the role of CVE as a soft power programmatic approach to countering terrorism. This approach is a departure from more traditionally used hard power strategies in this realm. This latter distinction is important because this thesis primarily focuses on the application of CVE within the category of soft power approaches.

Since the term CVE is relatively new, the literature pertaining to it may be organized into several categories related to the conceptualization of CVE and the subject of CVE itself. Works may be categorized as contributing to the concept of CVE, the definition of CVE, or other literature with an association to CVE. In addition to an examination of this literature, the gaps in the literature reviewed are analyzed, and opportunities for future analysis and concluding remarks are provided. This process will assist in the later examination of the U.S. CVE strategy and the comparative case study analyses of the UK and Australian CVE strategies, to include the identification of commonalities and discrepancies (agreements and divergence) of CVE principles among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia.

⁹⁸ Hudson, “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?,” i.

1. Countering Violent Extremism—The Concept

While a number of CVE related strategies are contained within a multiplicity of CVE frameworks in various countries, existing academic literature on the specific subject of CVE is relatively new and therefore, limited in its scope. This may be due, in part, to the recent emergence of CVE as a specific prevention component in the broader CT effort. According to author Georgia Holmer, this shift towards the concept of prevention began to occur after 9/11 in response to the changing nature of terrorism—particularly, the introduction of the decentralized terrorist structure and self-radicalization—to include autonomously directed small groups and individual actors.⁹⁹ Over the past decade, understanding the concept of CVE, along with the potential effectiveness of CVE specific programs designed to counter terrorists’ recruiting efforts, has become a recognized focus in the greater CT effort.¹⁰⁰

These statements are not to suggest that the concept of countering VE as an approach to countering terrorism overall is new. In fact, as a strategy used to manage aspects of potential conflict, efforts to counter VE have likely been around as long as conflict itself. Rather, it is necessary to understand that CVE has traditionally been embedded within other CT literature and not necessarily evaluated in isolation. In 2011, a collective review by scholars Nasser-Eddine, Garnham, Agostino, and Caluya of the progression of CVE as a CT strategy noted that this integration of CVE—as a sub-element of broader efforts to address extremism at its causal roots—was most appropriate, and therefore, necessitated that CVE be embedded within these social, economic, and political constructs.¹⁰¹ Holmer agrees with the perspective that CVE has emerged from the broader CT effort as an identified program but adds that CVE continues to remain conceptually and programmatically within the broader policymaking framework of CT efforts.¹⁰² Clarifying this nuanced conception of CVE allows for the

⁹⁹ Georgia Holmer, “Countering Violent Extremism: A Peacebuilding Perspective,” Special Report 336, *The United States Institute of Peace*, September 2013, 2, <http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Transnational/CVEUSIP.pdf>.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 1–2.

¹⁰¹ Nasser-Eddine et al., “Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review,” i.

¹⁰² Holmer, “Countering Violent Extremism: A Peacebuilding Perspective,” 2.

inclusion and review of literature associated with the concept of CVE that predates the use of the specific terminology associated with CVE.

Although not formally called CVE in the literature until most recently, recognizable components of the CVE concept can be found within broader strategies developed to counter insurgencies throughout history. The most notable example of formalized recognition of this concept is found in literature in the United Kingdom dating back to the British counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine in the early part of the 20th century.¹⁰³ British COIN operations were much more militaristic and geographic centric than today's CVE programs, implementing a “hard power” philosophy to counter insurgency. However, although the implementation of COIN operations differed significantly from today’s “soft power” philosophy, according to Retired Colonel Michael Crawshaw, “At the heart of any counter-insurgency campaign lies one basic requirement—the population of the territory concerned should form the perception that the government offers a better deal than do the insurgents.”¹⁰⁴ This ideology translates to elements of today's CVE efforts, particularly those designed to counter the narrative of terrorist organizations in an attempt to curtail the process of self-radicalization, which can lead to violence. While the CVE programs in Western democratic societies of today may not be intended to retain control of geographic territory from traditional insurgency campaigns, they are aimed at countering campaigns of violence. Beyond this generalized comparison of the concepts of insurgency and CVE, the term insurgency is used synonymously with CVE in its application in counter-radicalization policies used in other parts of the world.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Colonel Michael Crawshaw (ret.), “The Evolution of British Counter Insurgency (COIN),” *Ministry of Defence Joint Doctrine Publication*, December 21, 2012, 7–8, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-evolution-of-british-coin>.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 1.

¹⁰⁵ See for example, United States Agency International Development (USAID), “The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency Policy,” 2011, http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/VEI_Policy_Final.pdf.

2. Countering Violent Extremism—Defining the Term

The term CVE is rather nascent while at the same time seemingly ubiquitous in current CT discourse; the result of the progression of the role of CVE within the broader CT narrative. This has allowed the term “CVE”—much like other terms associated with the discussion on terrorism—to be applied rather broadly. Neither the Oxford nor Merriam-Webster dictionaries offer a definition for CVE, which suggests that CVE is essentially a phraseology utilized to describe a desired objective achieved through a combination of programmatic efforts.¹⁰⁶ Author Brad Deardorff offers the notion that CVE is an effort but also argues that CVE, as an effective CT strategy, must embrace a strategic method of confronting the ideologies of terrorism.¹⁰⁷ Holmer agrees with Deardorff that countering ideology is intrinsic to CVE and then elaborates further by offering examples of ideology, such as extreme political, social, cultural, and religious ideologies.¹⁰⁸ Former Department of Homeland Security (DHS) CVE Working Group member Michael Downing offers an alternative method of defining CVE by succinctly stating what it *is not* and what it *is*, “It (CVE) is not an inoculation against extremism. It is however, a good prescription to build healthy, resilient communities making it more difficult for violent extremism and violence for that matter to take root.”¹⁰⁹ Holmer also chooses to describe CVE by utilizing a similar approach as Downing, which defines CVE as an emerging field of policy and practice that “...focuses on countering the pull of terrorist recruitment and influence by building resilience among populations vulnerable to radicalization.”¹¹⁰

Although nuances within these definitions exist, Crawshaw, Deardorff, Downing, and Holmer share the opinion that CVE must focus on the root causes of extremist violence and implement strategies that focus on prevention and disengagement. As the

¹⁰⁶ This statement is based on an online search of dictionaries conducted on May 14, 2014, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/spellcheck/american_english/?q=countering+violent+extremism and <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/countering%20violent%20extremism>.

¹⁰⁷ R. Brad Deardorff, *The Roots of Our Children’s War: Identity and the War on Terrorism* (Williams, CA: Agile Press, 2013): 32, 198.

¹⁰⁸ Holmer, “Countering Violent Extremism: A Peacebuilding Perspective,” 2.

¹⁰⁹ Michael Downing, email message to author, May 30, 2014.

¹¹⁰ Holmer, “Countering Violent Extremism: A Peacebuilding Perspective,” 2.

concept of CVE has matured and developed as a natural outgrowth of other CT concepts, it has become a more familiar and understood term in the CT vernacular.

With few exceptions, the overall majority of literature tends to focus on an analysis of the effectiveness of CVE programs rather than on the attempt to define CVE as a term. Scholars Will McCants and Clinton Watts opine that the lack of a clear definition for CVE is problematic and can lead to conflicting and counterproductive programs.¹¹¹ This confusion can also lead to flawed assumptions regarding CVE, and thus, assessments of CVE programs become difficult.¹¹² McCants and Watts then propose the following definition for CVE, “[R]educing the number of terrorist group supporters through non-coercive means.”¹¹³ McCants and Watts unsatisfactorily brief definition of CVE seems to contribute to the very ambiguity they observed in their own review of the term.

Overall, the literature suggests the specific term CVE, along with its associated concepts, is often intertwined within the literature on terrorism, CT, and extremism. Nasser-Eddine et al. explain this absence of scholarly definition by offering perhaps the best explanation of CVE, which suggests its foundation is “in government policy rather than scholarship,” and therefore, is rarely defined within the literature.¹¹⁴

3. Countering Violent Extremism—The Programmatic Environment Going Forward

Briefly reviewing specific CVE programs through a lexicon that includes governmental policy as suggested by Nasser-Eddine et al. offers a mixture of varied approaches for review. In the past decade, as self-radicalization and VE have become a more focused area of interest for countries in their efforts to fight terrorism domestically; the result has been a global elevation in the overall importance of the concept of CVE, as

¹¹¹ Will McCants and Clinton Watts, “U.S. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment,” *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, 2012, 1, https://www.fpri.org/docs/McCants_Watts - Countering_Violent_Extremism.pdf.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Nasser-Eddine et al., “Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review,” 16.

well as its specific programmatic strategies designed to prevent or counter (de-radicalize) radicalization.¹¹⁵ This effort includes both Muslim and non-Muslim majority countries. Examples include Canada's *Building Resilience against Terrorism* strategy, Denmark's *Polarization and Radicalization Action Plan*, Saudi Arabia's *Prevention, Rehabilitation, and After Care (PRAC)* program, the UK's *Prevent* and *Channel* programs, Australia's *Building Communities of Resilience Grant Program* and its dedicated *CVE Unit* and the U.S.'s *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*.¹¹⁶ This direction implies a change in the position of CVE from a sub-element—as noted in the research by Nasser-Edine, Garnham, Agostino, and Caluya—to that of a primary element, which further suggests that social, economic, and political factors have now inverted and become necessary sub-elements for effective CVE strategies.

Although CVE is understood to be a highly contextualized effort, these programs share similar foundational components, and countries recognize that the commonalities of their CVE programs—the understanding of common platforms underpinning the radicalization and de-radicalization process—far outweigh the political differences. As an example, an impressive number of Muslim and non-Muslim majority countries, to include Australia, Canada, China, Colombia, Egypt, the European Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have come together to participate in the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF).¹¹⁷ Through this collaboration, the GCTF offers continuously developing CVE related research and literature for use by member and non-member countries alike that focuses on “highlighting key counterterrorism themes that are flexible enough to be

¹¹⁵ James Brandon and Lorenzo Vidino, “European Experiences in Counterradicalization,” *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point*, June 21, 2012, <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/european-experiences-in-counterradicalization>.

¹¹⁶ Based on a brief Internet search of CVE and de-radicalization programs (Canada, Denmark, and Saudi Arabia), as well as a review and examination of the UK, Australian and U.S. programs as part of this thesis research.

¹¹⁷ The Soufan Group, “Assessing the UAE-Based Center on Countering Violent Extremism,” February 18, 2013, <http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-assessing-the-uae-based-center-on-countering-violent-extremism/>.

amended and adapted for regional or national use.”¹¹⁸ This trend supports Holmer’s position that the concept of CVE, along with the potential effectiveness of CVE specific programs designed to counter terrorist recruiting efforts, has become a recognized focus in the greater CT effort in recent years.¹¹⁹ The U.S., UK, and Australian CVE strategies are examined in more detail as part of the case study analysis.

4. Analysis and Gaps in Reviewed Literature

Although the future for CVE literature appears positive, the current literature on the concept of CVE, along with practitioner focused CVE strategies, is still emerging. While the term CVE is becoming more common in the terrorism vernacular, its influential role in CT now appears generally accepted by researchers, academics, and practitioners. With little exception at this time, the literature in the area of the long-term effectiveness of CVE programmatic strategies, and their applicability and effectiveness in the United States in particular, is relatively void of any significant analysis. This includes substantive research and literature in the following sub-topical areas.

- Identifying potential cultural and ideological barriers
- Identifying group(s) of experts through criteria development and role identification who have proper authority and knowledge to develop such programs
- Criteria used to establish local government and community participation requirements
- The appropriate method—if any—to incentivize local communities and governments to participate

According to Magnus Ranstorp, as late as 2010, little in depth scholarly literature existed that evaluated the progression of radicalization to violence and the corollary relationship between the impact of VE to the effectiveness of CVE measures.¹²⁰ Additionally, Ranstorp noted that scholars tended to focus their research into distinct and

¹¹⁸ Global Counterterrorism Forum, “Framework Documents,” September 27, 2013, <http://www.thegctf.org/web/guest;jsessionid=E704E5B67C648E079F4E9EC54B76AF1C.w142>.

¹¹⁹ Holmer, “Countering Violent Extremism: A Peacebuilding Perspective,” 1–2.

¹²⁰ Magnus Ranstorp, ed., *Understanding Violent Radicalisation: Terrorist and Jihadist Movements in Europe* (New York: Routledge, 2010), introduction, 2.

separate sociological and psychological categories, and focused heavily on VE and radicalization and much less on the examination of CVE.¹²¹

With little exception, also missing from the literature are meaningful analyses and recommendations central to CVE as an effective tool in soft power engagement against VE throughout the United States. This particular analysis should also be conducted in addition to the ongoing review of the more programmatic oriented steps associated with CVE. This thesis offers recommendations for the latter which, if reviewed and updated on an ongoing basis, can support an evaluation of the larger soft power issue.

D. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS

With an understanding of the defined intent of CVE and its relatively recent implementation within the United States when compared to its use throughout the world, a review of the applicability of CVE as an effective soft power CT strategy within the United States should be conducted. In this further analysis, the following question should be asked, “Can such a strategy deliver a consistent and effective CVE programmatic framework that allows for meaningful collaboration between local governments and their communities to engage in the prevention of VE and self radicalization?” In essence, “Can such a comprehensive strategy, if properly developed at the federal level, reduce VE in this nation’s communities *and* increase community resiliency for when such event occurs?” The relevant academic literature offers a significant amount of additional scholarly resources through their bibliographies and works cited. Each of these additional sources provides further opportunities for exploration into the nuances of each of the sub-areas touched in this review. It is anticipated that these additional research opportunities will further support the notion that the current U.S. strategy for countering VE is not feasible, and in the wake of continuous developments in the CVE realm, will not be an effective tool to support homeland security at the local and state level in the United States. The U.S. CVE strategy must be updated and embrace a process of continuous review to stay relevant and effective in the efforts to counter VE in the United States.

¹²¹ Ranstorp, ed., *Understanding Violent Radicalisation: Terrorist and Jihadist Movements in Europe*, introduction, 2.

Utilizing the CVE resources offered through the GCTF, as well as those lessons offered by the existing CVE strategies from throughout the world, a revised, updated, and relevant national strategy to counter VE in the United States is achievable.

E. CONCLUSION

This literature surrounding CVE is being produced with relative frequency and offers an opportunity for further evaluation in the near term. Therefore, this brief examination of the literature should not be considered conclusive. This chapter examined the literature surrounding many terms and terminologies used in the discourse of CVE and attempted to clarify the intended application of certain terms used in the following research.

The intention of this chapter was to allow the reader an opportunity to place these terms in necessary context, and thereby, better understand the narrative surrounding their use. Understanding the context of their application allows the reader to scrutinize the encompassing CVE literature offered in this review and in the following chapters more effectively.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

III. AN EXAMINATION OF TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES

Americans hold a unique perspective on terrorism. Their conceptualization of this phenomenon typically stems from the iconic events of 9/11. Similarly, many only see CT efforts through the global prism of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. However, in reality, terrorism—and the efforts to thwart terrorism—have a longer and broader history in America. This chapter examines that history of terrorism in the United States and its more recent efforts to counter terrorism, both globally and domestically. It briefly examines the perception of terrorism held by many Americans and attempts to identify some of the broader reasons for this somewhat uniquely held perspective by offering some of the more notable theories.

Additionally, the chapter briefly reviews the origin and ensuing progression of the U.S. *National Security Strategy* (NSS) and other supportive CT strategies designed to support the NSS. This review continues with an examination of the multiple iterations of CT strategies including the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, the *Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan*, the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, and the *National Counterterrorism Strategy*. These strategies are collated and presented by strategy type—as opposed to chronology—to examine better the various individual strategy iterations and to understand their individual roles in relation to the broader CT efforts. It also highlights their relationship to one another. Concurrently, the chapter examines the progression and evolution of these strategies to include moving from hard power outwardly focused offensive and defensive strategies towards a soft power holistic approach that includes prevention and intervention components designed to deter VE. This review intends to provide an overview of these U.S. security and CT strategies to understand better the philosophical transformation the United States has undergone through the various iterations of the aforementioned strategies. The chapter then concludes with an analysis of the U.S. CVE strategies implemented for the first time in 2011.

The goal of this chapter is to develop a basic understanding of the U.S. approach, both philosophically and practically, to combating and countering terrorism and the progression towards awareness of self-radicalization and VE in particular. This evaluative process contributes to this thesis by formulating a basic understanding of the various U.S. security strategies in existence, along with their intended scope and purpose. With this foundational understanding in place, this analysis can then offer a critique of the U.S. CVE efforts and propose changes or additions, as offered in future chapters.

A. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES

1. The Current Perception of Terrorism in the United States

If the American population were asked to associate the word terrorism with an event, most would likely say September 11, 2001 or simply 9/11. Thirteen years later, it is still fresh in the minds of many. In fact, The National September 11 Memorial Museum in New York City just recently opened, and it will appropriately continue to be a vivid reminder of that fateful day.¹²² As a subject for terrorism studies, policy debates and CT program development, the difficulty with 9/11 is that it has become synonymous with the concept of terrorism. It is an iconic event whose viciousness and magnitude is fortunately not reflective of the vast majority of terrorism acts. However, this magnitude has also caused many Americans to erase from their memory any recollection of terrorism incidents on U.S. soil prior to 9/11.¹²³

Some of the difficulty in separating 9/11 from other acts of terrorism—and the broader category of disasters in general—can be attributed to the fact that terrorism as a category of disaster itself is unique since, unlike natural disasters or technological failures, it is purposeful. Therefore, an act of terrorism has the propensity to result in greater psychological impacts than other types of disasters.¹²⁴ Additionally, a correlation

¹²² Peter Baker and Stephen Farrell, “Obama Dedicates 9/11 Memorial Museum,” *New York Times*, last modified May 15, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/16/nyregion/obama-dedicates-9-11-memorial-museum.html?_r=0.

¹²³ Brian Jenkins, *Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), 8.

¹²⁴ Butler, Panzer, and Goldfrank, ed., *Committee on Responding to the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism, “Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism: A Public Health Strategy*, 59.

exists between this resulting impact and the sense of an individual's lack of control since "degree of control"—or lack thereof—directly correlates to familiarity and knowledge.¹²⁵ The 9/11 terrorist attacks were not only incredibly purposeful in their intent, from an analytical perspective, they were also exceedingly successful in their collective objective to convey a sense of inflated power.¹²⁶ This perspective created the fear that terrorism of this magnitude could impose its will upon the United States—the fear of a new normal for terrorism—that Americans today know has not come to fruition. However, as noted by Butler, Panzer, and Goldfrank, the enormous degree of impact of the 9/11 attacks, coupled with the fact it occurred on such a level never before experienced, and therefore, unprecedented and unfamiliar to the United States, caused a high degree of fear, anxiety, and sense of lack of control over terrorism at that moment.¹²⁷

Additionally, effects from terrorism can be long lasting and manifest themselves over a longer period than the timeline surrounding the initial event. An element that contributes to this incongruent perception of 9/11 as a baseline for terrorism is the continual and ubiquitous reference to 9/11 by the U.S. government in nearly every security related strategic document produced since the attacks.¹²⁸ Politically, the United States operates in an environment in which failure to reference 9/11 could appear insensitive and disrespectful.

Since so many uncertainties surround terrorism, the government's attempt to explain terrorism to the American public can actually provoke the ongoing cycle of uncertainty, fear, and anxiety.¹²⁹ This situation is compounded by the fact that the government cannot itself wholly redefine terrorism without losing some of its own credibility and support.¹³⁰ Although the 9/11 attacks have proven to be an anomalous

¹²⁵ Butler, Panzer, and Goldfrank, ed., *Committee on Responding to the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism, "Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism: A Public Health Strategy*, 45.

¹²⁶ Martha Crenshaw, "A Welcome Antidote," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 17, no. 4 (2005): 518.

¹²⁷ Butler, Panzer, and Goldfrank, ed., *Committee on Responding to the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism, "Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism: A Public Health Strategy*, 45.

¹²⁸ This statement results from analysis by the author of multiple security related strategies produced since September 11, 2001.

¹²⁹ Crenshaw, "A Welcome Antidote," 519.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

event in the United States, for these reasons, this disproportionate act of terrorism will likely continue to be associated with the standard perception of terrorism by many Americans.

As a result of the 9/11 attacks, the American public was also introduced to a newly formed perception of what a terrorist represented and of the religiosity of terrorism. Both of which—to some degree—have been mischaracterized over the years. This perception originated with the awareness—not necessarily understanding—of why Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda were claiming responsibility for the 9/11 attacks. This viewpoint is represented most notably with U.S. discourse around the topic of “Why do they hate us” and Presidents Bush’s over simplified response that “They hate our freedoms.”¹³¹ This newly formed perception continued with the 9/11 Commission Report’s description of bin Laden and religious extremism, by entitling Chapter Two of the report, “The Foundation of the New Terrorism”¹³²

Islamic extremism was now synonymous with terrorism, and as a result, America’s perception of the threat of terrorism is much different now than it was 35 years ago.¹³³ As the GWOT progressed, a focus on extremism and its relation to violence began to develop that fit into the widening aperture of discourse regarding CT strategies. Like the United Kingdom in the last several years, the United States has begun incorporating soft power approaches to its more traditional compliment of hard power tactics.

2. A Brief Overview of Terrorism in the United States—1970 to 2000

The United States needs not look too far back in the annals of history to see the pervasiveness of terrorism on U.S. soil. The decade during the 1970s saw 60 to 70

¹³¹ eMediaMillWorks, “Text: President Bush Addresses the Nation,” *The Washington Post*, September 20, 2001, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html.

¹³² Thomas Kean, 9/11 Commission et al., *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, 1st. ed., authorized ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2004), 47.

¹³³ Jenkins, *Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001*, 9.

terrorist incidents, primarily bombings, occurring on U.S. soil *every year* that resulted in the deaths of 72 people between 1970 and 1978.¹³⁴ The frequency of terrorism was at a level 15–20 times greater than that experienced in the post-9/11 era.¹³⁵ Notwithstanding 9/11, the actions too, were on a scale not recognized today. For example, between 1970 and 1977, The Weather Underground was responsible for 45 bombings, including the U.S. Capital, the Pentagon and the U.S. Department of State. The New World Liberation Front is believed to be responsible for nearly 100 bombings in California between 1974 and 1978, and Cuban exile groups claimed responsibility for nearly 100 bombings.¹³⁶ Additional organizations, such as the Armed Front for National Liberation, the Jewish Defense League, the Ku Klux Klan, and émigrés from Croatia and Serbia, all engaged in acts of terrorism—typically bombings—during the decade.¹³⁷ These groups could be understood to have been self-radicalized—although that label is largely reserved for individuals or small groups—and these larger groups discussed are more likely to be labeled as organizations.

Some may attribute the ideologies of the 1970s a result of the period’s newly formed socially progressive values and social awareness of U.S. politics and global policy. While the decade ended, terrorism and the use of violence to further newly formed ideologies continued well into the 1990s. In addition to the historical presence of terrorist organizations, the presence of self-radicalized individuals—or lone wolf actors—who committed acts of terrorism, also existed prior to 9/11. Three of the more notable self-radicalized individuals were Ted Kaczynski, Timothy McVeigh, and Eric Rudolph.

Between 1978 and 1995, the “Unabomber” Ted Kaczynski, detonated 16 bombs—including one on an American Airlines flight—to further his anti-industrialism

¹³⁴ Jenkins, *Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001*, 8.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

and anti-technology ideologies.¹³⁸ Over the course of Kaczynski's 17-year campaign, three people were killed and 23 were injured.¹³⁹ Kaczynski even used the term "terrorism" when offering to stop the bombing campaign if a national syndicated newspaper would print his manifesto.¹⁴⁰ In 1995, Timothy McVeigh bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma, which killed 168 and wounded over 500.¹⁴¹ In the years prior, McVeigh's paranoia of the federal government developed into anger and to self-radicalization. This final stage was attributed to the perceived injustice that McVeigh felt as a result of the federal government's handling of the Ruby Ridge standoff in 1992 and the Branch Davidian standoff in 1993.¹⁴² Between 1996 and 1998, Eric Rudolph was responsible for four bombings that killed three people and wounded over 120 others.¹⁴³ These bombings included Atlanta's Centennial Olympic Park in 1996, an abortion clinic and gay bar in 1997, and a second abortion clinic in 1998.¹⁴⁴

Terrorism in the United States, although not as ubiquitous as in other countries, was prevalent during this period, and more so, more common than it is today. Although the interpretation of religion, to include extreme views of religion, may have played a role in some of these terrorist events, religion does not appear to be acknowledged as an overt or primary contributing factor toward extremism during this period. This correlation would come after the terrorist attacks upon the United States on 9/11. Also notable is that the term “terrorism” had not yet worked its way into the national vernacular. Although these events were reported by the media, they were often not associated with the concept of terrorism as things are in today’s terrorism conscious environment.

¹³⁸ Nathan Springer, "Patterns of Radicalization: Identifying the Markers and Warning Signs of Domestic Lone Wolf Terrorists in Our Midst" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 33, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi/tr/fulltext/u2/a514419.pdf>.

139 *Ibid.*, 33.

140 Ibid., 45.

141 *Ibid.*, 24–25.

142 Ibid., 13.

143 Ibid., 51.

144 Ibid

3. A Brief Overview of Terrorism in the United States—2001 to Present

In the morning hours of September 11, 2001, American Airlines (AA) Flight 11 and United Airlines (UA) Flight 175 departed from Boston at 7:59 and 8:14, respectively, AA Flight 77 departed from Washington Dulles at 8:20, and UA Flight 93 departed from Newark at 8:42.¹⁴⁵ By 9:03, AA Flight 11 and UA Flight 175 had each crashed into the two separate towers at the World Trade Center in New York; 30 minutes later AA Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon and 30 minutes afterwards—at 10:03—UA Flight 93 crashed into a field in Pennsylvania.¹⁴⁶ On this day, the United States suffered its largest loss of life on U.S. soil—2,973 lives—and its relationship with terrorism would undergo a significant transformation. Radicalized violence on U.S. soil was not new, but a vicious and unimaginable attack of this magnitude was unprecedented, and placed all other terrorist events prior to 9/11 into secondary and tertiary categories of significance.

Other significant terrorist incidents have occurred since 9/11. The 2009 Fort Hood attack by Major Nidal Hasan killed 13 people and wounded 32 others. Major Hasan was self-admittedly a supporter of the Taliban.¹⁴⁷ Unprecedented at the time, this event indicated a new development whose magnitude was largely unseen prior to 2009—self-radicalized or recruited U.S. citizens attacking Americans on U.S. soil.¹⁴⁸

On April 15, 2013, two bombs detonated near the finish line of the Boston Marathon that killed three people and wounded over 260 others, many severely.¹⁴⁹ Brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev are believed to be responsible, and Dzhokhar, the surviving brother, has indicated that the attack was in support of Muslims

¹⁴⁵ Kean, 9/11 Commission et al., *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, 4, 7.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 32–33.

¹⁴⁷ Carter, “Nidal Hasan Convicted in Fort Hood Shootings; Jurors Can Decide Death.”

¹⁴⁸ Hoffman, “American Jihad,” 4.

¹⁴⁹ Herman B. “Dutch” Leonard et al., “Why Was Boston Strong? Lessons from the Boston Marathon Bombing,” *Harvard Kennedy School and Harvard Business School*, April 2014, 1–2.

suffering at the hands of the American war in Iraq.¹⁵⁰ Further, all evidence appears to support the idea that the brothers were self-radicalized and acted without specific direction or operational support from any structured terrorist organization.¹⁵¹ The Boston bombing, perhaps due to its use of bombs as its method of violence, coupled with its self-radicalized and anti-American sentiment by two Muslims, has been referred to as the “next attack”—a reference to the post-9/11 era.¹⁵²

Other less notable terrorist attempts identified as extremist ideologically centered and self-radicalized have not come to fruition or drew the attention that these two incidents have. Moving forward, self-radicalized VE will continue to be a part of the domestic terrorism narrative, and in parallel, the continual evolution of CVE programmatic strategies should also be a part of this same discourse.

4. The Perception of Terrorism in the United States—Future Challenges

The United States has not, before now, been subject to the kind of security threats, or the risk of external wars with domestic consequences, that have characterized many European democracies.¹⁵³

While the acts of violence were significantly more frequent and the death toll significantly higher during the time before 9/11 than in the decade since 9/11, the presence of fear and anxiety today represent the fact that 9/11 is the foundation of reference for terrorism for so many Americans. Further analyses of this observation indicates that 9/11 was viewed by many Americans as a surprise attack on the nation as a whole, not upon a particular individual or group, and perceived to be on the same level as

¹⁵⁰ Scott Wilson, Greg Miller, and Sari Horwitz, “Boston Bombing Suspect Cites U.S. Wars As Motivation, Officials Say,” *The Washington Post*, April 23, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/boston-bombing-suspect-cites-us-wars-as-motivation-officials-say/2013/04/23/324b9cea-ac29-11e2-b6fd-ba6f5f26d70e_story.html.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Steven Bucci, “The Immediate Aftermath of Boston: No Time to Stand Still,” *The Heritage Foundation*, no. 3918 (April 18, 2013): 2–3, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/boston-act-of-terror-reinforce-homeland-security-policies>.

¹⁵³ Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, “Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights during Wartime,” [Draft Manuscript: July 18, 2003]: 3, last accessed February 28, 2014, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100809215300/http://www.lawandsecurity.org/documents/samfinal.pdf>.

the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor.¹⁵⁴ Further, localized attacks, like those described in a pre-9/11 America, were not recognized as an act of violence by large organized terrorist networks, but rather as “behavior” of one or two individuals.¹⁵⁵ On a personal level, Americans felt safer believing that the attacks were not directed at them as individuals. Americans felt the opposite regarding the 9/11 attacks.

Applying this methodology to the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings, it would stand to reason then that this terrorist event—that killed three people and was perpetrated by two individuals—would be on a level similar to the 1996 Centennial Park bombing in Atlanta. On the other hand, as an alternate narrative, if the Boston bombings were intended to further a political ideology, then it would be on a level similar to the Croatian and Serbian émigré terrorism from the 1970s. The problem with this methodology is 9/11. Precisely what makes 9/11 iconic is that with regard to terrorism and counterterrorism, a pre-9/11 and post-9/11 America will always exist. In fact, as noted earlier, the Boston bombing has been referred to as the “next attack”—a reference to the post-9/11 era.¹⁵⁶ Americans before 9/11 utilized a framework for categorizing individualized attacks that did not contain a conscious awareness of an attack on the scale of 9/11. While today’s environment is certainly not the same as it was in the months following 9/11, it will never return to its pre-9/11 condition. Even though 9/11 has so far proven to be an anomaly—due in large part to the U.S. response—it is nonetheless the standard for terrorism in many citizens’ minds. Today, Americans live in anticipation of another significant attack and look at each new event as potentially being that next attack.

According to researchers Brandon and Silke, who studied the psychological effects of terrorist attacks, “[F]ear and anxiety, once aroused, do not dissipate, adapt, or habituate.”¹⁵⁷ These feelings result in higher expectations being placed upon the

¹⁵⁴ Susan Brandon and Andrew Silke, “Near and Long Term Psychological Effects of Exposure to Terrorist Attacks,” in *Psychology of Terrorism 2007*, ed. Bruce Bonger et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 181–182.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 182.

¹⁵⁶ Bucci, “The Immediate Aftermath of Boston: No Time to Stand Still,” 1.

¹⁵⁷ Brandon and Silke, “Near and Long Term Psychological Effects of Exposure to Terrorist Attacks,” 187.

government to prevent terrorism, particularly as Americans have conceded more authority to the government since 9/11 than occurred in the 1970s. In addition to the utilization of 9/11 as the standard that Americans use to measure terrorism, the paradox is that what makes terrorism so frightening to Americans is that it is so unfamiliar.¹⁵⁸ As a contrast, from an emotional health and post-incident recovery perspective, in Northern Ireland and Israel, habituation and familiarity to such events affords an individual the opportunity to recover more fully emotionally and return to a sense of normalcy much quicker.¹⁵⁹ It is not to imply that terrorism is a good thing. It simply suggests that the more familiar people are with it, the less anxiety they tend to retain.

This potentially unique circumstance in the United States places pressure on governments—federal in particular—to perform at a level almost unattainable when it comes to preventing terrorism. This requires the implementation of effective CT programs developed using well-founded principles and careful analysis, and then delivered with long-term objectives in mind. This further underscores the importance of community partnership programs, and the value of local, engaged, communities to not only enhance the U.S. CVE efforts but to reduce anxiety and fear in citizens.

B. RELEVANT U.S. SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES—THE PROGRESSION TOWARDS COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

1. The National Security Strategy—A Brief History and Review of the 2002, 2006, and 2010 Strategies

Immediately following WWII, the concept of a formalized National Security Strategy, to include the implementation of the National Security Council, and the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was established under the direction of the *National Security Act of 1947*.¹⁶⁰ This act remained largely intact until the Reagan Administration and was amended as part of the *Goldwater-Nichols Department of*

¹⁵⁸ Brandon and Silke, “Near and Long Term Psychological Effects of Exposure to Terrorist Attacks,” 182.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 183.

¹⁶⁰ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Milestones: 1945–1952, National Security Act of 1947,” last accessed May 24, 2014, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/national-security-act>.

*Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.*¹⁶¹ Among other things, this act requires the president to annually submit to Congress a comprehensive national security strategy report that focuses on

- 1) worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States; 2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy.¹⁶²

The first national security strategy published after 9/11 was the 2002 NSS issued on September 17, 2002. As part of the national strategy framework theme, the 2002 NSS continued with a globally focused overarching strategy. However, primarily due to the anticipation of what a post-9/11 global environment would convey, the 2002 NSS specifically references the threat of terrorism and the strategies required to defend against it and defeat it.¹⁶³ Additionally, the 2002 NSS offers a view of the ongoing and impending restructure of the federal government by suggesting that the current structure was designed for a different era, and further, to meet the new requirements and challenges posed by this new era, all the major national security institutions would need to be transformed.¹⁶⁴

In March 2006, the White House released the *2006 National Security Strategy*. As the second such strategy since 9/11, the 2006 NSS continued forward many of the objectives developed in the 2002 NSS. Further, it also reported on the results of several of the 2002 NSS objectives, such as the governmental transformation of major national

¹⁶¹ Don M. Snider, *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision Second Edition* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, The Strategic Studies Institute, March 15, 1995), 2.

¹⁶² National Security Agency, “Public Law 99-433: The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, section 603, subsection 104-Annual Report on National Security Strategy, (99th Session of the United States Congress, October 1, 1986),” last accessed May 24, 2014, http://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic heritage/60th/interactive_timeline/Content/1980s/documents/19861001_1980_Doc_NDU.pdf.

¹⁶³ This statement is based on a review by the author of Office of the President of the United States, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America—September 2002* (Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States, September 2002).

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 29.

security institutions. These particular changes included the establishment of the DHS and its compilation of 22 federal agencies, the newly formed National Counterterrorism Center and National Counter Proliferation Center and the creation of the position of Director of National Intelligence.¹⁶⁵

In May 2010, the White House released the comprehensive *2010 National Security Strategy*; the first such strategy for President Obama. While the NSS is intended to be a globally focused overarching strategy, the 2010 NSS departs from previous themes with more focus on extremism and domestic concerns surrounding self-radicalization. In reference to domestic VE, it states,

several recent incidences of violent extremists in the United States who are committed to fighting here and abroad have underscored the threat to the United States and our interests posed by individuals radicalized at home. Our best defenses against this threat are well informed and equipped families, local communities, and institutions.¹⁶⁶

The 2010 NSS then outlines the need to empower local communities to counter radicalization and the importance of community engagement and partnerships toward these efforts.¹⁶⁷ This terminology was directly inserted into the national CVE strategies published the following year. The 2010 NSS demonstrated the government's growing awareness of VE, self-radicalization, and the impending need for CVE strategies to effectively counter this emerging concern.

In March 2014, the *Quadrennial Defense Review* was published and is normally used as a guidepost to construct the national security strategy. While anticipated soon, the 2014 NSS has yet to be published.

2. Other Relevant National Strategies—2001 to 2011

On October 8, 2001, less than one month after the terrorist attacks upon the United States, President George W. Bush—through Executive Order—established the

¹⁶⁵ Office of the President of the United States, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America—March 2006* (Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States, March 2006), 43.

¹⁶⁶ Office of the President of the United States, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America—May 2010* (Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States, May 2010), 19.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

Office of Homeland Security, the precursor to the DHS created on March 1, 2003 after passage of the *Homeland Security Act of 2002*.¹⁶⁸ The move to establish the DHS, along with the subsequent strategies discussed in this section, represented the beginning of a bifurcation of the national security philosophy into two generalized categories. The first category continues to be the overarching globally focused NSS, while the second category—in actuality, a complementary document to the NSS—has a narrower strategic focus on the threat of terrorism to the homeland. This second category has evolved over time through a progression of strategies that today also include strategies for CVE.

a. The National Strategy for Homeland Security—A Review of the 2002 and 2007 Strategies

While still the Office of Homeland Security, the first directive given by the president was to establish a *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (NSHS).¹⁶⁹ The objective of this strategy—intended to be a complementary strategy to the NSS—was to focus on the threat of terrorism in the United States, and to develop a framework by which CT related activities could be coordinated between federal, state, local, and private sector organizations.¹⁷⁰ This new strategy also gave the American public its first look at the newly created definition of the term “Homeland security.” “Homeland security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”¹⁷¹

The 2002 NSHS mainly focused on hardening critical infrastructure key resources (CIKR) and formalizing intelligence and information-sharing capabilities between agencies. This focus, as a means of hardening the U.S.’ defense against the *external* threat of terrorism emanating from outside its borders, was void of the recognition or

¹⁶⁸ Larry Gaines and Victor Kappeler, *Homeland Security* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2012), 32.

¹⁶⁹ Office of Homeland Security, Office of the President of the United States, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America—July 2002* (Washington, DC: Office of Homeland Security, Office of the President of the United States, July 2002), iii.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., vii.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 2.

inclusion of programmatic strategies designed to *prevent* terrorism from occurring at the outset. This lack of an inward facing perspective typifies the strategic philosophy in place at the time, largely as a result of the still very fresh memory of the 9/11 attacks.

As it delivered this new domestic strategy, the federal government recognized the potential sensitivity to the multiplicity of state and local governments, and announced the NSHS was a national strategy and not a federal strategy. It acknowledged that the democratic philosophy of governance in the United States is founded on the principles of federalism.¹⁷² Additionally, the strategy emphasized that this new domestic oriented direction should not “overly federalize the war on terrorism.”¹⁷³ With over a decade of experience and observation as the GWOT, and subsequent domestic strategies, have played out, the matter of whether or not the federal government could be described as having overly federalized the war on terrorism is a matter for debate. Overall, the 2002 NSHS recognized that even though a connection between national security and homeland security existed, each now needed separate but corresponding strategies going forward.

In October 2007, an updated NSHS was published. Between the 2002 version and the 2007 update, the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*—2003 and 2006 versions—were published. The 2007 NSHS presented the first iteration of the now familiar Prevent, Protect, and Respond framework.¹⁷⁴ The framework, which incorporates a fourth element of Continue, defines each element as follows.

- Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks
- Protect the American people, critical U.S. infrastructure, and key resources
- Respond to and recover from incidents that do occur

¹⁷² Office of Homeland Security, Office of the President of the United States, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America—July 2002*, vii.

¹⁷³ Ibid., x.

¹⁷⁴ Office of Homeland Security, Office of the President of the United States, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America—October 2007* (Washington, DC: Office of Homeland Security, Office of the President of the United States, October 2007), 1.

- Continue to strengthen the foundation to ensure this nation’s long-term success¹⁷⁵

The 2007 NSHS reflects a shift from being terrorism centric towards an all-hazards methodology that, while still mindful of terrorism prevention, now includes non-terror related events, such as large-scale catastrophes, including but not limited to, man-made and natural disasters.¹⁷⁶

b. *The 2012–2016 Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan—A Recognition of Countering Violent Extremism*

In February 2012, the DHS published its third edition of the *Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan*.¹⁷⁷ This 2012–2016 document followed the 2008–2013 edition, which in turn, followed the initial 2004 strategic plan. This 2012–2016 strategy document was, in part, the result of the *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review* (QHSR) process, which is designed to ensure the resulting plan incorporates the unified strategic framework used in setting its mission and goals.¹⁷⁸ Although still not yet providing a comprehensive CVE platform, for the first time, the DHS Strategic Plan acknowledged VE and the value of engaging communities as part of a broader CVE strategy. This acknowledgement is demonstrated by the following statements, to “prevent and deter domestic VE and the radicalization process that contributes to it” and to “Increase community participation in efforts to deter terrorists and other malicious actors and mitigate radicalization toward violence.”¹⁷⁹

A general concern with the DHS is the absence of a single strategy—as represented by the NSHS and the *Homeland Security Strategic Plan*—and that such a

¹⁷⁵ Office of Homeland Security, Office of the President of the United States, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America—October 2007*, 1.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *The Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2012–2016* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, February 2012).

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., i.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 3–4.

strategy will complement and conform to the overarching national security strategy.¹⁸⁰ Absent a single strategy, confusion can occur regarding the priorities, mission, and objectives caused by multiple strategies within one organization, and the propensity exists for miscommunication and confusion.

c. *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism—A Review of the 2003 and 2006 Strategies*

First published in February 2003, the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (2003 NSCT) was intended to be an elaborative strategy. It was developed to support the *National Security Strategy* by “expounding on our need to destroy terrorist organizations, win the “war of ideas,” and strengthen America’s security at home and abroad.”¹⁸¹ The 2003 NSCT was designed to identify, attack, and defeat terrorist threats prior to those threats reaching U.S. borders.¹⁸² It delineates itself from the NSHS, which is intended to focus on the prevention of terrorist attacks within the United States.¹⁸³

As a comprehensive strategic document, the 2003 NSCT was detailed and straightforward in outlining its objectives. Further, it was one of the first public documents that demonstrated the U.S. government’s understanding of terrorist organizational networks and structures. One such example is Figure 1, which represents the basic structure of terrorism. The corresponding narrative (not shown) discusses the overarching strategy affecting each of the levels.

¹⁸⁰ Shawn Reese, *Defining Homeland Security: Analysis and Congressional Considerations* (CRS Report No. R42462) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 13.

¹⁸¹ Office of the President of the United States, *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism—February 2003* (Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States, February 2003), 2.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid.



THE STRUCTURE OF TERROR

Figure 1. The Structure of Terror¹⁸⁴

The overall objective of the 2003 NSCT ultimately was to eliminate terrorist organizations abroad by being vigilant and relentless in its global pursuit of these organizations to ensure their operational capabilities and spheres of influence are made irrelevant.¹⁸⁵ The theory of the 2003 strategy was that the elimination of these terrorist organizations, coupled with the furtherance of political and economic tools, would stabilize regions otherwise vulnerable to the influence of these organizations, and thereby, allow the opportunity for democracy to establish itself.¹⁸⁶

One such observation made in the strategy was the belief that terrorist organizations needed to maintain a physical base in which to operate.¹⁸⁷ By implication, the belief was that if terrorist organizations were deprived of their ability to maintain a presence physically from which to operate, terrorism could be eliminated. Ten years later, while the effectiveness of these conventional military tactics are argued by scholars, it

¹⁸⁴ Office of the President of the United States, *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism–February 2003*, 6.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Raphael F. Perl, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: Background and Issues for Congress* (CRS Report No. RL34230) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), ii, 6.

¹⁸⁷ Office of the President of the United States, *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism–February 2003*, 6.

can also be argued that decentralized terrorist cells and self-radicalization may—to some degree—be the manifestation of the success of these early U.S. CT strategies.¹⁸⁸

The *2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (2006 NSCT) was released by the White House on September 5, 2006.¹⁸⁹ The strategy continued with the 2003 theme as it relates to protecting the United States and its global partners from terrorist attacks with an offensive strategy of preemptive disruption and disabling of terrorist networks.¹⁹⁰ In addition, it broadened the terrorism threat by adding rogue nations states. However, the 2006 version offered a more detailed set of strategies by dividing them between short-term and long-term objectives. The short-term objectives included the prevention of attacks by terrorist networks; the denial of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to terrorists and rogue states, the denial of support and sanctuary to terrorists by rogue states, and not allowing terrorists to control and nation.¹⁹¹ The long-term objectives included winning the “war of ideas” through the global advancement of effective democracies, the promotion of international coalitions and partnerships, and the enhancement of CT infrastructure and capabilities.¹⁹²

Criticism of the 2006 NSCT centers on the concerns that the U.S. government has taken an overly simplistic view on the motivations that lead to terrorism—particularly ideological motivations—on the characterization of transnational terrorism, and that narrowly focusing on a “war of ideas” limits the United States in its ability to divert attention and effort towards other alternative strategies.¹⁹³ An additional concern is the 2006 NSCT minimizes the impacts of U.S. global policy as a contributing factor toward the underlying cause of terrorism.¹⁹⁴

¹⁸⁸ Kumar Ramakrishna, “From Global to Micro Jihad: Three Trends of Grassroots Terrorism,” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, May 7, 2013, <http://rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0882013.pdf>.

¹⁸⁹ Perl, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: Background and Issues for Congress*.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., ii, 2.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 3.

¹⁹² Ibid., 4.

¹⁹³ Ibid., 9.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

However, supporters of the strategy contend that actively confronting ideology and religion-centered radicalization is a necessary next step in the evolution of countering terrorism.¹⁹⁵ This reference to prevention and intervention of the ideological narrative as a security strategy is an example of U.S. progression on the hard power to soft power continuum. As noted in the other strategies examined in this chapter, the 2006 NSCT is in congruence with these other strategies as it begins to address CVE themed objectives to counter terrorism.

d. A Review of the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism

In June 2011, the White House released the *National Strategy for Counterterrorism* (NSCT). In a departure from previous national terrorism strategies’ “seek and destroy,” and “combating terrorism” methodology, the current version utilizes a “counterterrorism” methodology. Even so, the White House intriguingly communicates that the new strategy “...neither represents a wholesale overhaul—nor a wholesale retention—of previous policies and strategies.”¹⁹⁶ However, the strategy does continue to adhere to the principles of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and supporters.¹⁹⁷ The strategy also continues to be a complementary element to the *National Security Strategy* while focusing on the U.S. capacity for CT and homeland security efforts.

The 2003 and 2006 NSCTs were outward facing and any reference to defense against terrorism from coming into the United States was generally outwardly postured at the U.S. borders; distinguishing its objectives from the NSHS, which is intended to focus on the prevention of terrorist attacks within the United States.¹⁹⁸ The *2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism* represents a shift in this posture. While the 2011 NSCT

¹⁹⁵ Perl, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: Background and Issues for Congress*, 8–9.

¹⁹⁶ Office of the Press Secretary: The White House, “Fact Sheet: National Strategy for Counterterrorism,” June 29, 2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/29/fact-sheet-national-strategy-counterterrorism>.

¹⁹⁷ Office of the President of the United States, *The National Strategy for Counterterrorism—2011* (Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States, June 28, 2011), 1.

¹⁹⁸ Office of the President of the United States, *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism—February 2003*, 2.

only briefly discusses engagement with communities and information sharing among law enforcement organizations to build resilience against al-Qaeda inspired radicalization, its reference to community engagements and partnerships offers an indication of the future direction the U.S. government intends to move the CT discourse. In August, just two months after the *National Strategy for Counterterrorism* was released, the White House published the first ever *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, which was immediately followed up with the *Strategic Implementation Strategy Plan (SIP) for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, released in December 2011.

C. CONCLUSION

Americans have a unique conceptualization of terrorism that stems from the iconic events of 9/11. As a result, this conceptualization presents additional challenges for the United States in its CT and CVE efforts. However, this chapter illustrated that, in reality, terrorism has a much longer and broader history in America. Viewing the pre-9/11 terrorism environment in the United States—through this brief historical examination—has offered itself as a basis for the analysis of the successive progression of strategies to counter terrorism and combat VE. As a result, this methodology has allowed the reader to form a basic understanding of the various U.S. security strategies in existence, along with their intended scope and purpose. With this foundational understanding now in place, this thesis research can next move forward with an analysis and critique of the current U.S. CVE efforts.

IV. AN OVERVIEW OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES AND AN EXAMINATION OF THE CURRENT U.S. STRATEGIES FOR COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

In the fight against terrorists, and the subsequent impacts of terrorism activities, the United States—at a national level—has historically focused its CT strategy on 1) the pursuit of terrorists abroad, 2) building foreign partnerships, and 3) strengthening the country’s resilience.¹⁹⁹ These strategies are reflected in ongoing military operations, the hardening of critical infrastructures identified through formalized CIKR programs, and the significant amount of “homeland security” related equipment and training provided to first responder agencies. Until 2011, domestic strategy was not designed to engage local communities in support of building community partnerships for the purpose of countering self-radicalization and VE. As the U.S. government turned its focus inward, this soft power approach needed to ensure it incorporated practical “whole of community” preventive strategies rather than relying on traditional intelligence gathering law enforcement measures.

This chapter briefly looks at the emerging concept of self-radicalization and VE in the United States and its comparison to VE of the past. The chapter examines the use of the Internet as an effective recruitment and radicalization tool implemented by al-Qaeda and other supporters of jihad that placed the issue on a global platform. Thus, new challenges were created for the United States that required a shift in strategy from traditional hard power military tactics toward more soft power community-based and counter-narrative tactics. The chapter then examines the two strategies implemented by the United States to counter VE. These strategies—codified in two documents released in 2011—are the *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, and its partner document, the *Strategic Implementation Strategy Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*.

The goal of the chapter is to develop a basic awareness of VE in the United States and its approach to domestic CVE applications since 2011. Through this analysis, this

¹⁹⁹ Office of the President of the United States, *The National Strategy for Counterterrorism—2011*, 1.

chapter contributes to this thesis by evaluating the overall effectiveness of the U.S. CVE strategies in place since 2011, and then offering policy and program design recommendations intended to improve the current CVE strategy.

A. THE RECOGNITION OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND SELF-RADICALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Much like terrorism in general, radicalization and VE have been part of the U.S. fabric long before September 11, 2001. The more recent recognition of “religious based ideological extremism moving into stages of violence” is rooted primarily in the choice of words people select to communicate on this issue. Not intending to over simplify the complex set of factors that surround the discourse, VE occurs when extremist or radical views turn to violence as a means to further that ideology. While the views are legal in the United States, the violent actions associated with them are not. If people subscribe to this definition, then viewing violence as a means to further their ideology is rooted in this country’s history all the way back to its beginnings. This country’s founding fathers, by definition, were radicals who took to violence as a means to further an ideology and influence a government in an attempt to alter its policies. Moreover, historically, violence in this sense has traditionally been contextualized and localized geographically—either regionally or nationally—but not globalized. New within the construct of terrorism today is its global reach. This reach also has been perpetuated by the U.S.’s own use of the term “global” in the frequently used phrase “Global War on Terror” during the Bush administration. Additionally, the religious underpinnings of this call to global jihad—through the exploitation of religion, as well as the issuance of fatwa’s by Muslim clerics, as a means to support and justify violence—underscores the complex nature of this challenge. An additional factor that complicates the discourse is that, in a similar fashion to the earlier discussion of Americans’ markedly unique perspective of terrorism after 9/11, VE or self-radicalization is now viewed in much the same way; through a post-9/11, jihadist centric lens.

Prior to 2011, the United States fought the GWOT utilizing conventional military tactics that, due in large part to the U.S. military’s success, has led to an operational decentralization and use of smaller terrorist cells along with the furtherance of an

individual jihad strategy.²⁰⁰ As a result of the overall effectiveness of this strategy, this movement towards self-radicalized VE has become an important challenge for the United States today. This challenge is due, in part, to the fact that these elements are extremely difficult to detect and prevent with conventional military tactics.

1. The Internet—An Effective Method of Recruitment Towards Self Radicalization and Violent Extremism

Terrorist organizations and the United States would agree on few issues. One such issue is the emerging trend toward the use of small cell and self-radicalized actors as an effective means of violence in support of extremist ideological beliefs. This newly identified strategy by terrorist organizations moves away from the expensive, long-term planning, and large cell operations like the 9/11 attacks, and focuses on decentralized Internet-driven strategies to radicalize individuals to commit localized terrorist acts. The terrorist message is to “think globally but act locally.”²⁰¹ Overall costs for such operations fluctuate between \$2,000 and \$4,000 as opposed to the estimated \$400,000 to \$500,000 spent by al Qaeda on the 9/11 attacks.²⁰² Due to the low number of operatives and lack of central planning, this new trend also reduces the likelihood of detection and exploits local opportunities to strike targets in the United States. It is the ultimate low risk, high reward model of operation.

The primary recruitment weapon of choice in this new threat is the Internet. According to thesis research conducted in 2012 by former Naval Postgraduate student Charles Eby, “The use of the Internet is an emerging trend in lone-wolf terrorism. The number and percentage of total cases that have actively used the Internet has increased since 2008.”²⁰³ According to a 2011 FBI report, “The Internet has allowed terrorist groups to overcome their geographic limits and plays an increasing role in facilitating

²⁰⁰ Ramakrishna, “From Global to Micro Jihad: Three Trends of Grassroots Terrorism,” 2.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Lauren O’Brien, “The Evolution of Terrorism since 9/11,” *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* 80, no. 9 (September 2011): 9, accessed May 29, 2013, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=686969>.

²⁰³ Charles Eby, “The Nation That Cried Lone Wolf: A Data Driven Analysis of Individual Terrorists in the United States Since 9/11” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 55, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=710310>.

terrorist activities.”²⁰⁴ Since 2010, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has published the online English language magazine *Inspire* to recruit individuals into self-radicalization based on messages of ideology and to provide technical assistance for weapons making.²⁰⁵

In March 2014, al-Qaeda announced on YouTube it would soon launch the online magazine *Resurgence*.²⁰⁶ This course of action continues the theme of using the Internet to connect directly with individuals—particularly U.S. and British Muslims—in an attempt to recruit them to violence.²⁰⁷ Terrorists today are becoming creative in the delivery of their online messaging and delivering these calls for violence in a manner more emotionally appealing to the youth than a sit down conversation with an Imam or reading a fatwa condemning terrorism and violence.²⁰⁸ The YouTube promotional video announcing the launch of *Resurgence* incorporates the voice of Malcolm X delivering a 1965 speech justifying—and thereby calling for—the use of violence as an appropriate and necessary response to the already existing presence of violence by an oppressor.²⁰⁹

Deliberately, al-Qaeda has associated its struggle to one very familiar and personal to many Americans—the civil rights movement of the 1960s. In further comparison, al-Qaeda is presenting its grievance as a struggle—not a war—against a common oppressor. The oppressor is the U.S. government and its policies as they relate to areas of the Middle East and North Africa. Even though the narrative is from 1965, the video blends depictions of current U.S. promulgated violence that seems to modernize the perceived Muslim struggle and call to jihad by framing it as a modern era “struggle.” This viewpoint makes the issues relevant to today’s generation and moves it away from a

²⁰⁴ O’Brien, “The Evolution of Terrorism since 9/11,” 6.

²⁰⁵ Ramakrishna, “From Global to Micro Jihad: Three Trends of Grassroots Terrorism,” 2.

²⁰⁶ ‘Majalah Jihad Al-Qaeda Berbahasa Inggris Baru, Resurgence,’ YouTube video, posted by Arrahmah Channel, March 12, 2014, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y4n1HHPHxV4>.

²⁰⁷ Matthew Cole and Robert Windrem, “Al Qaeda Announces New English-Language Terror Magazine,” *NBC News*, last updated March 9, 2014, <http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/al-qaeda-announces-new-english-language-terror-magazine-n48531>.

²⁰⁸ Speaker Rashad Hussein, panel discussion topic: Muslim Public Affairs Council, “Online Radicalization: Myths and Realities,” sponsored by New America Foundation, Safe Spaces Initiative, accessed May 29, 2014, <http://www.mpac.org/safespaces/>.

²⁰⁹ ‘Majalah Jihad Al-Qaeda Berbahasa Inggris Baru, Resurgence,’ YouTube video.

historical 600 CE era religious centric issue to a social “awakening” more similar to the 1960s civil rights movement. This messaging may appeal to a much broader Muslim and non-Muslim audience who may not otherwise subscribe to a more direct Salafist Islamic ideology.²¹⁰ As an example of this messaging, Figure 2 represents a screenshot from the video visually incorporating the words from Malcolm X with the visual image of a young Muslim. The image portrayed by al-Qaeda offers a Muslim youth with a sling shot that presents the viewer with an image of a non-militant, rather unimposing youth protestor, not the image of a more proverbial Mujahideen fighter or Islamic terrorist.



You have to find out what does this man speak. And once you know his language, learn how to speak his language and he will get the point.” —Malcolm X²¹¹

Figure 2. Visual Incorporation of Malcolm X’s Words and a Young Muslim²¹²

Al-Qaeda’s comparison of jihad to historically familiar uses of violence in the United States, as a means of response to perceived grievances, attempts to justify and normalize VE as a common, familiar, and socially accepted tactic. This strategy can be viewed as al-Qaeda’s attempt to counter the ongoing narrative by the U.S. government

²¹⁰ Nadav Morag, email message to author, May 28, 2014.

²¹¹ Malcolm X, “February 14, 1965 Speech at the Ford Auditorium, Detroit, Michigan,” accessed May 27, 2014, http://www.malcolm-x.org/speeches/spc_021465.htm.

²¹² “Majalah Jihad Al-Qaeda Berbahasa Inggris Baru, Resurgence,” YouTube video.

that VE is something new—a new form of terrorism—not before seen by Americans on U.S. soil.

The video does not reveal the fact that Malcolm X was allowed to share his radical views within the United States under the benefit and protection of the U.S. Constitution or that Malcolm X was a Muslim himself who was assassinated by members of the Nation of Islam. The U.S. response should be to continue to counter the al-Qaeda narrative aggressively through not only words, but actions as well. However, offering a counter narrative in areas such as the Malcolm X issue, particularly as it relates to his Muslim faith or the events surrounding his assassination, can be extremely sensitive areas for the U.S. government to operate in. Muslim-American religious leaders can best deliver this counter narrative.

This operational focus still accomplishes the terrorist organization's agenda of instilling fear in U.S. citizens by exploiting the U.S. government's inability to detect, deter, and prevent 100 percent of these localized attacks from occurring. The 2009 Major Nidal Hassan Fort Hood shootings and the 2013 Tsarnaev brothers Boston bombings are two examples of successful implementation of this strategy.²¹³ The U.S. government began to recognize that unless this strategy is effectively defeated at the grass roots ideological level, it is likely to continue as the preferred method of attack well into the future. A strategy that recognizes indicators of violence prior to an event are crucial but also the most difficult to implement; particularly in communities that may already possess an inherent mistrust of government.

The Internet has proven to be a useful environment for radicalizing and recruiting others to violence. Preventing this situation from occurring is a critical component to preventing U.S. “homegrown” terrorism.²¹⁴ An effective response requires a paradigm shift from this country’s traditional military efforts in a global theater to a more localized community response strategy. In his remarks at the National Defense University on May

²¹³ Ramakrishna, “From Global to Micro Jihad: Three Trends of Grassroots Terrorism,” 2.

²¹⁴ Peter R. Neumann, *Options and Strategies for Countering Online Radicalization in the United States, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* (London, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation King’s College London, 2013), 432.

23, 2013, President Obama acknowledged that after a decade of war using traditional tactics to fight large terror networks, the United States must acknowledge this new threat and recognize that U.S. tactics must change from a military response to a more localized response.²¹⁵

B. CURRENT U.S. STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM—BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

1. Development of the 2010 Countering Violent Extremism Working Group

From 2001 to 2009, U.S. authorities generally felt that American Muslims were not as susceptible to radicalization as their European counterparts. However, since that time, incidents on U.S. soil began to challenge that long-held assumption.²¹⁶ Although radicalization can be a highly individualized process, through observing both Muslim and non-Muslim majority countries engage in various counter-radicalization efforts, it became evident that the radicalization process is preventable.²¹⁷ Today, it is widely understood that radicalization can lead to violence, and further, that this progression towards violent radicalization can actually be prevented and even reversed.²¹⁸

Since the United States was not immune from radicalization, and programs in other countries, particularly those in non-Muslim majority Western value-based countries, were having an effect then, the United States determined an appropriate strategy that would fit within the framework of U.S. values was necessary.

In 2010, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano tasked the Homeland Security Advisory Council to work with state and local law enforcement and community group representatives to present recommendations for a community-based CVE initiative

²¹⁵ President Barack Obama, “Remarks of President Obama,” accessed May 31, 2013, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-barack-obama>.

²¹⁶ Vidino, *Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe*, 2.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Lorenzo Vidino and James Brandon, *Countering Radicalization in Europe* (London, UK: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence: King’s College London, 2012), 7.

premised on the community oriented law enforcement approach.²¹⁹ Six local law enforcement officials participated on the 26-person CVE Working Group, and while representatives were present from federal agencies, there was no representation from the FBI—the agency tasked by law with the responsibility to investigate terrorism in the United States.²²⁰ This focus towards local law enforcement influence on a national strategy is an example of the federal government’s recognition that the local agencies know their communities best and have a history of successful community-based engagement strategies. According to CVE Working Group member Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Deputy Chief Michael Downing “The White House got it—that this type of work is best left with state and locals—no one knows the landscape better.”²²¹ In addition to being well positioned to interact with communities, by addressing individual and community issues, local agencies are able to mitigate causal factors that may contribute to VE.²²²

The committee focused on three core areas for its CVE programming: 1) best practices—a focus on existing best community-based practices to reduce and prevent violent crime, 2) information sharing—relative to the information and intelligence exchange between DHS and state and local authorities to address ideologically motivated violent crime effectively, and 3) training and other support—to determine ongoing training needs, technical assistance, and funding to support CVE programs.²²³ The committee delivered its final work product to the DHS Secretary in spring 2010, which included multiple findings and recommendations within each of these categories.

As a foundation for analysis of the resultant strategies implemented by the federal government in 2011, it is important to view and understand these committee findings and

²¹⁹ Homeland Security Advisory Council, *Countering Violent Extremism Working Group (CVE)* (Washington, DC: Homeland Security Advisory Council, Spring 2010), 2.

²²⁰ Ibid., 27–29. Observation based on author’s review of the CVE Working Group members list.

²²¹ Downing, email message to author.

²²² Dina Temple-Raston, “White House Unveils Counter-Extremism Plan,” *NPR*, August 3, 2011, <http://www.npr.org/2011/08/04/138955790/white-house-unveils-counter-extremism-plan>.

²²³ Homeland Security Advisory Council, *Countering Violent Extremism Working Group (CVE)*, 3.

recommendations to confirm their inclusion or exclusion into the final CVE strategies and to evaluate the efficacy of those decisions.

- CVE committee findings include the following.
 - Community-oriented policing works in preventing violent crime
 - Emphasis should be on building safe, secure, resilient, and crime resistant communities
 - All violent crime is local crime
 - Tension can occur between those involved in law enforcement investigations and those collaborating to establish local partnerships to stop violent crime²²⁴
- CVE committee recommendations include the following.
 - Develop and use common terminology
 - Expand Civil Rights Civil Liberties (CRCL) engagement efforts separate from support of community-oriented policing
 - Incorporate information-driven, community-based violent crime reduction into local preparedness efforts
 - Support efforts to establish local dispute resolution capabilities
 - Through policy, the DHS should utilize the philosophies based on communication, trust, and mutual respect to develop relationships with local law enforcement
 - Generate threat-related information products
 - Establish communication platform to share threat-related information directly with faith-based or other communities
 - Increase public awareness regarding terrorism and other homeland security related trends so that they can be demystified and incorporated into local violent crime reduction efforts
 - Develop case studies
 - Continue efforts to ensure that fusion centers have the capacity to receive and understand threat-related information and to share that knowledge with local authorities
 - Expand availability of training and technical assistance focused on the understanding, identification, and mitigation of threats through community-oriented policing

²²⁴ Homeland Security Advisory Council, *Countering Violent Extremism Working Group (CVE)*, 5–6.

- Improve quality of training
- Expand availability of training for state, local and tribal law enforcement and DHS components.²²⁵

This focus on the existing local government/local community partnerships for programmatic strategies to counter VE is well placed and follows the same general premise recognized in many other Western valued countries that have also pursued similar strategies. The initiative takes advantage of—and builds upon—the existing community oriented policing model rather than developing an entirely new federally based program. Integrating CVE elements within the framework of existing community programs allows for the participants to approach a new concept while using a familiar well-established platform; thereby, mitigating any perceived threat by community members, and at the same time, reducing the learning curve for delivery of such programs by local governments.

This approach wisely recognizes that within the United States—and even the broader base of Western-valued countries—no single Muslim organization typically claims the majority voice for all Muslims.²²⁶ Implementing a flexible localized program allows local partnerships to serve the needs of localized Muslim communities within that jurisdiction without trying to force a singular “one size fits all” CVE strategy into all communities across the United States.

2. Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States—An Overview

The Federal Government will often be ill-suited to intervene in the niches of society where radicalization to violence takes place, but it can foster partnerships to support communities through its connections to local government, law enforcement, Mayor’s offices, the private sector, local service providers, academia, and many others who can help prevent violent extremism.²²⁷

²²⁵ Homeland Security Advisory Council, *Recommendations, Countering Violent Extremism Working Group*, Spring 2010, 15–26.

²²⁶ Vidino, *Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe*, 6.

²²⁷ Office of the President of the United States, *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States, August 2011), 3.

In August 2011, the White House released the first of two documents specifically intended to communicate the government’s approach towards countering VE on U.S. soil through the prevention of self-radicalization. The delivery of this eight-page document, entitled *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (hereafter referred to as *Empowering Local Partners...*), represented the first such CVE document for the Obama Administration and further advanced the philosophical shift towards the inclusion of soft power strategies in the “war on terror.” The *Empowering Local Partners...* document recognizes that groups such as al-Qaeda are actively “seeking to recruit or inspire” Americans to execute attacks in the United States. The *Empowering Local Partners...* communicates the U.S. intent to address all forms of extremism that lead to violence but names al-Qaeda specifically, and refers to its “hateful ideology.”²²⁸ As a result, the *Empowering Local Partners...* calls upon communities—particularly the Muslim communities—to enjoin in the effort to counter the al-Qaeda narrative and deter self-radicalization.

The *Empowering Local Partners...* document outlines its approach into four distinct objectives. The first objective, entitled “the challenge,” highlights several intuitive observations with CVE. These include: 1) The recognition that, as a pluralistic nation, the United States must embrace all cultures, religions, and ethnicities, 2) actions required to counter VE effectively must respect and balance the rights of individuals protected by the U.S. Constitution to express their views freely and further their ideologies, including those considered hateful or unpopular. However, the document draws the distinction—a very clear demarcation—between this constitutionally protected activity and the use of violence, the latter either through direct use or the encouragement of its use as a means to further an individual’s ideology, 3) CVE is best achieved not by government intervention but by engaging and empowering assets at the local community level to build resilience against VE, and 4) real or perceived discrimination toward Muslim Americans related to CVE efforts can create the perception that America is anti-

²²⁸ Office of the President of the United States, *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, ii.

Muslim or anti-Islam; thereby, increasing any existing sense of alienation or discrimination that furthers the terrorist narrative.²²⁹

The second objective, “a community-based approach,” expounds on the theme that communities are best positioned to recognize signs of radicalization and effectively intervene. This section of *Empowering Local Partners...* introduces the notion that rather than develop new programs and funding institutions, leveraging existing community-based problem solving programs, such as community oriented policing—a prominent theme observed throughout the analysis—provides an experienced programmatic base to address VE as part of the broader community safety focus.²³⁰

The third objective, “goal and areas of priority action,” recognizes that efforts must be taken to prevent violent extremists from inspiring, recruiting, or financing persons to engage in acts of violence. It proposes to accomplish this objective by providing federal level government support to local partners in three general categories. The first category within this section, entitled “enhancing federal engagement with and support to local communities that may be targeted by violent extremists,” critically emphasizes that any community-based effort towards CVE by government must ensure it is not conducted at the exclusion of other community concerns and that these community-based relationships are not built upon national security concerns alone.²³¹ This category is an important acknowledgement and an essential element for analysis now that the *Empowering Local Partners...* document has been in existence for three years.

The second category, “building government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism,” focuses on education and information sharing. It recognizes the importance of incorporating best practices through the exchange of shared experiences with America’s foreign partners, which lends itself well to understanding that while not all lessons and methodologies are directly applicable, common elemental characteristics are found in all similarly positioned challenges. This theme continues with

²²⁹ Office of the President of the United States, *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, 1.

²³⁰ Ibid., 6.

²³¹ Ibid., 5.

the assurance that the federal government is, with regard to better understanding radicalization and counter radicalization methodologies, “...building a robust training program with rigorous curriculum standards...based on intelligence, research, and accurate information...”²³² This theme represents the awareness that misinformed stakeholders can—particularly as it relates to cultural proficiencies and culturally oriented-community engagement efforts—do more harm than good by creating tension and further eroding trust.

The third and final category under the “goal and areas of priority action” objective is entitled “the countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals.” This category focuses on challenging violent extremist propaganda—particularly that which is delivered online—to include its anti-Western ideologies and promotion of violent radicalization as a justifiable and legitimate course of action. As part of the CVE efforts, it affirms the United States will aggressively counter this fomenting rhetoric by promoting American ideals of inclusiveness and unification.²³³ A final note of caution is offered in the form of a reminder that “[O]ur words and deeds can either fuel or counter violent ideologies abroad, so too can they here at home.”²³⁴ This area in particular is one that continues to be exploited by al-Qaeda and other supporters of jihad through the use of online communication. The fourth objective, “guiding principles,” outlines the foundational elements of this country—civil liberties and civil rights—and commits to supporting these ideals through the expression of seven supporting but broadly worded statements.²³⁵

Overall, the *Empowering Local Partners...* document broadly communicates the federal government’s recognition that it is community outreach- and community-based partnerships—through already locally established relationships—that will be most effective in countering VE in the United States. Further, the document affirms that

²³² Office of the President of the United States, *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, 6.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Ibid., 7.

²³⁵ Ibid., 8.

established and proven programs, such as community-based policing—also known as community-oriented policing—are well positioned as a delivery model for CVE programs. Some scholars, policy analysts, and pundits debated whether this eight-page document, which does not call it itself a strategy, was, in fact, a strategy for CVE in the United States. LAPD Deputy Chief Michal Downing, a member of the original Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) CVE Working Group, best described the document as a “policy statement”—not a strategy—by the federal government to acknowledge that state and local governments are the right vehicle to deliver CVE and that this policy statement also communicates that CVE in the local context is best exemplified as a “verb,” and in the federal context is best exemplified as a “noun.”²³⁶ This statement best captures the intent of the *Empowering Local Partners...* strategy as a representation of the role the federal government should play in CVE in the United States.

3. The Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States

In December 2011—four months after the *Empowering Local Partners...* document was published, the White House followed up with the more comprehensive strategy and partner document, aptly entitled the *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (hereafter referred to as SIP). The SIP recombines the four areas identified in the *Empowering Local Partners...* document and focuses on three core areas: 1) enhancing community engagement, 2) building government and law enforcement expertise, and 3) countering violent extremist propaganda.²³⁷ Although the SIP indicates it is intended as a framework to apply to all forms of VE, it points out that its priority focus is on VE inspired by al-Qaeda as the most significant violent extremist threat to this country at present.²³⁸ The SIP is recognizable as a strategy and outlines what it calls core objectives and sub-objectives. Further, the SIP outlines the alignment of activities between agencies and

²³⁶ Downing, email message to author.

²³⁷ Office of the President of the United States, *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States, December 2011), 2.

²³⁸ Ibid.

assigns federal agency leads and partners for a number of activities outlined within the document. Some, not all, of these objectives and activities are recognizable outgrowths from the recommendations proposed by the 2010 CVE Working Group. The following activities are identified throughout the SIP.

- Whole-of-government coordination
- Leveraging existing public safety, violence prevention, and resilience programming
- Coordination of domestic and international efforts
- Addressing technology and virtual space
- Enhancing federal engagement with and support to local communities that may be targeted by violent extremists
- Building government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism
- Countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals

Throughout the SIP, the responsibility for these activities are divided among the federal government “...departments, agencies, and components focused on law enforcement and national security and those whose efforts support, but do not directly lie within, these areas.”²³⁹

The SIP, by name and content, is a CVE strategy—albeit a broad-brush strategy—that identifies objectives and assigns responsibilities. The SIP recognizes the unique challenge of the CVE operating environment, its affected communities, the nexus to religious ideology, and its potential for improper encroachment on civil rights and civil liberties. It is necessary to tread cautiously in this area, and the SIP recognizes that getting it wrong can potentially do more harm than good.²⁴⁰

²³⁹ Office of the President of the United States, *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, 21.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 3.

C. AN EXAMINATION OF THE CURRENT U.S. CVE STRATEGY

1. The Evolution towards a CVE Strategy in the United States

Beginning in 2006, five years before the *Empowering Local Partners...* and SIP strategies were introduced (collectively referred to in this chapter as a singular U.S. CVE strategy), some government officials, terrorism pundits, and terrorism scholars began to opine that conventional military tactics would not be the determining factor in the war on terror. No doubt existed that the U.S. military and its tactics were far superior to the military force presented by al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. However, the battle of ideology—the narrative—was not such a lopsided matchup and some posited that this battle was being won by the terrorist organizations. In many ways, today's U.S. CVE strategy is an outgrowth of the U.S.'s own slowly transforming ideological progression from a methodological, reactive war fighting strategy to today's holistic, community-minded proactive strategy. As the United States became more aware and more educated, it recognized the battlefield must include resources to combat conflicting ideologies and the causal factors of self-radicalization. As a result, its strategies contemporaneously reflected this paradigm shift.

Even though the United States still very much espoused a GWOT mindset at the time, the first evidence of this awareness of ideology as a concept is presented in the 2006 NSCT, which is considered the overarching CT strategy that other strategies support. The word “ideology” is used 19 times throughout the 23-page document and is often preceded by the word “radical” or “murderous” in its use, which is reflective of the military attack attitude still held by practitioners of the GWOT philosophy during that time. The expression of ideology in the 2006 NSCT centers on defeating ideology by replacing it with democracy and freedom, and not by preventing or countering the ideology itself. This concept is emphasized numerous times throughout the document and reflected in statements, such as “The long-term solution for winning the War on Terror is the advancement of freedom and human dignity through effective democracy” and “In effective democracies, freedom is indivisible. They are the long-term antidote to the

ideology of terrorism today. This is the battle of ideas.”²⁴¹ The United States was in essence stating that to defeat terrorism, it was going to offer something more tangible and personally valuable, democracy and freedom. Dangerously, this narrative presumes that people will clearly pick democracy and freedom over an ideology founded in religion. The concepts of prevention and countering through alternative narrative and programmatic strategy, appears yet to be developed. While recognition of ideology as a factor in the GWOT itself is evident, the U.S. government took an overly simplistic view of the motivations that lead to terrorism—particularly the ideological motivations.²⁴² Nonetheless, the recognition of ideology as a factor in what later would be commonly termed radicalization and VE was a necessary initial step in the evolution of countering violent terrorism strategies in use today. This strategy soon found itself in congruence with other strategies as the discourse on CVE progressed.

The federal government listened to the pundits, analyzed the research, and recognized that the United States needed a domestic focused soft power strategy that was proactive and preventative rather than reactive and offensive in nature. Additionally, this strategy needed to focus on prevention-oriented actions that could fit within an existing program framework and leverage existing local partnerships. It took an additional five years—from 2006 until 2011—for a CVE specific strategy to be implemented in the United States, and an additional three years later, it still remains in its original version. The fortuitous result of this delay is that it has allowed the United States to observe similarly positioned countries—the United Kingdom in particular—adjust and amend their CVE strategies as a result of significant push back and criticism of applications of original versions of their strategy. The negative aspect of this delay by the United States is that CVE is not a “one size fits all countries” strategy, and countries have created counter-radicalization programs that significantly differ in their scope and objectives. The United States has its own unique challenges that also differ significantly from its Western democratic-valued neighbors. One brief example is the over 18,000 federal, state, local,

²⁴¹ Office of the President of the United States, *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism—September 2006* (Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States, September 2006), 9.

²⁴² Perl, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: Background and Issues for Congress*, 9.

and tribal law enforcement agencies ranging in size from the 35,000 members (New York Police Department) to one officer agencies. This nation's own unique challenges have not been adequately addressed. The United States could, and should, be further down the CVE road.

2. Examination of the U.S. CVE Strategy—Background

In 2010, the year before the U.S. CVE strategy was introduced, three million Muslims were living in the United States, and less than 100 individuals—or .3%—had committed themselves to violence in support of jihad.²⁴³ While the broader American non-Muslim population struggles with an ongoing heightened sensitivity to terrorism—as discussed in the previous sections—it is important to recognize that the American Muslim population must not only grapple with the same fears, they must also deal with the stereotype that Muslims on the whole are engaged in, or associated with, terrorism. Islamophobia creates significant challenges among the Muslim communities and governments must address the bigotry. These factors suggest that the American Muslim population overwhelmingly rejects the violent ideology associated with jihad. Understanding that this rebuke of violence alone will not stop VE, under the right parameters, these communities would welcome partnerships with the government to implement intervention and counter-narrative programmatic strategies, which is an essential component to CVE. The government must recognize that no CVE program can be successful without the assistance of the Muslim community.²⁴⁴

While the 2011 U.S. CVE strategy admittedly focuses on countering the al-Qaeda narrative, it appropriately recognizes the application for countering all forms of VE, and that fundamentally, the path an individual takes towards radicalization is similar regardless of the underlying theme. The thoughtful and deliberative process utilized through the initial establishment of a CVE Working Group demonstrates the cognizance of the role of local governments and local relationships in the delivery of CVE programs.

²⁴³ Jenkins, *Would-Be Warriors-Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001*, vii.

²⁴⁴ Vidino, *Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe*, 6.

Upon its delivery, the U.S. CVE strategy received high marks from the MPAC for its focus on community-based solutions to counter VE.²⁴⁵ Above all, the delivery of such a strategy in 2011 demonstrated the initiative and leadership by the federal government to take the necessary first steps to focus the discussion and begin the process of developing a CVE strategy.²⁴⁶ The 2011 *Empowering Local Partners...* and SIP are a good start for the United States towards countering this emerging threat. The strategy development process and the resulting strategy, both represent the government's more sophisticated understanding of terrorism and the notion that radicalization is comprised of a multitude of causal factors. This includes the recognition of communal environmental factors as elements of the broader sociological construct, as well as more individualized psychological factors.

The government has demonstrated through this collective engagement process that it has come to understand that countering radicalization is much more complex than providing an oversimplified alternate choice in the form of democracy and freedom. This paradigm shift is most evident when looking back and attempting to identify the point in time at which the United States first began to brand 9/11 as an attack on its freedom; thereby, opining that offering freedom and democracy—whether in the United States, or establishing it through force in other countries—will satisfactorily address the conflict. This viewpoint can be traced back to the days immediately following the 9/11 attacks when on September 20, 2001, President Bush addressed Congress, and in response to, “why do they hate us” President Bush replied, “They hate our freedoms.”²⁴⁷ It then follows that if the oversimplified belief is that the 9/11 attacks were about hating U.S. freedoms, to offer what the United States believes “they” are “jealous” of—in the form of freedom and democracy—to those would be jihadists, would mean they would choose freedom and democracy over a religious ideology that leads them to choose violence. The failure with that perception, as evidenced over the last 10 years, is that the provision of

²⁴⁵ Muslim Public Affairs Council, “White House’s Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism: Supports MPAC’s Core Issues & Initiative,” August 3, 2011, <http://www.mpac.org/programs/government-relations/white-houses-strategy-on-countering-violent-extremism.php>.

²⁴⁶ Downing, email message to author.

²⁴⁷ eMediaMillWorks, “Text: President Bush Addresses the Nation.”

freedom and democracy specifically may have very little to do with a person's choice to join jihad. Rather, it is the religious interpretation by some of how freedom and democracy are in conflict with their ideology, and can lead people away from an ideal Islamic society, that causes the conflict.²⁴⁸ Democracy and freedom are not the envy; they are the enemy. In the United States, in which freedom and democracy already exist as pillars of this pluralistic society, VE is likely more closely aligned with social and psychological factors. These factors, which support the concept of localized community-oriented CT programs, include socioeconomic factors, integration and socialization factors, feelings of belongingness, and religious guidance. Therefore, VE and CVE are considerably localized issues.

3. Examination of the U.S. CVE Strategy—Effectiveness and Application

Three years of performance has now allowed ample time for an evaluation and reassessment of this U.S. CVE strategy. The rapid evolution of change, along with resulting swift adaptation to this rapid change as it relates to terrorist methodologies and tactics, necessitates a frequent review and update of the U.S. CVE strategy. This update to the U.S. CVE strategy—arguably the tool that has the most potential to be effective against VE—has yet to occur. This malady is conflated due to the observation by some experts that neither the 2011 NSCT nor previous similar published CT strategies provide clear guidance to federal, state, and local agencies to plan, prepare, or implement effective CT strategies.²⁴⁹

The 2011 U.S. CVE strategy is a commendable first step. The nascent philosophy surrounding the strategy is representative of the well-qualified and diverse members on the 2010 CVE Working Group. Like any strategy or operation, the application of CVE is

²⁴⁸ Moghaddam, *From the Terrorist's Point of View: What They Experience and Why They Come to Destroy Us*, 9.

²⁴⁹ Paul Smith, "A Critical Assessment of the US National Strategy for Counterterrorism: A Missed Opportunity?," *Real Instituto Elcano*, July 9, 2011, 1.

always evolving, and now is the time to refine and refocus not only the philosophy, but also the approach to CVE as well.²⁵⁰

a. The Strategy Framework

The strategy states, “The SIP provides a blueprint for how we will build community resilience against violent extremism.”²⁵¹ However, in actuality, the strategy provides little federal guidance to community groups on how to engage or intervene with people who may be susceptible in radicalization.²⁵² This blueprint per se, is nonexistent. The U.S. federalist system of governance should not preclude the federal government from providing more direct oversight and program support, particularly, if federal funding is provided. Providing a model policy framework that agencies can adopt still allows local agencies to build and deliver a malleable community tailored CVE program within this broader federal framework. While customizable, some overarching standard must be available to ensure a nominal level of consistency exists throughout the country regardless of community size. Further, it is possible that smaller less recognizable agencies are engaging in CVE activities under the auspice of community-oriented policing, or simply localized policing efforts, and are unaware that they may benefit from federal support for CVE specific programming. This situation supports the widely held notion that the application of CVE programming, through the leveraging of local networks and relationships, is best placed at the state and local levels, and guidance, resources, and coordination—in the form of funding, support, training, tools and structure—are best provided at the federal level.²⁵³

b. The Relationship between Countering Violent Extremism and the Muslim Community

The strategy noticeably focuses on engagement with Muslim communities and while this strategy is logical, the United States must be careful not to portray the strategy

²⁵⁰ Downing, email message to author.

²⁵¹ Office of the President of the United States, *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, 2.

²⁵² Bjelopera, *Countering Violent Extremism in the United States*, i.

²⁵³ Neumann, *Preventing Violent Radicalization in America*, 7.

as a Muslim CVE strategy, which can result in a number of unintended consequences. One such consequence is the potential for perception by non-Muslim Americans that only Muslims can be terrorists or that only Muslims are susceptible to self-radicalization. If the focus is heavily oriented to a particular group in practice, regardless of what the language in the strategy indicates, that group can become labeled and stereotyped as either not deserving of funding or assistance, or conversely, as being the only group eligible for funding and assistance. This perception of exclusivity on either end of the spectrum can negatively impact CVE efforts. The United States must acknowledge that this anti-Muslim bias is very real. While addressing the members of the Committee on Homeland Security in June 2012, Mr. Faiza Patel, Co-Director at the Brennan Center for Justice, noted his analysis of 2009 and 2010 FBI hate crime statistics revealed a nearly 50 percent increase in anti-Islamic hate crimes in the United States over the one-year period.²⁵⁴

An additional caution with this existing approach is that countering a religious narrative requires the government to weigh in on religion, or at least, provide some level of support to communities to engage in religious centered activities, both of which can have First Amendment implications. In essence, to counter a religious-based narrative requires countering the theology behind the message and then offering an alternative narrative or interpretation of a religion, a slippery slope for government. Juan Zarate, former Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism, and a CVE advocate in the Bush administration, acknowledged this very concern.²⁵⁵ In addition, the UK and Australian comparative case studies also demonstrated similar concerns with providing government funding to religious organizations, which had to be addressed in updated CVE strategy documents.²⁵⁶ The United States has yet to address this issue.

²⁵⁴ Faiza Patel, “Testimony for The American Muslim Response to Hearings on Radicalization (presentation to the United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security),” June 20, 2012, <http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/testimony-%E2%80%9C-american-muslim-response-hearings-radicalization>.

²⁵⁵ Spencer Ackerman and Noah Shachtman, “Muslim Rappers, ‘Google Ideas’: Inside the Flawed U.S. Campaign to Fight Militant Memes,” *Wired Magazine*, October 9, 2012, <http://www.wired.com/2012/10/cve/all/>.

²⁵⁶ This statement is based on the author’s review of the history and evolution of CVE strategy in both the UK and Australia.

c. The Role of Federal Law Enforcements Agencies in Countering Violent Extremism—Counterterrorism vs. Counter Radicalization

The strategy identifies the DHS, DOJ, and the FBI as national security or law enforcement agencies and directs them to “...execute many of the programs and activities outlined in the strategy” and to also “...support the CVE effort while insuring we do not change the core missions and functions of these departments and agencies.”²⁵⁷ This directive places local law enforcement and its community-based approach in conflict with its federal partners. The FBI mission, for example, is heavily intelligence collection oriented and appropriately designed to counter terrorism, which requires a heavy investment in all forms of intelligence gathering, including signals intelligence (SIGINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT). However, intelligence gathering and community-oriented policing are two distinct functions and blending of the two can erode the trust necessary to engage in effective CVE efforts. In the United Kingdom, tension and a perception of mission conflict between the Prevent and Pursue strands of the national CT strategy known as CONTEST was noted in a 2011 study conducted to assess the effectiveness of Prevent.²⁵⁸ This very issue was also noted within the information-sharing recommendations of the 2010 CVE Working Group report calling it a “...inherent tension between federal law enforcement investigations and local partnerships to stop violent crime.”²⁵⁹

The strategy conflates CT and counter-radicalization responsibilities, which also contributes to role and mission confusion in CVE efforts. This confusion can threaten the relationship between law enforcement and the community, particularly if the community believes the attempt to establish the relationship is predicated on intelligence gathering; in essence, securitizing the relationship. The resulting approach can alienate the local Muslim community, and further their fear and distrust of the U.S. government. If this alienation occurs, it may actually foster the self-radicalization process rather than deter it.

²⁵⁷ Office of the President of the United States, *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, 4.

²⁵⁸ Martin Innes, Colin Roberts, and Helen Inness, *Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers* (Cardiff, Wales: Universities’ Police Science Institute, Cardiff University, March 2011), 5.

²⁵⁹ Homeland Security Advisory Council, *Countering Violent Extremism Working Group (CVE)*, 17.

Counterterrorism efforts fit well within the mission of the FBI, and as noted previously, rely on a heavy investment in intelligence gathering. Counter-radicalization fits well within CVE programming, and as also noted above, relies on localized community engagement and relationship efforts. The U.S. strategy needs to more clearly distinguish CVE from counterterrorism and recognize CVE as a community-based program distinctly positioned within the counter-radicalization realm in support of the broader mission of CT. Counter-radicalization should not involve continuous intelligence gathering or primary law enforcement engagement.²⁶⁰ Understanding this concept, the role of the community police officer should be to focus on counter-radicalization and not CT, by recognizing that an individual is the bridge between the two. Figure 3, a diagram offered by the Bipartisan Policy Center, visually represents this relationship.²⁶¹



Figure 3. Bipartisan Policy Center Counterterrorism-Community Policing-Counter-Radicalization Relationship Model²⁶²

To represent this concept better, a more detailed diagram of Figure 3 would illustrate federal *law enforcement* agencies within the CT bubble and CVE programs within the counter-radicalization bubble. Other *non-law enforcement* federal agencies that provide guidance, resources, and coordination in support of CVE programs most

²⁶⁰ Neumann, *Preventing Violent Radicalization in America*, 19.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Ibid.

certainly should be located within the counter-radicalization bubble. Upon analysis of the recommendations presented by the 2010 CVE Working Group, and in personal conversations with two members of the working group (Downing and Elibiary), it is apparent the CVE Working Group also supported the notion that local law enforcement is best positioned to engage in these efforts and not federal law enforcement.²⁶³

d. Intelligence Gathering vs. Community Policing

The divergence between intelligence gathering and community policing is not only confined to the law enforcement community. It has very real implications to the required trust component within these community partnerships. In 2009, The Markle Foundation's Task Force on National Security in the Information Age claimed, "An information sharing framework will succeed only if the American people are confident that it will respect their privacy and protect against inappropriate disclosure."²⁶⁴

The desired objective of such a strategy is to increase the effectiveness of CT operations through the consistent application of guidelines and common frameworks, while always respecting privacy and individual rights. Any new options must clarify local law enforcement's role of engaging in community partnerships—particularly with local Muslim communities—and identifying gaps in information sharing among local, state, and federal agencies.²⁶⁵ Further, when such an initiative takes on a national or even international focus, a central authority should coordinate them.²⁶⁶ This central authority in the United States is the federal level and is the best place to deliver a clearly articulated framework that outlines how intelligence operations at all levels should function in

²⁶³ This statement is the author's and is based on a review of the 2010 CVE Working Group Report, with Mohamed Elibiary in personal communication with the author at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, January 29, 2014 and Michael Downing, in phone conversation with the author, May 20, 2014.

²⁶⁴ Zoe Baird and Jim Barksdale, *Nation at Risk: Policy Makers Need Better Information to Protect the Country, The Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age* (New York: The Markle Foundation, March 2009), 5.

²⁶⁵ Jessica Zuckerman, "Forty-Fourth Terrorist Plot against the U.S. Marks Need for Continued Vigilance," *The Heritage Foundation*, no. 3446 (January 9, 2012): 2, <https://www.hsl.org/?view&did=697386>.

²⁶⁶ United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, "Public-Private Partnerships for the Protection of Vulnerable Attacks," January 2009, 3, https://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctif/pdfs/web_protecting_human_rights.pdf.

furtherance of countering terrorism and countering radicalization.²⁶⁷ Implementing a strategy that first unequivocally outlines this bifurcation between intelligence gathering and community policing, and then directs how this objective is going to occur, is a critical pillar for an effective nationally recognized CVE program. Without it, the success of any CVE program is doubtful.

e. The Role of U.S. Attorneys in Countering Violent Extremism

The strategy identifies U.S. attorneys as community-based CVE leads, and states they are well positioned through their historical engagement with communities, to make determinations at the local level with regard to which communities should be selected for engagement in CVE programs.²⁶⁸ The strategy recognizes U.S. attorneys as the senior law enforcement executives in their region and calls on them to: 1) discuss issues, such as civil rights, as they relate to CT efforts, 2) raise awareness of the threat of VE, and 3) to facilitate partnerships to prevent radicalization to violence.²⁶⁹

This view—that U.S. attorneys are well positioned to lead community CVE efforts—is in direct contrast with the idea that locally placed assets are best positioned to work with their communities on CVE efforts. It is questionable that a presidentially appointed chief litigator—arguably the same person who will investigate and prosecute those responsible for acts of terrorism—is well positioned to facilitate and maintain effective and ongoing CVE program partnerships.²⁷⁰ This decision does not appear to be an outgrowth of the CVE Working Group, as no such recommendation was presented in its final report.²⁷¹

It is unclear if the determination to use U.S. attorneys is based on the Australian CVE model. If so, the United States must be reminded that a singular Attorney-General's

²⁶⁷ Bucci, “The Immediate Aftermath of Boston: No Time to Stand Still,” 2–3.

²⁶⁸ Office of the President of the United States, *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, 8.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ Bjelopera, *Countering Violent Extremism in the United States*, 12.

²⁷¹ This statement is based on a review by the author of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Recommendations,” *CVE Working Group*, last accessed June 7, 2014, http://www.fema.gov/txt/government/grant/bulletins/373_cve_recommendations.txt.

Department (AGD) in Australia is responsible for focusing on countering extremism through efforts aimed primarily at social cohesion. While the Australian AGD continues to focus on community integration, it now places a newly formed emphasis on resiliency.²⁷² Additionally, a CVE Taskforce—referred to as the CVE Unit—was created and placed within the Australian AGD and the Australian CVE strategy, entitled *A National Approach to Countering Violent Extremism in Australia: the CVE Strategic Plan*, was developed in this department.²⁷³

f. The Responsibility for Countering Violent Extremism at the Federal Level

A major critique of the U.S. CVE strategy is that it does not clearly identify who is responsible for oversight of CVE programming at the federal level. While the strategy lists a multitude of activities and efforts, and even directs federal agencies towards these activities and efforts, it is silent on which single federal agency is responsible for managing the CVE programming.²⁷⁴ This lack of detail creates ambiguity relative to the delegation of responsibilities and resources.²⁷⁵ To divide responsibilities of any program among multiple agencies reduces the sense of importance of the overall program; thereby, watering down the desired result and the sense of accountability as a “second tier” program. This very result was reflected in the area of CVE related training—a component of the CVE strategy and a recommendation of the CVE Working Group—after a 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) document reported concerns and

²⁷² Hizb ut-Tahir—Australia, *Government Intervention in the Muslim Community* (Sydney, Australia: Media Office of Hizb ut-Tahir in Australia, November 2013), 122.

²⁷³ Geoff McDonald—First Assistant Secretary National Security Law and Policy Division, *Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Migration Inquiry into Multiculturalism in Australia* (Australian Government: Attorney General’s Department, March 2, 2012), 2–3, Appendix A.

²⁷⁴ Bjelopera, *Countering Violent Extremism in the United States*, ii, 20–23.

²⁷⁵ Cassandra Lucaccioni, “61st Terrorist Plot Against the U.S.: Terry Lee Loewen Plot to Attack Wichita Airport,” Issue Brief #4110 on Terrorism, *The Heritage Foundation*, December 18, 2013, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/12/terry-lee-loewen-terrorist-plot-in-wichita-kansas-airport>.

complaints resulting from non-standardized training material and inconsistently applied training.²⁷⁶

For the reasons outlined previous, the lead federal agency responsible for CVE program delivery should not be a federal law enforcement agency but rather an agency whose mission more closely aligns with program facilitation, guidance, and support. This approach recognizes the importance of CT efforts, its methods and tactics, allows for the separation of CT and counter-radicalization, and thereby, eliminates the securitization of the community relationship. This effort by federal law enforcement agencies to develop and maintain ongoing formalized partnerships at this highly localized level within Muslim communities is not seen in other community-oriented programs—nor does federal law enforcement seem interested in doing so. CVE should not be the exception. While the design of such a program is with the best intentions, it may bring into question the motives and efforts related to this singular issue. A CVE program must avoid the perception that securitization and perfunctory intelligence gathering are the real objectives.

g. Training

The 2010 CVE Working Group cautioned, “[B]ad training not only is ineffective—but can serve to escalate tensions between law enforcement and the community.”²⁷⁷ Unfortunately, the resulting 2011 strategy did not incorporate this caution. A comprehensive 2012 GAO report focused on CVE training and found that some community members and advocacy organizations raised concerns about the quality of CVE training delivered by DHS, FBI, and DOJ.²⁷⁸ The report indicated that instances of federally sponsored or federally funded CVE and CT training that used offensive and

²⁷⁶ Government Accountability Office, *Report to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Countering Violent Extremism: Additional Actions Could Strengthen Training Efforts*.

²⁷⁷ Homeland Security Advisory Council, *Countering Violent Extremism Working Group (CVE)*, 24.

²⁷⁸ Government Accountability Office, *Report to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Countering Violent Extremism: Additional Actions Could Strengthen Training Efforts*, 2.

inaccurate information demonstrated the need to develop standards for CVE-related training.²⁷⁹

A second concern with training is the funding and programming associated for specific CVE training. The access and understanding of what constitutes CVE-related training was unclear to many grant participants who may have otherwise sought out funds to provide related training in their communities.²⁸⁰ An added concern is that those agencies that chose to obtain funding may have pursued training that did not meet the intended CVE curriculum and grant criteria. The training issue is another example of the consequences resulting from a lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities.

D. CONCLUSION

The 2011 *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* and the follow-on *Strategic Implementation Strategy Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* are excellent first steps into the next phase of countering VE. The federal government is to be commended for its recognition of this emerging threat and then facilitating a thoughtful and deliberative process to develop the U.S. CVE strategy. It demonstrates the wisdom of inclusion of soft power strategies as another tool in the campaign against terrorism, and the necessity of localized community engagement in this effort.

The 2011 U.S. CVE strategic plan states, “The Federal Government can foster nuanced and locally rooted counter radicalization programs and initiatives by serving as a facilitator, convener, and source of information to support local networks and partnerships at the grassroots level.”²⁸¹ These objectives are the areas in which the federal government is best positioned to affect CVE efforts positively. It is an excellent

²⁷⁹ Government Accountability Office, *Report to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Countering Violent Extremism: Additional Actions Could Strengthen Training Efforts*, 2.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., 12.

²⁸¹ Office of the President of the United States, *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*.

statement, and should serve as the federal government's CVE mission statement to ensure CVE deliverables meet one of these mission objectives.

Like any first iteration of a policy, plan, or strategy, an evaluative process of its strengths, weaknesses, identified gaps, and current relevance in an ever-changing environment, is essential to the longevity and effectiveness of such an important strategic plan. Failure to do so encourages the antithesis of these desired outcomes. This chapter has attempted to engage in that evaluative process, and as a result, has revealed several concerns with not only the content of the strategy but with the overall ineffectual implementation of the strategy at the federal level.

To build upon this critique in a constructive manner that can offer recommendations for an improved U.S. CVE strategy, a review of CVE strategies in the similarly positioned countries of the United Kingdom and Australia is a necessary next step. Once completed, the applicable positive attributes from these case study analyses can be synthesized with the U.S. strategy to provide final recommendations for an updated U.S. CVE Strategy—a CVE 2.0 if you will—to counter VE in the United States.

V. THE UNITED KINGDOM

This chapter examines the UK’s efforts in CT, including a historical view of the UK’s transition from a hard power to a soft power philosophy relative to domestic CT strategies in particular. This analysis provides a broad overview of the United Kingdom, its ethos, national and local governance structure, and the progression of its well-documented use of doctrine and strategy as effective communication components used to guide its national efforts. The chapter concludes with an examination of the UK’s implementation of established programmatic strategies CONTEST-*Prevent* and Channel, which offer guidance and support to local community-based organizations to recognize and prevent—through specific intervention strategies—self-radicalization and VE. This focus identifies the relevant organizational similarities and differences—the causes, effects and variables—that impact programs designed to counter VE.

The goal of the chapter is to develop a better understanding of the UK’s approach, both philosophically and practically, to countering terrorism overall and self-radicalization and VE in particular. This evaluative process later contributes to this thesis by offering potential applicable attributes for consideration by the United States as it considers its updates and improvements to its own CT strategies related to self-radicalization and VE.

A. OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

To provide context to the United Kingdom as a relevant case study for analysis of its CT philosophy and resulting strategies, a brief overview of the UK’s ethos, governance, and policing structure is necessary. These foundational elements, which along with the specific CT strategies discussed in this chapter, add to the relevance of the United Kingdom as a pertinent subject of study for the United States.

The United Kingdom has a long and well-documented history of domestic terrorism. Given this history, it has a distinguished parallel CT effort as well. It also has a similarly long history of using both doctrine and strategy to communicate its philosophies and guide its actions effectively. As a result, the UK CT strategy known as CONTEST—

particularly its third iteration known as CONTEST 3 and its *Prevent* element—along with partner programs, such as Channel, offer themselves as creditable examples of CT strategies that effectively engages with its citizenry. The result is a more transparent interaction with the community, which is capable of providing an effective means of countering extremism and the extremist narrative.²⁸²

1. Ethos

The United States and the United Kingdom are comparable countries that face similar challenges in their effort to combat domestic and international terrorism. This comparable aspect not only comes as a result of their common ideologies and founding beliefs in democracy, and the rule of law, but also, in how they are perceived by other nations, extremist terrorist organizations, and those predisposed to self-radicalization within their own borders.

As a democratic country with an ethos similar to the United States, the United Kingdom provides a relevant comparison to the United States for evaluating its CT methodologies and its subsequent public sector interaction to fight terrorism. While underlying fundamental differences in governmental and operational structure exist that must be considered, the United Kingdom has a differing but comparable legal and political ideology. Additionally, the United Kingdom, along with Western Europe, has a significant history of combating terrorism—both religious and insurgent—and thus, provides a robust set of experiences, references, and responsive strategies for analysis. These factors offer up a unique opportunity to research the UK’s relationship with its public—to include corresponding legislation, doctrine, strategies, and programs—to determine their contribution to the UK’s success in domestic counterterrorism efforts, which has been literally ongoing since the early 1900s.

2. Governance

The United Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy in which the monarch may hold some limited influence but does not set public policy or install political leaders. The

²⁸² Kyle Johnston, “CONTEST 3: Progress for Transparency and Evaluation,” *RUSI*, July 14, 2011, <http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref%3AC4E1EEF67D24BE/#.UxZMaqSYbIU>.

United Kingdom is comprised of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, the latter three having their own form of devolved governance. The United Kingdom has a parliamentary form of governance, and the people do not directly elect the prime minister. Rather, this person is appointed by the monarch and comes from the political party that holds the largest number of seats in the House of Commons. However, even though the prime minister is not directly elected in a popular electoral format, the British system ensures voters know who will fulfill the various governmental roles when voting for a given party's representative in their voting district.²⁸³

The prime minister is not an independent considered an equal among peers—*primus inter pares*—and, in contrast to the United States, does not represent a separate branch of government. The constitutional monarchy has an established Parliament made up of an upper house known as the House of Lords. Not without periodic controversy throughout history, and in contrast to the United States, these members are not popularly elected. Rather, they are appointed due to their heritage, peerage, or ecclesiastic affiliation. Although overt religious interaction with the church is typically from a distance, no distinct separation of church and state exists under this system. The lower house is known as the House of Commons, and is comprised of popularly elected representatives. Although the majority of bills come from the House of Commons, both members can introduce bills for consideration and passage.²⁸⁴

3. Policing Structure

The United Kingdom is responsible for unifying policing services in England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, and its law enforcement responsibilities are encapsulated within three general categories. Similar to U.S. state and local agencies, the United Kingdom has regional (also known as territorial) police forces, some of which are still known as constabularies. The United Kingdom has 45 such police forces (39 in England, one in Scotland, four in Wales, and one in Northern Ireland) each lead by a

²⁸³ Nadav Morag, email message to author, April 29, 2014.

²⁸⁴ Nadav Morag, *Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011), 25.

chief constable.²⁸⁵ In addition, the United Kingdom has six other non-geographically arranged police agencies: British Transport Police, Central Motorway Policing Group, Civil Nuclear Constabulary, Ministry of Defence Police, Port of Dover Police and the National Crime Agency.²⁸⁶ These forces total approximately 153,574 officers.²⁸⁷

The United Kingdom has four primary intelligence agencies consisting of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6), the British Security Service (BSS or MI5), the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), and the Defense Intelligence Staff (DIS).²⁸⁸ While these agencies could be tangentially compared to the U.S. federal law enforcement level by virtue of their national jurisdictional scope, the UK model is significantly unique from the U.S. model in that these four agencies do not possess powers of arrest and are not directly involved in domestic law enforcement matters.²⁸⁹

This significant disparity between the U.S.'s nearly 18,000 law enforcement agencies and over 765,000 sworn officers,²⁹⁰ and the UK's 55 agencies and 153,574 officers must be noted. It cannot be overstated that when it comes to the multi-layers of policing, and the presumed effects on territoriality and information and intelligence sharing—among public agencies, as well as the private sector—it is apparent that the U.S. model creates measurable encumbrances not realized by the United Kingdom. This is not to say the United Kingdom does not have its own challenges relative to information sharing and CT, which reside in other categories subject to analysis.

²⁸⁵ Police UK, "UK Police Forces," last accessed February 25, 2014, <http://www.police.uk/forces/>.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ Gavin Berman and Aliyah Dar, "Police Service Strength, Library House of Commons," last updated July 25, 2013, <http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-papers/SN00634/Zpolice-service-strength>.

²⁸⁸ Morag, *Comparative Homeland Security*, 133.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Brian Reaves, "Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies: 2008," *U.S. Department of Justice: Office of Justice Programs-Bureau of Justice Statistics*, July 2011, 1, <http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cslea08.pdf>.

B. AN ANALYSIS OF THE UK'S COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS

1. A Long History of Strategy and Doctrine

Dating back to the 16th century British empire, the United Kingdom has a long history of interacting within conflict and terrorism environments. The UK's experience with terrorism and its more focused CT efforts span the entire 20th century dating back to the early 1900s with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and continuing on from the late 1960s with the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA).

In more recent times, the always-present terrorist threat in Northern Ireland and the newer confluence of al-Qaeda and affiliate terrorist organizations, and self-radicalized “lone wolf” actors has allowed—although not without significant struggle—the United Kingdom to be a veritable ongoing case study in national CT efforts. In 2010, Northern Ireland alone experienced 40 terrorist related attacks, and between 2009 and 2010, over 600 people were arrested for terrorist related activity in the United Kingdom.²⁹¹ This activity is substantiated by the UK’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) nearly continuous designation of the UK terrorism threat level as CRITICAL or SEVERE during much of the period from 2006 through 2010.²⁹²

In addition to its history in counterterrorism operations, the United Kingdom has a nearly equal history in the use of strategy and doctrine dating back to the British counter-insurgency doctrine in the early part of the 20th century.²⁹³ In 1998, in response to the recognition by the Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) that UK operations needed to have a clearer and long-term vision, it directed the establishment of *The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre* (DCDC) under the guidance of the Ministry of Defense (MoD).²⁹⁴ The DCDC is responsible for producing concepts and doctrine intended to

²⁹¹ Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, *CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism—July 2011* (London, The United Kingdom: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2011), 10.

²⁹² MI5 Security Service, “History of Terrorist Threat Levels,” last accessed February 28, 2014, <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/the-threats/terrorism/threat-levels.html#history>.

²⁹³ Crawshaw, “The Evolution of British Counter Insurgency (COIN),” 7–8.

²⁹⁴ Ministry of Defence, “Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre—What We Do,” last accessed February 28, 2014, <https://www.gov.uk/development-concepts-and-doctrine-centre#what-we-do>.

inform decision makers in “defence strategy, capability development and operations.”²⁹⁵ Presently, the DCDC contains more than 30 Joint Doctrine Publications (JDPs) written just within the past six years.²⁹⁶ It recognizes the purpose of doctrine is to educate and inform decision makers in the development of their own strategy and operations.²⁹⁷ The United Kingdom operates with a clear understanding of the difference between doctrine and strategy; using doctrine as an overarching guiding ideology and strategy as an operational tool that initiates and guides implementation.

A noteworthy distinction between the United States and the United Kingdom is that beyond its military application, the MoD contributes directly to domestic CT efforts, such as CONTEST through its “intelligence collection counter-terrorism capacity building” for law enforcement and security agencies.²⁹⁸ In the United States, this consistent level of involvement by the military in civilian law enforcement operations would be the exception rather than the rule.

2. A Brief History of CONTEST

Like the United States, the United Kingdom maintains a National Security Strategy that is periodically updated and published. It provides an overarching analysis of the UK national security environment and identifies strategies that will be implemented to address identified areas of concern. In response to the global threat of terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11, the Secretary of State for Defence directed a new chapter be added to the UK Strategic Defence Review.²⁹⁹ The United Kingdom, now concerned with the

²⁹⁵ Ministry of Defence, “Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre,” last accessed February 28, 2014, <https://www.gov.uk/development-concepts-and-doctrine-centre>.

²⁹⁶ GOV.UK, “Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) Series,” last update September 3, 2013, <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ministry-of-defence/series/joint-doctrine-publication-jdp>.

²⁹⁷ Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, *CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism—July 2011*, 122–123.

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ UK National Archives, “Ministry of Defence—Performance Report 2001/2002: Defence Policy,” last accessed February 28, 2014, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20131205100653/http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm56/5661/chap03.htm>.

threat of al-Qaeda, moved forward to update its strategy from Northern Ireland to pursue terrorists.³⁰⁰

The UK's CT strategy known as CONTEST (COUnter-TERRORism STrategy) was developed in 2003 as part of the UK's National Security Strategy. Initially, CONTEST followed typical national security strategic thinking in place at the time, and focused primarily on overseas and international terrorism.³⁰¹ Understanding that CT has a necessary domestic component, this new strategy eventually began to employ CT strategies focused within the UK's borders as well. Upon its development in 2003, CONTEST was originally a classified strategy and remained as such until 2006.³⁰² Upon evaluation of CONTEST, the United Kingdom saw terrorism as a complex threat and recognized that greater public awareness and understanding of the threat, coupled with community partnerships and citizen support, would be instrumental in successfully combating terrorism.³⁰³ In part to allow for this public engagement, the United Kingdom declassified CONTEST in 2006. However, from a methodological and operational perspective, CONTEST remained largely intact as written.

Based on the UK's experience with terrorism, the framers of CONTEST understood that terrorism would remain an asymmetric tactic for violent extremist groups, and therefore, it was prudent not to draft a CT strategy that communicated an expectation of outright elimination of terrorism or otherwise to guarantee 100 percent effectiveness.³⁰⁴ Therefore, the purpose of CONTEST is to reduce—not eliminate—the overall risk of terrorism and to allow people a sense of freedom of movement, normalcy, and confidence as they go about their daily lives.³⁰⁵ This pragmatic approach by the

³⁰⁰ Paul Smith (former UK government employee and current NPS CHDS adjunct faculty member) in phone discussion with the author, February 2, 2014.

³⁰¹ Her Majesty's Stationery Office, *CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism—July 2011*, 17.

³⁰² Johnston, "CONTEST 3: Progress for Transparency and Evaluation."

³⁰³ Secretary of State for the Home Department, *Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom's Strategy* (London: Her Majesty's Government: The Stationery Office Limited on Behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office, July 2006), 3.

³⁰⁴ Sir David Omand, "Securing the State: National Security and Secret Intelligence," *Center for Complex Organizations; Prism Magazine* 4, no. 3 (May 2013): 2.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

United Kingdom was drawn from hard lessons in Northern Ireland. Indeed, even as the United Kingdom implemented this new strategy to counter the terrorism narrative, it continued to deal with domestic terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland.

Implementation of this new strategy allowed for a comprehensive CT approach to domestic terrorist activities, which provided a unique opportunity to address the causes of terrorist ideologies through soft power approaches.³⁰⁶ This shift towards countering the terrorist ideological narrative as a “prevention” strategy was a departure from the more militaristic and “reactive” international, COIN focus of the past.

While similar to the “troubles” in Northern Ireland by virtue of its domestic application, this new ideological struggle is extremely dissimilar overall in comparison since decentralized and individualized actors do not represent a central form of governance with which to negotiate, and this type of terrorism is not ethnonationalist based. Therefore, HMG realized, it was going to be a long war that required a blend of hard and soft strategies, to include what became generally referred to as a “hearts and minds” campaign.³⁰⁷ This approach required an awareness that while it might be considered warfare, it included UK citizens, and not just foreign or military adversaries who would be engaged. In 2004, while discussing the development of CONTEST, former UK Security and Intelligence Coordinator, Sir David Omand, indicated that its CT efforts must effectively and clearly communicate its mandates to those who exercise authority in operations at the strategic and operational levels while still accounting for constitutional and legal frameworks.³⁰⁸

As a singular CT strategy, CONTEST has always contained four elements, identified as work streams, which include objectives and expected outcomes. The first three work streams are *Pursue*—intended to stop terrorist attacks through detection,

³⁰⁶ Deardorff, *The Roots of Our Children’s War: Identity and the War on Terrorism*, 74–76.

³⁰⁷ Ibid., 75.

³⁰⁸ Sir David Omand, Security & Intelligence Coordinator, Cabinet Office, “National Resilience Priorities for UK Government” (text of speech given to Royal United Services Institute—RUSI—July 1, 2004), *RUSI*, last accessed March 2, 2014, <http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C40AB913E66BA2/#.UxOvfKSYbIU>.

investigation, and disruption, in the United Kingdom and against UK interests overseas, *Protect*—intended to strengthen the United Kingdom and its infrastructures, and reduce its vulnerabilities to terrorist’s attacks, and *Prepare*—intended to mitigate the impact of terrorist’s attacks when they do occur.³⁰⁹ The fourth work stream, known as *Prevent*, was originally designed with a narrowly focused aim to disrupt terrorist activity by utilizing a more clandestine approach.³¹⁰ *Prevent*, in its current version, is the most relative to domestic CVE strategies.

a. *PREVENT—A Revised Focus on Community Support*

The defining quality of Prevent is that it has institutionalized an overt counter-terrorism policing capacity focused upon addressing individual and community level risks in a predictive and pre-emptive fashion.³¹¹

Over the last several years, the UK’s CT strategies and corresponding methodologies have continued to undergo significant change.³¹² In large part, this change is the result of the ongoing evaluation and annual assessment of its CT strategies by HMG to ensure that these strategies and tactics are responsive to the ever-changing community and threat environments. This process of assess, implement, evaluate, update, and re-implement should be viewed as a positive, self-evaluative process. The *Pursue*, *Protect* and *Prepare* work streams of CONTEST have largely evolved in congruence with these CT methodologies, essentially remaining within that CT structure. *Prevent*, however, has continued to undergo the most significant transformation since the creation of CONTEST.³¹³

³⁰⁹ Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, *CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism—July 2011*, 10—13.

³¹⁰ Innes, Roberts, and Inness, *Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers*, 16.

³¹¹ Ibid., 3.

³¹² Ibid., 16.

³¹³ Ibid.

A main concern for the *Prevent* strategy has been to establish greater community trust and methods of engagement between law enforcement and communities.³¹⁴

In response to complaints about the secrecy surrounding security services and intelligence gathering activities under CONTEST, in 2009, CONTEST underwent a major rewrite as part of HMG’s new approach to open up its CT strategies in an effort to be more transparent in hopes of building greater public trust and support.³¹⁵ Known as CONTEST II, this new strategy directly resulted in a significant change in scope and purpose for the *Prevent* strand in particular.³¹⁶ This new approach appears to be the beginning of the transformation away from intelligence gathering functions—now a function of the *Pursue* work stream—and towards community-based programs focused on holistic societal efforts to prevent extremism. Within CONTEST II, *Prevent* now focused on three types of activities.

- Counter-radicalization—focuses upon inhibiting the spread and influence of extremist ideas both generally and in specific cases
- De-radicalization—involves acts to reduce the influence of extremist ideas where they have gained traction
- Community Cohesion Building—is focused upon increasing the resilience of communities so that they are less likely to be influenced by extremist views³¹⁷

In the October 2010 National Security Strategy, HMG listed CT as a highest national security priority.³¹⁸ Additionally, the strategy suggested an upcoming fundamental change to the previous CT strategy by calling for “[A] radical

³¹⁴ Ibid., 87.

³¹⁵ Johnston, “CONTEST 3: Progress for Transparency and Evaluation.”

³¹⁶ Innes, Roberts, and Inness, *Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers*, 11.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ The Stationery Office Limited, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty* (London: The United Kingdom: The Stationery Office Limited on Behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, October 2010), 28.

transformation in the way we think about national security and organise ourselves to protect it.”³¹⁹

A year later, in June 2011, the most current version of CONTEST—known as CONTEST 3—was published.³²⁰ Again, as evidenced by the ongoing annual reassessment of its CT strategy, this updated version of the *Prevent* work stream continued the migration towards a truly community-based and community-led counter-radicalization program. This current version focuses on challenging the supporting ideology of terrorism, protecting vulnerable individuals, and supporting communities and organizations in which a risk of radicalization exists.³²¹ It is a multi-discipline, community-minded approach that is much more than an intervention strategy; it seeks to eliminate the roots of the radicalization process altogether. This focus shift has led to the inclusion of an already existing and familiar program known as Channel (described in more detail in the next section) as an effective community-based and community-led program for those GOs (governmental organizations) and NGOs (non-governmental organizations) already engaged with assisting at risk individuals in their communities.³²²

Success of *Prevent* is essential to the success of CONTEST and the UK’s CT efforts overall. In recognition of this need, the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT), in partnership with communities and local governments, developed a 40-page guide to assist local partners and communities in the delivery of the *Prevent* strategy.³²³ To help raise awareness of *Prevent* and to better recognize and understand when to support an individual who may be in need of services, a two-hour training program called Workshop to Raise Awareness of *Prevent* (WRAP) is provided to front line staff across

³¹⁹ Ibid., 3.

³²⁰ Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, *CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism—July 2011*, 9.

³²¹ HM Government, *Channel: Protecting Vulnerable People from Being Drawn into Terrorism. A Guide for Local Partnerships* (London, The United Kingdom: HM Government, October 2012), 4,

³²² Ibid.

³²³ Her Majesty’s Government, *Delivering the Prevent Strategy: An Updated Guide for Local Partners* (London, The United Kingdom: Her Majesty’s Government, August 2009), 4.

all sectors.³²⁴ This program supports the common understanding that CONTEST 3, and the *Prevent* strategy in particular, is a transparent CT strategy that engages the public and offers them a meaningful role in CT efforts.³²⁵

Although the UK's National Security Strategy does not specifically reference CONTEST or *Prevent* by name, CONTEST 3 is an obvious example of the National Security Strategy's reference to the radical change in the UK's CT strategy. A significant undertaking, *Prevent*, while still focusing on addressing radicalization by countering terrorist ideology, is now enjoined in partnerships with multiple public-private sectors of the community.³²⁶ In a review of multiple studies conducted during the evolution of *Prevent*, it can be demonstrated that the processes and practices guided by *Prevent* have also matured and evolved as a result of the *Prevent* reconfigurations.³²⁷ *Prevent* has now developed into the preeminent ingredient of CONTEST's CVE strategy.

3. Channel—A Localized Community-Based Partnership Program in Support of *Prevent*

a. Overview

Surveyed as part of a 2011 *Assessment of Prevent* study by researchers at Cardiff University, UK law enforcement agencies indicated that they have come to understand that *Prevent* has developed into a blend of methodologies that integrate traditional CT elements with good neighborhood policing practices. Further, they also understand that *Prevent* is not only enhanced but may even be dependent on these more localized policing practices.³²⁸ The Channel program is a good example of how this national strategy guides, supports, and blends with more localized community policing efforts.

³²⁴ HM Government, *Channel: Protecting Vulnerable People from Being Drawn into Terrorism. A Guide for Local Partnerships*, 13.

³²⁵ Johnston, "CONTEST 3: Progress for Transparency and Evaluation."

³²⁶ Her Majesty's Stationery Office, *CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism—July 2011*, 11–12.

³²⁷ Innes, Roberts, and Inness, *Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers*, 4.

³²⁸ Ibid., 3.

The Channel program, developed as a pilot program in 2007, is based on similar successful initiatives designed to support individuals “at risk from involvement in gangs, drugs and other social issues.”³²⁹ Repurposing this successful programmatic structure, Channel provides “[S]upport to people at risk of being drawn towards support for or involvement in all forms of terrorism including that which is perpetrated by the extreme far-right.”³³⁰

With a goal of early recognition, assessment, and intervention for both children and adults, Channel is well placed within already existing collaborative local community partnerships in an effort “[T]o identify individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism; assess the nature and extent of that risk; and develop the most appropriate support plan for the individuals.”³³¹ Channel partnership agencies include education, health, social services, children’s and youth services, offender management services (prisons and probation), law enforcement, and other local community organizations.³³² The United Kingdom recognizes that these local individuals, organizations, and communities are best positioned to recognize an at-risk individual’s generally uncharacteristic behavior via changes in routine, ideology, and traditionally normative patterns of social engagement. Today, Channel operates in all of England and Wales, and is a key element of the *Prevent* strategy.³³³

³²⁹ Association of Chief Police Officers, “National Channel Referral Figures,” accessed April 22, 2014, <http://www.acpo.police.uk/ACPOBusinessAreas/PREVENT/NationalChannelReferralFigures.aspx>.

³³⁰ Ibid.

³³¹ Association of Chief Police Officers, “Channel—Protecting Vulnerable People from Being Drawn into Terrorism,” accessed April 23, 2014, <http://www.acpo.police.uk/ACPOBusinessAreas/PREVENT/Channel.aspx>.

³³² Her Majesty’s Government, *Channel: Protecting Vulnerable People from Being Drawn into Terrorism. A Guide for Local Partnerships* (London, The United Kingdom: Her Majesty’s Government, August 2012), 8, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118194/channel-guidance.pdf.

³³³ Association of Chief Police Officers, “Channel—Protecting Vulnerable People from Being Drawn into Terrorism.”

b. A Guide for Local Partnerships

The *Channel: Protecting Vulnerable People from Being Drawn into Terrorism. A Guide for Local Partnerships*, and an accompanying vulnerability assessment framework (discussed in more detail in section 3c.), are provided to community organizations as a resource tool to assist with behavior recognition, intervention, and access to resources. The guide is a comprehensive 30-page strategy that first articulates the national overarching strategy to reduce terrorism (the UK's NSS), then the objective of CONTEST and its *Prevent* work stream—identifying *Prevent* as a national program in support of the NSS but focused at the local level—and finally, the strategy of Channel to provide specific programmatic resources in support of *Prevent*.³³⁴

Channel is emphasized as a key element of *Prevent* and its purpose is clearly articulated within the guide. The purpose of Channel is the following.

- Provide advice for local partnerships on how to deliver Channel projects
- Explain why people may turn towards terrorism and describe indicators that may suggest they are doing so
- Provide advice on the support that can be provided to safeguard those at risk of being targeted by terrorists and radicalisers³³⁵

In addition to recognizing CONTEST and *Prevent*, the resource guide identifies other more localized programs already in place and operated by many of the very same partnership agencies. Recognizing them as parallel to *Prevent*, these programs include the multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) program that guides how to manage individuals being released from custody (akin to the U.S. probation/parole

³³⁴ Her Majesty's Government, *Channel: Protecting Vulnerable People from Being Drawn into Terrorism. A Guide for Local Partnerships*.

³³⁵ Ibid., 5.

model), the working together to safeguard children program conducted by the Department for Education and the Building Partnerships, Staying Safe: Guidance for Healthcare Organizations Program conducted by the Department of Health.³³⁶ Recognizing these programs by name and then emphasizing that they should be operated ““alongside” Channel communicates their equality in importance as part of the greater system of programmatic strategies designed to positively impact and safeguard communities. For partnerships to be effective, a clear framework must exist for understanding the roles of both partners, their relationships among the partners, and the identified areas requiring cooperation.³³⁷ This level of detailed explanation regarding the relationship and role of each organization and the separate-but-equal parallel programs recognizes the systems approach to CVE. This reinforces the importance of good communication as an important element of an effective strategy. In the case of Channel, this approach informs, educates, and empowers these local partnerships to ensure they are not only a stakeholder, but also, an engaged participant in the battle against VE.

Beyond the stated purpose and the explanation of partnership roles and parallel programs, the guide outlines the actual referral and determination process. This program is overseen by a multi-agency panel, and includes a designated police practitioner responsible for coordination of Channel. This police coordinator can either be a wholly dedicated Channel coordinator closely aligned with *Prevent* (in the case of larger communities), or as a portion of the duties of an officer in smaller communities. Regardless, these coordinating officers are identified as either the *Prevent* engagement officer (PEO) or the single point of contact (SPOC) officer.³³⁸

³³⁶ Ibid., 6.

³³⁷ European Network and Information Security Agency, *Cooperative Models for Effective Public Private Partnerships: Good Practice Guide*(Heraklion, Crete, Greece: ENAISA, 2011), 11.

³³⁸ Her Majesty’s Government, *Channel: Protecting Vulnerable People from Being Drawn into Terrorism. A Guide for Local Partnerships*, 7–8.

Surveys of these coordinating officers (identified as *Prevent* or CT officers) conducted as part of a 2011 study by researchers at Cardiff University indicate these officers often feel as if they must navigate the conflicts between the role of CT intelligence officer and the community engagement officer.³³⁹ The distinctly differing actions required of these two roles, along with the perceptions by the community, can negatively affect the relationship between law enforcement and the community. Presumably in its efforts to continue towards seeking trust and engaging in transparency, Channel addresses these ISE concerns in three separate sections of the guide: the *Sharing Information* section and two annex documents entitled *Sharing Information with Partners*, and *Freedom of Information* (FOI).³⁴⁰ The first two sentences of the *Sharing Information* section state “Channel is **not** [sic] a process for gathering intelligence. It is a process for providing support to the people at risk” and continues by recommending an information-sharing agreement be utilized at the local level.³⁴¹

c. A Vulnerability Assessment Framework

The vulnerability assessment framework—known as safeguarding and the common assessment framework (CAF)—contains a 22 characteristic guidepost to assist local partnerships in determining whether individuals meet the criteria to be placed in the Channel program.³⁴² The framework explicitly acknowledges that the presence of any of these characteristics does not imply that a person will always be drawn to terrorism or commit a terrorist act; rather, the presence of certain characteristics may be indicators of extremism or vulnerability towards committing illegal acts.³⁴³ These characteristics are contained within three primary sections of the assessment framework: *engagement* with a

³³⁹ Innes, Roberts, and Inness, *Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers*, 18.

³⁴⁰ Ibid., 10, 23–29.

³⁴¹ Innes, Roberts, and Inness, *Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers*, 10.

³⁴² Her Majesty’s Government, *Channel: Vulnerability Assessment Framework* (London, United Kingdom: Her Majesty’s Government, October 2012), 1–3.

³⁴³ Ibid.

group, cause, or ideology, *intent* to cause harm, and *capability* to cause harm.³⁴⁴ Understanding the engagement-intent-capability framework and attendant characteristics allows the opportunity for early intervention and placement in the Channel program and access to particular resources that may be most beneficial to the individual.

Figure 4 represents the complete cycle of the Channel process. Utilizing the Channel guide and vulnerability assessment framework, the process begins with the identification and referral of a person who may be exhibiting vulnerability characteristics towards extremism and violence. A referral can come from public agency employees, the police, or the community at large.³⁴⁵ The diagram exhibits the overall step-by-step process as a person moves through the Channel program. Note two important items in the Channel process diagram.

- The diagram consists of two exit points—one in the Referral Screening step and the other at the Preliminary Assessment step. If and when people are exited from Channel, they may be referred to other assistance programs. Regardless, all exited cases will be reviewed again between six and 12 months from their exit date.³⁴⁶ This review is an excellent example of the importance of partnership programs identified in the guide, which offer a collaborative community approach to these intervention and prevention strategies.
- As noted by the two directional arrows, after the Multi-Agency Panel creates an appropriate support package, and the support package has been implemented, an ongoing evaluation of the program's effectiveness—and by implication the individual's progress—continually occurs in the form of an evaluative feedback loop. This non-linear approach is an effective method of ensuring the program is not stagnant in its efforts to realize a successful resolution that benefits the individual and the community.³⁴⁷

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ Her Majesty's Government, *Channel: Protecting Vulnerable People from Being Drawn into Terrorism. A Guide for Local Partnerships*, 13–14, 16.

³⁴⁶ Her Majesty's Government, *Channel: Protecting Vulnerable People from Being Drawn into Terrorism. A Guide for Local Partnerships*, 18.

³⁴⁷ Ibid., 15.




Figure 4. The Channel Process³⁴⁸

d. *Referral Data*

Like many prevention efforts, data used to quantify the “number of incidents prevented” or which are otherwise directly attributable to prevention “successes” is difficult to measure. Measurement of reduction in terrorist events overall has many variables; intervention programs just being one of them. In these circumstances, data on the types and numbers of available resources, and subsequent program participation, are most relevant.

Data on Channel has been kept since April 2006. From April 2006 through March 31, 2013, 2,653 referrals were made to Channel.³⁴⁹ Figure 5 provides a breakdown of these referrals by year. Other relevant data was not broken down by year but was collated

³⁴⁸ Her Majesty’s Government. *Channel: Protecting Vulnerable People from Being Drawn into Terrorism. A Guide for Local Partnerships.*

³⁴⁹ Association of Chief Police Officers, “National Channel Referral Figures.”

in aggregate during the same time period. Of the 2,653 referrals, 587 (22 percent) were deemed by the Multi-Agency Panel to have met the criteria to enter into the Channel program, and the remaining 2,066 referrals were deemed to not have met the criteria for admission into Channel, but were directed to other services as deemed appropriate.³⁵⁰ Of the 2,653 referrals 1,723 were adults and 930 were juvenile.³⁵¹ See Figure 6.

**2,653 - the total number of referrals to CHANNEL
April 2006 through March 31, 2013**




Figure 5. Number of Referrals to Channel, April 2006 through March 31, 2013

**2007-2013
Adult v. Juvenile referrals
Accepted to Channel v. referred to other
services**




Figure 6. Data on Referrals Accepted to Channel vs. Other Services, 2007 through 2013

³⁵⁰ Association of Chief Police Officers, "National Channel Referral Figures."

³⁵¹ Ibid.

C. AREAS OF CONCERN

Over the last 11 years in particular, mainly as a result of the 9/11, 2001, Madrid 2004, and London 2005 terrorist attacks, the organizational structures and methodologies surrounding CT efforts have continually evolved in the United Kingdom.³⁵² This evolution of structures and methodologies also includes significant changes to the legal framework used to guide and direct CT efforts. However, these legislative changes in particular have not occurred without debate.

1. Expansive Terrorism Legislation

One overarching concern by some in the United Kingdom has been the expansive reach of UK terrorism legislation. As an example, language in the UK *Terrorism Act* 2006 (TA 2006) intended to assist in deterrence measures under the *Prevent* concept lists offenses, such as the *encouragement* and *glorification* “whether in the past, in the future or generally”³⁵³ of terrorism through written or verbal means that can apply to “a statement that is likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences.”³⁵⁴ Broadly worded legislation, such as that contained in the TA 2006, can be viewed as empowering the government to target innocent, non-terrorist, citizens.³⁵⁵ In fact, *Prevent* is premised on the disruptive intervention model since it is recognized as an effective model for addressing extremist anti-social and undesirable activities.³⁵⁶ However, these activities are not illegal per se, and a struggle noted in the earlier versions of *Prevent* was a lack of awareness and confidence in law enforcement to engage in

³⁵² Innes, Roberts, and Inness, *Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers*, 16.

³⁵³ (The citation refers directly to the term glorification contained in the Act), Legislation.gov.uk, “Terrorism Act 2006,” accessed April 22, 2014, <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/section/1>.

³⁵⁴ Legislation.gov.uk, “Terrorism Act 2006.”

³⁵⁵ Emmanouela Mylonaki and Tim Burton, “An Assessment of UK Anti-Terrorism Strategy and the Human Rights Implications Associated with its Implementation,” *Journal on Terrorism and Security Affairs* 6 (2011): 1.

³⁵⁶ Innes, Roberts, and Inness, *Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers*, 4.

disruptive intervention tactics appropriately.³⁵⁷ This issue has largely been addressed as part of the transformative process of *Prevent* discussed earlier.³⁵⁸

In the most recent update, Counterterrorism Act 2008, the legislation actually broadens the definition of terrorism from the 2006 iteration that caused ambiguity in determining when “views sympathetic to terrorism amount to encouragement,” and thus, potentially violate the law.³⁵⁹ At worst, such broad reaching legislation carries the risk of actually radicalizing otherwise innocent individuals offended by government infringements.³⁶⁰ While well intended in the battle against terrorism, these types of provisions—particularly those codified into law—can actually be counterproductive in their CT efforts and attempts to forge community partnerships and trust.

2. Interaction with Muslim Communities

A second notable concern is the subject of targeted focus upon Muslims and their communities by the police to further CVE efforts. Due to its liberal post-war immigration policies, the United Kingdom is considered a pluralist nation. This policy, along with its geographical proximity to the Muslim world, has resulted in a significant Muslim immigrant population over the last several decades.³⁶¹ According to the Pew Research Center, in 2010—the most recent year for which data is available—an estimated 2.8 million Muslims live in the United Kingdom, which comprises 4.6 percent of the total population.³⁶² Muslims continue to be the fastest growing segment of Europe’s population.³⁶³ Muslims are, and will continue to be, an integral part of the UK social fabric, and an important partner in the UK’s efforts to combat VE.

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

³⁵⁸ Ibid.

³⁵⁹ Mylonaki and Burton, “An Assessment of UK Anti-Terrorism Strategy and the Human Rights Implications Associated with its Implementation,” 9.

³⁶⁰ Ibid., 1.

³⁶¹ Morag, *Comparative Homeland Security*, 177–178.

³⁶² Pew Research, “Religion and Public Life Project, “Number of Muslims in Western Europe,” September 15, 2010, <http://www.pewforum.org/2010/09/15/muslim-networks-and-movements-in-western-europe/>.

³⁶³ Morag, *Comparative Homeland Security*, 177.

As noted in the chapter research, the issue of police roles—intelligence gathering versus community caretaker—was of particular concern in the first two iterations of CONTEST. Primarily due to a lack of trust and lack of desire for engagement, Muslim communities prefer to address problems internally initially using informal social interventions rather than involving the police.³⁶⁴ In a 2010 report for the House of Commons, the Communities and Local Government Committee noted, “We remain concerned by the number of our witnesses who felt that Prevent had been used to ‘spy’ on Muslim communities. Our evidence suggests that differing interpretations of terminology relating to concepts such as ‘intelligence gathering’, ‘spying’ and ‘surveillance’ are posing major challenges to the Prevent agenda.”³⁶⁵ In stark contrast to this position, HMG indicated in its 2011 *Prevent* strategy framework that no evidence exists to support this claim; however, it reaffirmed that to improve trust, “Prevent must not be used as a means for covert spying on people or communities.”³⁶⁶

The relevance of the justification for either position is tangential to the more critical matter that perceptions of such actions in fact exist and it is these perceptions that can erode trust and damage the relationship. This belief is particularly critical to CT efforts since, although *Prevent* and Channel are not purported to be religious or ethnicity focused, the predominant threat of terrorism is from Islamist extremists who attack Muslims, and as a result, these two programs are prevalent within Muslim communities.³⁶⁷

In 2011, CONTEST 3 was significantly re-tooled and re-implemented with a particular focus on these concerns. Laudably, HMG has gone to great efforts in rewriting these strategies to emphasize a focus on the behavioral characteristics and not the ethnicity or religion of a person.

³⁶⁴ Innes, Roberts, and Inness, *Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers*, 87.

³⁶⁵ Communities and Local Government Committee, House of Commons, *Preventing Violent Extremism: Sixth Report of Session 2009–10* (London: The Stationery Office Limited, March 2010), 3.

³⁶⁶ Her Majesty’s Government, Secretary of State for the Home Department, *Prevent Strategy* (London, the Stationery Office Limited on Behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, October 2010), 6.

³⁶⁷ Association of Chief Police Officers, “National Channel Referral Figures.”

D. CONCLUSION

The UK's experience with domestic terrorism—to include intermittent success and failures over an extended period of time—is generally considered to have been successful in thwarting homegrown terrorist threats.³⁶⁸ The NSS, CONTEST-*Prevent* and Channel together present as a strong example of an amalgamated system of strategies that support a common overarching ideology communicating how the United Kingdom approaches self-radicalization and VE.

This overall result is an inward facing, actionable, and interconnected system of implemented domestic CT strategies, evaluated by scholars, the public, and HMG, then redesigned and re-implemented over time, all with the common purpose to combat self-radicalization and VE. Further, this structured and transparent use of strategy allows for an ongoing analysis of the “social contract” between the government and its people while ensuring public and private sectors are on the same page—not to mean agreement—when it comes to CT efforts. The resulting benefit allows the public to engage in meaningful discourse on the topic and feel their opinions are valued. This objective is also accomplished by blending existing community organizations and their programs through collaborative interactions that synergize the overall effectiveness of each program. By this inclusion, communities are stakeholders and partners in the greater CT effort. According to former British Security Service officer Paul Smith, “Throughout this review process, the British Government regarded its counterterrorism strategy as a national policy, which incorporates economic, educational and social policy, and foreign affairs, as well as purely defence, security and intelligence matters.”³⁶⁹ This viewpoint is evidenced by the approach of *Prevent* and Channel in particular.

This preventive programmatic concept would fit well within the U.S. NSCT and the U.S. CVE strategy. This concept also recognizes that, if implemented properly, and with awareness of the cautions outlined above, an effective domestic strategy to counter

³⁶⁸ Deardorff, *The Roots of our Children's War: Identity and the War on Terrorism*, 42–43.

³⁶⁹ Paul Smith, “Counterterrorism in the United Kingdom: Module II: Policy Response,” *Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security*, slide 3, last accessed March 3, 2014, https://www.chds.us/coursefiles/comp/lectures/comp_CT_in_the_UK_mod02_ss/player.html.

self-radicalization and VE can be successfully administered at the national level and implemented at the local level.

This chapter examined the UK's efforts in CT, including a brief look at its transition from hard power to soft power philosophy in its CT application. This chapter then examined the UK CVE strategies known as CONTEST-*Prevent* and Channel that offer themselves as detailed programs for study.

The goal of the chapter was to develop a better understanding of the UK's approach, both philosophically and practically, to countering terrorism overall and self-radicalization and VE, in particular. This evaluation can now join the earlier U.S. evaluation and together serve as a backdrop for the analysis of Australia's approach towards CT and CVE.

VI. THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

This chapter examines the CT efforts of The Commonwealth of Australia (hereafter referred to as Australia), including a view of Australia's philosophical shift in its attitude towards terrorism—both domestic and non-state actor—as well as its resulting domestic CT strategies. This change in philosophy is particularly significant relative to its CVE strategies. This chapter also provides a broad overview of Australia's ethos, its two-tiered governance structure, its policing structure, and its use of strategy as an effective communication tool used by the government to guide its approach to CT efforts over its history. This chapter then briefly views the history and evolution of Australia's immigration policies and their relevancy to current terrorism and CVE challenges. The chapter then explores the progression of terrorism, as well as both the current and future terrorist threats to Australia as a result of the ongoing Syrian civil war. This is of particular relevance to Australia's CVE programs and the likely possibility they will be tested in the near term due to this emerging threat. The chapter then briefly reviews the history of CT as a formalized strategy—commonly referred to as agreements—as well as an examination of Australia's maturation towards its now robust menu of CVE programs, including its specially designated CVE unit and the building community resilience grants program. In addition to exploring Australia's development and implementation of these programs, the chapter reviews Australia's well-chosen placement of these programs to emphasize the outreach and community-based focus while minimizing their reliance on law enforcement. This approach offers guidance, resources, and extensive support to local community-based organizations to help Australia recognize and prevent self-radicalization and VE.

The goal of the chapter is to develop a better understanding of Australia's approach, both philosophically and practically, to countering terrorism overall and self-radicalization and VE in particular. This evaluative process contributes to this thesis by offering an alternative approach to dealing with these issues and providing potential applicable attributes for consideration by the United States as it considers its updates and improvements to its own CT strategies related to self-radicalization and VE.

A. OVERVIEW OF AUSTRALIA

To provide context to Australia as a relevant case study for analysis of its CT philosophy and resulting strategies, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of Australia's ethos, history, and governance and policing structure. These foundational elements, along with the specific CT strategies discussed in this chapter, add to the relevance of Australia as a pertinent subject of study for the United States.

Noticeably evident is Australia's similarities to the United Kingdom, which shares many of its formal cultural and governance compositions. However, in an equivalent number of ways, Australia is also similar to the United States relative to its historical transition from British colonies, elements of its governance model, progression as a more autonomous country, the evolution of its relationship with an already indigenous population, and its geographic size. Many of these elements are cause for recognition of Australia and its parallel processes relative to domestic CT efforts.

In stark contrast to the United Kingdom, Australia has enjoyed a long history of relative freedom from terrorism.³⁷⁰ Additionally, when looking specifically at the transformative process towards radicalization as a component of terrorism, Australia ranks lower than the United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, and the United States.³⁷¹ This is not to say Australia is free from terrorism or VE. Australia's overall risk from terrorism has substantially increased because of its close alliance with the United States, and support for post-9/11 conflicts promulgated by the United States in the GWOT.³⁷² In spite of Australia's relatively benign history of terrorism, the Australian governments—both federal and state—have been quick to act by displaying a proactive rather than reactive approach towards its counterterrorism efforts. The result is an array of highly directed CVE programmatic strategies intended to engage and support local communities

³⁷⁰ Morag, *Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons*, 74.

³⁷¹ Carl Ungerer, "Beyond bin Laden: Future Trends in Terrorism," *The Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, December 2011, 9.

³⁷² Peter Chalk, Richard Warnes, Lindsay Clutterbuck, and Aidan Kirby, *Considering the Creation of a Domestic Intelligence Agency in the United States: Lessons from the Experiences of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom*, ed. Brian Jackson (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 13.

with the objective of preventing the environmental conditions necessary for VE to take root initially. For comparative purposes, while not as lengthy in its overall history as that of the United Kingdom, Australia does use strategy to communicate its philosophies effectively and guide its actions. As a result, the Australian CT strategies discussed in this chapter offer a creditable example of programs that can be effectively implemented during a time when VE is perceived as manageable—the current environment in the United States—and not critical.

1. Ethos

The United States and Australia are comparable countries that face similar challenges in their efforts to combat domestic and international terrorism. As noted, while both have had minor incidents of terrorism over the course of their histories—the 9/11 attacks notwithstanding—they both have been relatively isolated from the long history of domestic terrorism seen by European countries. While this geographic isolation may have been useful in the past, globalization, and the increased number, frequency, and relative ease with which people travel, has relegated the relative geographic isolation irrelevant.³⁷³

While underlying fundamental differences exist in governmental and operational structure that must be considered, Australia has a differing but comparable legal and political ideology. Australia also supports Western values, democracy, and the rule of law, and therefore, it shares a common ideology with the United States and other democratic countries. Australia's connection to the United States, in particular, is further entrenched by Prime Minister Julia Gillard's acknowledgement within the national security strategy of the importance of Australia's alliance with the United States, which identifies this relationship as one of Australia's eight pillars of national security.³⁷⁴ The United States is the only country recognized with such a distinction to be considered part of the foundation of Australia's national security. As a result, Australia may be viewed in

³⁷³ Chalk et al., *Considering the Creation of a Domestic Intelligence Agency in the United States: Lessons from the Experiences of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom*, 13.

³⁷⁴ Australian Government, *Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia's National Security* (Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2013), ii, 22.

a similar fashion as the United States by other nations, extremist terrorist organizations, and those predisposed to self-radicalization within their own borders. In fact, Australia's close alliance with the United States, and its geopolitical influence, may act as an aggravator towards the potential for extremism and self-radicalization in the near term within Australia. This concept is explored further in the "Syrian Conflict and Its Threat to Australia" and the "View Ahead—Future Terrorism Challenges for Australia" sections of this chapter. These factors offer up a unique opportunity to research Australia's relationship with its public—to include corresponding legislation, strategies, and programs—to determine their effectiveness in contributing to Australia's relative freedom from significant events of domestic terrorism.

2. History and Governance

Australia, the world's sixth largest country by land mass, is an island continent that also includes the island of Tasmania and several smaller islands. British colonization began in 1788, and the island evolved into six separately governed British colonies.³⁷⁵ Paradoxically, the U.S.-Australian connection may have its origins around this period. Because of the defeat of Britain in the American Revolution, Britain lost its 13 North American colonies and began to pursue new territories in a desire to establish replacement colonies under British rule.³⁷⁶ Much like North America, an already established indigenous population lived on the island when British colonizers arrived. These native inhabitants, aborigines and Torres Strait islanders, quickly began to dwindle in population. Today, they comprise approximately 2.4 percent (460,000) of Australia's estimated 22 million people.³⁷⁷

On January 1, 1901, British Parliament passed legislation allowing the six colonies—who each independently voted as well—to govern themselves as part of a commonwealth. A constitutional monarchy was established and The Commonwealth of

³⁷⁵ Hometown Australia, "History of Australia," accessed July 14, 2014, <http://www.hometownaustralia.com/index.php/41-general/11-history-of-australia>.

³⁷⁶ One World-Nations Online, "History of Australia," accessed May 4, 2014, <http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/History/Australia-history.htm>.

³⁷⁷ Australia.gov.au, "Our People," accessed May 4, 2014, <http://australia.gov.au/about-australia/our-country/our-people>.

Australia was created. The constitution itself was written in the years preceding the legislation with each colony providing a representative.³⁷⁸ Like the United States, the Australian Constitution defines its governmental structure, applicable authorities and procedures, and the rights and obligations of the states.³⁷⁹ Each of the six states also maintains its own state constitution and local government structure.³⁸⁰ This division of power between Australia's central government and the individual state governments created the federal system of governance in existence today. Like the United States, Australia has an established capital city (Canberra), which is not part of a state. Rather, the region is identified as the Australian Capital Region (ACT) and operates in a manner akin to the District of Columbia in the United States.

Like the United Kingdom, Australia is a constitutional monarchy. Due in part to its direct lineage to Britain, the Australian monarch is also the British monarch.³⁸¹ However, in the case of Australia—and Canada and New Zealand as well—the monarch appoints a Governor-General as the monarchs' representative. As such, the Governor-General maintains wide authoritative power, but in practice, typically only acts upon advice from ministers.³⁸² Australia blends its monarchy with its federal and parliamentary systems and—like the United States—has established distinctly separate legislative, executive, and judicial branches of its government.³⁸³

Its parliamentary system is comprised of a lower house (House of Representatives) and an upper house (Senate), with the House of Representatives maintaining 150 members and the Senate maintaining 76 members.³⁸⁴ The Senate

³⁷⁸ Australia.gov.au, “Australia’s Federation,” accessed May 2, 2014, <http://australia.gov.au/about-australia/our-government/australias-federation>.

³⁷⁹ Parliament of Australia, “The Australian Constitution,” accessed May 2, 2014, http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/Constitution.aspx.

³⁸⁰ Australia.gov.au, “Our Government,” accessed May 2, 2014, <http://australia.gov.au/about-australia/our-government>.

³⁸¹ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Australian Government, “About Australia,” accessed May 4, 2014, http://www.dfat.gov.au/facts/sys_gov.html.

³⁸² Ibid.

³⁸³ Australia.gov.au, “Our Government.”

³⁸⁴ Morag, *Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons*, 36.

membership is comprised of two members from each of the six states, two members from the northern territory, and two from the Australian Capital Region.³⁸⁵ Similar to the United States, and unlike the United Kingdom, members of both houses are popularly elected.³⁸⁶ Unlike both the United States and the United Kingdom, voting in Australia is compulsory for citizens over 18 and failure to do so can result in a fine or prosecution.³⁸⁷

Overall, Australia's governmental structure is recognized as a liberal democracy and is founded on the democratic values of freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of association, and the rule of law.³⁸⁸ Much of Australia's philosophy toward these democratic values is reflected by its inclusion and endorsement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.³⁸⁹ While Australia's roots come from the British model of governance, it has also incorporated many recognizable elements of the U.S. model, and blended these two models with elements unique to Australia, resulting in an effective federal-state-local system of governance. The symbiotic relationship between these three levels of governance may factor into its ability to develop, implement, and support successful CVE programs, which also allows for a close comparison to the U.S. governance structure and its potential corollary impact on similar CVE programmatic strategies in the United States.

3. Policing Structure

The policing structure in Australia is a two-tiered system comprised of a federal agency known as the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and eight state police forces. These eight state agencies represent the six states proper, the Northern Territory, and the ACT. The six state agencies are the New South Wales Police, Queensland Police, South Australia Police, Tasmania Police, Victoria Police and Western Australia Police. The

³⁸⁵ Australia.gov.au, "Our Government."

³⁸⁶ Morag, *Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons*, 36.

³⁸⁷ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Australian Government, "About Australia."

³⁸⁸ Ibid.

³⁸⁹ Australian Human Rights Commission, "Australia and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights," accessed May 4, 2014, <https://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/australia-and-universal-declaration-human-rights>.

Northern Territory Police—an independent police agency—provide police services to the Northern Territory. The AFP is responsible for providing police services to the ACT through a police services agreement and delivers this service through its designated ACT police program. With the exception of the AFP officers assigned to the ACT, these state agencies employ approximately 50,000 sworn officers.³⁹⁰ Beyond these two levels, no other police agencies exist.

The AFP has 4,270 sworn officers, and in addition to domestic federal level responsibilities and the ACT agreement, provides police service to external territories, such as Christmas Island, Cocos Island, Jervis Bay, and Norfolk Island.³⁹¹ The AFP also maintains an International Deployment Group (IDG) by which officers are assigned to various overseas locations, such as the Solomon Islands, Cyprus, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, and Papua New Guinea.³⁹² The mission of the AFP has changed significantly in recent years requiring a greater focus on national and international operations to include its CT efforts.³⁹³

Australia has four primary intelligence agencies consisting of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), the Defense Intelligence Organization (DIO), and the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD).³⁹⁴ Similar to the British Security Service, the ASIO engages in domestic intelligence and security services but possesses no independent arrest authority, and therefore, any limited detentions must be conducted through the AFP.³⁹⁵ ASIS, similar to the UK SIS and the U.S. CIA, is Australia's foreign intelligence service. Through the collection and distribution of secret intelligence, its primary focus is on

³⁹⁰ Australian Institute of Criminology: Australian Government, “Australian Crime: Facts and Figures: 2011,” last modified March 3, 2012, http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/facts/1-20/2011/7_resources.html.

³⁹¹ Australian Police Force, “AFP Staff Statistics,” accessed May 4, 2014, <http://www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/facts-stats/afp-staff-statistics.aspx>.

³⁹² Ibid.

³⁹³ Australian Police Force, “About the Australian Federal Police,” accessed May 4, 2014, <http://www.afp.gov.au/about-the-afp.aspx>.

³⁹⁴ Morag, *Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons*, 138.

³⁹⁵ Chalk et al., *Considering the Creation of a Domestic Intelligence Agency in the United States: Lessons from the Experiences of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom*, 42–43.

individuals or organizations outside of Australia that may threaten Australia's interests and the security and safety of its citizens.³⁹⁶ The DIO provides intelligence to the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the Australian government in matters relating to "global security, weapons of mass destruction, foreign military capabilities, defence economics and transnational terrorism."³⁹⁷ In addition, the DIO employs a whole of government approach and supports agencies engaged in countering and combating terrorism.³⁹⁸ The ASD provides foreign SIGINT to the ADF and the Australian government as a means of support for effective decision making on matters that affect the security of Australia and its interests.³⁹⁹

Australia has 13 police/intelligence agencies, fewer than the 55 agencies in the United Kingdom, and significantly fewer than the approximate 18,000 in the United States. As in the UK case study, it cannot be overstated that when it comes to the multi-layers of policing and the presumed effects on territoriality and information and intelligence sharing—among public agencies, as well as the private sector—it is apparent that the U.S. model creates measurable encumbrances not realized by Australia. Even so, Australia's many similarities in overall policing style, interaction with its communities, and efforts to counter VE through localized programmatic partnerships, make Australia a good model for study.

With respect to the response and investigation of terrorism-related incidents, the primary overall responsibility and commensurate authority is clearly established at the state and territorial level by the National Counter-Terrorism Arrangement.⁴⁰⁰ The Commonwealth's resources, such as the ASIO and the AFP, will provide investigative

³⁹⁶ ASIS: Foreign Intelligence, "Overview of ASIS," accessed May 2, 2014, <http://www.asis.gov.au/About-Us/Overview.html>.

³⁹⁷ Department of Defense: Australian Government, "About; Defense Intelligence Organization," accessed May 4, 2014, <http://www.defence.gov.au/dio/about-us.shtml>.

³⁹⁸ Ibid.

³⁹⁹ Department of Defense: Australian Government, "About ASD: Signals Intelligence Role," accessed May 4, 2014, <http://www.asd.gov.au/about/rolesigint.htm>.

⁴⁰⁰ Commonwealth States and Territories of Australia, *Agreement on Australia's National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2002), 3.

support when appropriate.⁴⁰¹ This designation of authority is important in understanding not only how a terrorism investigation will be conducted, but also more importantly, in understanding that the majority of incidents of terrorism in Australia are viewed as a local crime. In conjunction with this primary investigative responsibility, states' governments are also required to maintain individual CT plans.⁴⁰²

B. TERRORISM CHALLENGES IN AUSTRALIA—PAST TO PRESENT

1. Australia's Immigration Policy—Understanding Its Relevance to Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism

After the implementation of the *Immigration Restriction Act 1901*, the immigration policy of Australia from the initial days of colonization through the latter part of the 20th century was commonly referred to as the “White Australia Policy.”⁴⁰³ This policy placed heavy restrictions on immigration, and at the same time, afforded the removal of certain immigrants already living in Australia. This policy officially ended after passage of the *Migration Act of 1966*; however, it was essentially being progressively dismantled from 1949 through 1966.⁴⁰⁴ As a result, over seven million people have immigrated to Australia from over 200 countries since World War II.⁴⁰⁵ Today, Australia espouses a liberal and welcoming immigration policy that reflects Australia’s sense of obligation to assist immigrants and refugees from all over the world, particularly from countries in conflict. As a result, the number of immigrants from Africa and the Middle East has nearly doubled since 1996.⁴⁰⁶ The policy is also reflected in the overall demographic data, which indicates that today, over 25 percent of Australia’s

⁴⁰¹ Morag, *Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons*, 114.

⁴⁰² Ibid., 139.

⁴⁰³ Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Australian Government, “Fact Sheet 8—Abolition of the ‘White Australia Policy,’” last accessed May 18, 2014, <http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/08abolition.htm>.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁵ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Australian Government, “The Land and Its People,” last accessed May 18, 2014, <http://www.dfat.gov.au/aib/the-land-and-its-people.html>.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

21.5 million Australians were born overseas, and nearly half of all Australian citizens were either born overseas or have at least one parent born overseas.⁴⁰⁷

This situation results in geopolitics playing a large central role in Australia's national security strategy and its domestic CVE strategy. Therefore, Australia must pay particular attention to areas of conflict around the world since these issues will almost certainly have an impact upon Australia's citizens who may choose to identify with their ethnicity or country of origin in relation to geopolitical matters rather than aligning or identifying with Australia. With such a diverse composition, disagreements on these global issues—particularly during times of armed conflict—can have a polarizing effect among various Australian citizen populations who each may have vastly opposing and personal views. In addition, the political stance the Australian government may take in these matters may be in stark contrast to the views held by one or more groups. Along with this diverse population comes varying sets of values, customs, and beliefs that must be considered, understood, and effectively leveraged when determining how to best develop and implement community-based CVE strategies. This condition is currently evident because of the ongoing conflict in Syria and its relevance to the domestic security of Australia in the near future.

2. Terrorism—1978 to Present

Although not nearly as lengthy or arduous as the United Kingdom, Australia has actively engaged in CT efforts for some time, both domestically and abroad. In response to the 1978 Hilton Hotel Bombing in Sydney—viewed by many as the day terrorism began in Australia—the Australian government created the Standing Advisory Committee on Commonwealth and State Cooperation for Protection Against Violence (SAC-PAV) in an effort to create a common set of agreements for the response to threats and acts of politically motivated violence.⁴⁰⁸ Later the same year, Australia implemented

⁴⁰⁷ Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Australian Government, "Fact Sheet 8-Abolition of the 'White Australia Policy.'"

⁴⁰⁸ Australian Government, "Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee," *Australian National Security*, accessed May 4, 2014, <http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/WhatAustraliaisdoing/Pages/Australia-New-Zealand-Counter-Terrorism-Committee.aspx>.

and began using a three-level National Terrorism Public Alert System, and in 2003, Australia implemented a fourth level.⁴⁰⁹ The current four levels are LOW—terrorist attack is not expected, MEDIUM—terrorist attack could occur, HIGH—terrorist attack is likely, and EXTREME—terrorist attack is imminent or has occurred.⁴¹⁰ Since 2003, the National Terrorism Public Alert System has remained at the medium level; however, the level can be changed for one or more impacted communities or regions as necessary to provide for a more region specific advisement.

On October 12, 2002, a terrorist bomb killed 202 people, 88 of whom were Australian, in a nightclub in Kuta, Bali. The AFP played a major role in the investigation with an estimated 100 AFP personnel deployed to Bali during the height of the investigation.⁴¹¹ Earlier in that same year, Indonesia and Australia signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to develop a cooperative police agreement in an effort to combat transnational crime mutually. After the Bali bombing, the AFP established a permanent presence in Jakarta to provide ongoing investigative assistance to the Indonesian National Police (INP). On August 5, 2003, the joint AFP-INP team investigated the Jakarta Marriot hotel bombing.⁴¹² Overall, Australia has been progressive in its efforts to respond to terrorism committed both in Australia and against Australians around the world. This has required the AFP, in particular, to embrace its shift in responsibilities by moving towards an emphasis on CT both domestically and abroad.

As a result of all domestic CT operations in Australia, between 2001 and 2010, 38 people were arrested for terrorism related offenses, which resulted in 23 convictions, and another 40 people were identified as having a nexus to terrorism.⁴¹³ These numbers

⁴⁰⁹ Australian Government, “National Terrorism Public Alert System,” *Australian National Security*, accessed May 4, 2014, <http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Securityandyourcommunity/Pages/NationalTerrorismPublicAlertSystem.aspx>.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹¹ John Lawler, “The Bali Bombing: Australian Law Enforcement Assistance to Indonesia,” *Police Chief Magazine*, accessed May 4, 2014, http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=354&issue_id=82004.

⁴¹² Ibid.

⁴¹³ Australian Government, *Counter-Terrorism White Paper; Securing Australia-Protecting Our Community–2010* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2010), ii; Australian Government, *Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia’s National Security*, 8.

are in stark contrast to the over 600 people arrested for terrorist-related activity in the United Kingdom during a much shorter period between 2009 and 2010.⁴¹⁴

However, Australia's biggest challenges with terrorism may lie immediately ahead. A 2009 assessment of Australia's terrorism threat environment by the RAND Corporation opined that the primary domestic threat to Australia is Islamist extremists attempting to inspire individuals to commit political violence.⁴¹⁵ Coinciding with the RAND assessment, Australia's 2010 Counter-Terrorism White Paper noted that beginning in 2004, a notable increase was detected in the terrorist threat emanating from people born and raised in Australia who are at risk of becoming influenced by this radicalization message.⁴¹⁶ In 2011, an assessment of terrorism trends in Australia conducted by The Australian Strategic Policy Institute recommended that Australia shift its CT and counter-radicalization efforts towards those elements most at risk from the influence of al-Qaeda's ideology.⁴¹⁷ This environment is not unique to Australia, and like in the United Kingdom and United States, may be the consequence of an effective global campaign against terrorist organizations and their resulting shift in strategy as a countermeasure to those efforts.

3. The Syrian Conflict and Its Threat to the Security of Australia

Syria has become a magnet for foreign fighters, including Australians.⁴¹⁸

It is estimated that since 2012, 120 to 150 Australians have traveled to Syria to either support or fight alongside rebels against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad.⁴¹⁹ Of those Australians who are fighting, many are believed to be members of

⁴¹⁴ Her Majesty's Stationery Office, *CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism—July 2011*, 10.

⁴¹⁵ Chalk et al., *Considering the Creation of a Domestic Intelligence Agency in the United States: Lessons from the Experiences of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom*, 14.

⁴¹⁶ Australian Government, *Counter-Terrorism White Paper; Securing Australia—Protecting Our Community—2010*, ii.

⁴¹⁷ Ungerer, "Beyond bin Laden: Future Trends in Terrorism," 2.

⁴¹⁸ Anthony Bubalo, "Next-gen jihad in the Middle East," *Lowy Institute for International Policy*, March 2014, 1.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid., 4.

Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), a militant group connected to al-Qaeda.⁴²⁰ The concern for Australia is the significant possibility of radicalized Australians—with battle experience and a renewed profound anti-Western ideology—returning to Australia to recruit others to VE, and then pursue acts of domestic terrorism against the citizens and governments of Australia.⁴²¹ This bitterness towards Western ideology, coupled with Australia’s active role in the post-9/11 GWOT, and the U.S. role of unremarkable involvement in the Syrian conflict, could aggravate the eventual post-Syria response by extremists towards countries, such as Australia, and thereby, create additional tension between extremists and those they believe threaten Islam. These factors will almost certainly allow extremists the ability to further justify their use of violence, as well as provide a content rich narrative to recruit others towards violence. According to Anthony Bibalo of the Lowy Institute, “For Australia the immediate focus is, and should be, on individuals returning from Syria.”⁴²²

The Syrian situation and its potential domestic impacts to Australia are of such concern that ASIO Director General David Irvine specifically addressed the Syrian issue in his recent 2013 ASIO Report to Parliament.⁴²³ In addition, the report also discussed the challenges for security agencies associated with “home-grown terrorism” and “lone actors.”⁴²⁴ The Lowry Institute for International Policy presents a different context to ASIO’s perceived challenge, which notes that even if some Australians are not intent on continuing their terrorist activities upon arriving home, the Australian security agencies’ focus on them could create feelings of resentment and discrimination that could lead them to retaliate.⁴²⁵ The potential for near-term terrorism in Australia appears to be on a

⁴²⁰ Tom Allard, “Al-Qaeda Terrorist Threat to Australia,” *The Sidney Morning Herald*, February 1, 2014, <http://www.smh.com.au/national/alqaeda-terrorist-threat-to-australia-20140131-31sui.html>.

⁴²¹ Ibid.

⁴²² Bubalo, “Next-gen jihad in the Middle East,” 1.

⁴²³ Australian Government, *ASIO Report to Parliament 2012–2013, Australian Security Intelligence Organization*, Australian Government (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2013), viii.

⁴²⁴ Ibid., vii.

⁴²⁵ Bubalo, “Next-gen jihad in the Middle East,” 8.

trajectory that will eventually test the effectiveness of Australia's CVE programmatic strategies.

4. The View Ahead—Future Terrorism Challenges for Australia

In the coming years Australia will face a more complex and serious terrorist threat than it did after 9/11⁴²⁶

Australia's national security effort has been in constant transformation over the last 14 years and has been noticeably influenced by the 9/11 attacks upon the United States, the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings, Australia's involvement in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and the deaths of over 100 Australians worldwide in the last decade attributed to terrorism.⁴²⁷ One result of this transformation has been the more than tripling of Australia's annual spending on national security between 2000 and 2012, to \$1.5 billion dollars.⁴²⁸

With the near certain domestic unrest as Australians return from Syria, Australia is by no means exempt from the effects of terrorism. Australia has done well in its ability to respond quickly and adapt both nationally and internationally to the ever-changing threat of terrorism, its shifting environs, and methods. However, Australia's current environment may be its biggest challenge to date and the strength of its CVE programs is undoubtedly currently being tested and will continue in the coming months and years.

Going forward, addressing the long-term causes of terrorism by focusing on programs designed to recognize, intervene, and prevent self-radicalization from taking hold through community engagement may be the most effective strategy in maintaining and strengthening Australia's resistance to self radicalization and VE. Australia's pace of constant transformation will need to continue to anticipate, prevent, and counter the effects of extremist ideological rhetoric effectively and its call to VE, which some Australians will undoubtedly experience into the coming years. Countering the narrative, engaging communities to build and maintain trust and provide practical, useful resources

⁴²⁶ Bubalo, "Next-gen jihad in the Middle East," 10.

⁴²⁷ Australian Government, *Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia's National Security*, 9.

⁴²⁸ Ibid.

will be the foundation crucial to delivering an effective CT strategy. Published just two months ago, a March 2014 report by the Lowy Institute for International Policy, which studied the genesis of the next generation of jihadists, indicated, “For these and other reasons Australia is not about to escape the ‘war on terror’ era any time soon.”⁴²⁹

C. AUSTRALIA’S DOMESTIC COUNTERTERRORISM DOCUMENTS

1. The Evolution from SAC-PAV to NCTC

With the exception of the immediate aftermath of the 1978 hotel bombing in Sydney, prior to the 2000 Sydney Olympics, Australia perceived its threat from terrorism to be negligible and the responsibility for countering terrorism was largely the domain of the states.⁴³⁰ In preparation for the 2000 Olympic Games, Australia passed major legislation redefining the military’s domestic role and authority by granting them powers to detain and use force against civilians.⁴³¹ This action began to move the focus on terrorism and CT efforts into the national spectrum. As a direct result of the 9/11 attacks upon the United States, in April 2002, the Australian Prime Minister and other Parliamentary members determined an updated security strategy would be critical to the security of Australia.⁴³² This action coincided with another round of legislative changes, this time passing significant anti-terrorism laws giving broad authority to domestic intelligence agencies.⁴³³ The 1978 SAC-PAV Agreement was used as a framework for an updated agreement—which now included a new focus on *prevention* and *consequence management*—and on October 24, 2002, a new intergovernmental agreement (IGA) on Australia’s National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements was signed, which formally

⁴²⁹ Bubalo, “Next-gen jihad in the Middle East,” Lowy, 10.

⁴³⁰ RAND Corporation: Center for Asian Pacific Policy, “Australia’s Security Policy and the War on Terrorism,” 2003, 1, <http://www.rand.org/international/capp/events/03/australwot.html>.

⁴³¹ Ibid.

⁴³² National Counter-Terrorism Committee: Council of Australian Governments, “Ten Year Anniversary Report,” July 25, 2012, 1, <http://www.coag.gov.au/sites/default/files/NCTC%20Ten%20Year%20Anniversary%20Report.pdf>.

⁴³³ RAND Corporation: Center for Asian Pacific Policy, “Australia’s Security Policy and the War on Terrorism,” 1.

established the National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC).⁴³⁴ Like the SAC-PAV to NCTC shift, the National Counter-Terrorism Plan (NCTP) now replaced the existing National Anti-Terrorist Plan, which was also developed immediately following the 1978 Hilton hotel bombing in Sydney. The NCTC is comprised of Commonwealth (federal), state and territorial representatives and reports annually to the Council of Australian Governments (COAG).⁴³⁵ The NCTC provides strategic and policy advice to the various Australian governments, maintains the cooperative agreements between them, conducts a terrorism environmental threat assessment every three years, and maintains the NCTP.⁴³⁶ In 2002, the initial scope of the NCTC was terrorism centric and focused primarily on the consequences of terrorism. As it has evolved in the last 10 years, it has broadened its focus and taken on a more whole-of-government approach now—much like the United States—to encompass prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery elements.⁴³⁷

As a strategic policy and oversight committee, the NCTC plays an important role in defining Australia's approach to countering VE. In its 10-year report, published October 4, 2012, the NCTC acknowledged the growing concern with self-radicalization, and as a result, committed to increasing its CT capabilities through community-oriented CVE initiatives intended to assist communities in increasing their resilience to VE.⁴³⁸ Further, the NCTC recognizes that the funding and coordinating of these various CVE projects throughout Australia is essential to assist vulnerable individuals in disengaging from the ideological influences of VE and to empower communities to intervene prior to the need for a law enforcement response.⁴³⁹

⁴³⁴ National Counter-Terrorism Committee: Council of Australian Governments, “Ten Year Anniversary Report,” 1.

⁴³⁵ Ibid., 3.

⁴³⁶ Ibid.

⁴³⁷ Ibid., 2.

⁴³⁸ Ibid., 6.

⁴³⁹ Ibid., 4.

2. The NCTP—Australia’s Domestic Counterterrorism Plan

Australia’s CT efforts evolved into the creation of the NCTP to reflect the newly refocused understanding that CT has a necessary domestic component. As noted in the previous section, the NCTP is under the purview of the NCTC and is reviewed and updated at least triennially, which occurred in 2005, 2008, and 2011. The NCTP is Australia’s inward facing domestic strategy and has evolved in sync with Australia’s continuous transformation in its CT strategies. Today, the NCTP contains distinct elements that focus on addressing long-term causes of terrorism, of which CVE programs now play a prominent role.

a. 1st Edition NCTP—2002 to 2005

The first edition of the NCTP was created in 2002, and as a result of the attitude of the NCTC, focused primarily on combating terrorist organizations and the consequences of terrorism. The NCTP focused on three CT principles.

- Maximum Preparedness—strong ability to detect and disrupt terrorist activity
- Comprehensive Prevention—strong protection of people, assets and infrastructure from terrorist activity
- Effective Response—rapid and effective capabilities to reduce the impact of a terrorist incident, should one occur⁴⁴⁰

b. 2nd Edition NCTP—2005 to 2012

The NCTC conducted its first review of the NCTP in 2005, and the second edition was published later that same year. While this 2005 edition continued the theme of *Prevention* and *Preparedness* (as one combined element), *Response* and *Recovery*, it was devoid of any reference to—or recognition of—the concept of self-radicalization, extremism, VE, CVE, homegrown VE, or any “long term” approach to CT as a strategy

⁴⁴⁰ Andrew Metcalfe, Deputy Secretary—Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and Co-Chair of the National Counter-Terrorism Committee, “FOREWORD: Counter-terrorism in Australia,” *The Australian Journal of Emergency Management* 20, no. 2 (May 2005), <http://www.em.gov.au/Documents/Counter-terrorism%20in%20Australia.pdf>.

option. This iteration was still heavily entrenched in codifying agency roles and obligations, lines of authority, and formalized governmental responses to terrorism.⁴⁴¹

Between 2009 and 2011, terrorism assessments by the Australian Commonwealth, RAND Corporation, and The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, each suggested that the emerging primary threat to Australia's security was self-radicalization by Australian citizens susceptible to the influence of radicalization messaging.⁴⁴² The Australian Strategic Policy Institute further recommended that Australia change its CT policy to enhance its focus on CT and counter-radicalization, particularly in those areas "most at risk from the influence of al-Qaeda's ideology."⁴⁴³ Australia and the NCTC were responsive to these studies and recommendations, and thus, began a philosophical shift in Australia's approach towards terrorism by distinguishing between its international and domestic CT approaches.

c. 3rd Edition NCTP—2012 to Present

As the NCTC attitude has evolved over the last 12 years, so has the corresponding NCTP. In 2011, the NCTC conducted its second review of Australia's Counter-Terrorism Plan, which resulted in the 3rd edition of the NCTP being published in 2012. This NCTP significantly differentiates itself from the previous two versions by introducing Australia's newly formulated domestic CT approach to countering VE.⁴⁴⁴ For the first time, Australia formally recognized this issue and set a course to develop and implement a national approach to this newly evolving terrorist threat. Considered an integral part of its overall national security strategy, the 2012 NCTP continues to outline Australia's strategy to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism through the implementation of its four

⁴⁴¹ Commonwealth of Australia, National Counter-Terrorism Committee, *National Counter-Terrorism Plan*, 2nd ed. (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2005).

⁴⁴² Australian Government, *Counter-Terrorism White Paper; Securing Australia-Protecting Our Community—2010*, ii; Chalk et al., *Considering the Creation of a Domestic Intelligence Agency in the United States: Lessons from the Experiences of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom*, 14.

⁴⁴³ Ungerer, "Beyond bin Laden: Future Trends in Terrorism," 2.

⁴⁴⁴ Australian Government, *Counter-Terrorism White Paper; Securing Australia-Protecting Our Community—2010*, i, 3.

key components; *preparedness*, *prevention*, *response*, and *recovery*.⁴⁴⁵ It is the fourth component, *prevention*, which is studied in more detail and contains this newly formed CVE focus.

As stated, the first three components of the 3rd edition 2012 NCTP are as follows.

- *Preparedness*—refers to the process of planning, resourcing, and testing to ensure governments, agencies, and communities are prepared and equipped to prevent or respond to acts of terrorism
- *Response*—refers to actions taken by governments post-incident and reinforces that the state and territory governments have primary responsibility and the Commonwealth will act in a support role
- *Recovery*—refers to the process of supporting communities affected by man-made and natural disasters and like *Response*, outlines the responsibilities of state, territorial and Commonwealth governments⁴⁴⁶

The fourth component, *Prevention*, focuses on “[M]easures taken to eliminate or reduce the occurrence or severity of a terrorist act.”⁴⁴⁷ These measures are contained within the multiplicity of broad categories of intelligence, threat assessment, criminal investigation, protection of the community, public awareness, border control, transport security, aviation, maritime, surface transport, dignitary and foreign mission protection, business and community, being aware and vigilant, staying informed, countering violent extremism, protecting major events, critical infrastructure protection, regulation of hazardous material, and cyber security.⁴⁴⁸ A majority of these efforts is both needed, and familiar in most CT plans, and focus on hardening targets and systems as a means to deter and defend against acts of terrorism. CVE is a departure from these more traditional prevention efforts but is no less critical to the safety and security of Australia, its citizens, its infrastructures, and its systems. A notable concern of the *prevention* component is its potential dilution in overall effectiveness because of this multitude of categories;

⁴⁴⁵ Commonwealth of Australia, National Counter-Terrorism Committee, *National Counter-Terrorism Plan*, 3rd ed. (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2012), 8–15.

⁴⁴⁶ Commonwealth of Australia, National Counter-Terrorism Committee, *National Counter-Terrorism Plan*, 3rd ed.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid., 8.

⁴⁴⁸ Commonwealth of Australia, National Counter-Terrorism Committee, *National Counter-Terrorism Plan*, 3rd ed.

however, the CVE strategy itself is recognized as a standalone category, which, for the first time, indicates recognition and acceptance of CVE as an important aspect of prevention strategies.

As further evidence of its importance to the national security strategy, the CVE category articulates in detail four key principles for CVE used as guideposts for further programmatic strategies. These guideposts are the following.

- “Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) is an integral component of Australia’s counterterrorism prevention strategies.”
- “The effective prevention of violent extremism involves combining an appropriate security and law enforcement response with broader strategies to enhance resilience to, and lessen the appeal of, violent extremist influences.”
- “CVE is a national challenge requiring a national response, recognizing that strong partnerships between all levels of government are critical to success. Solutions must be locally appropriate and implemented with the active support of local communities. Coordination at a national level is imperative to reduce duplication of effort and to facilitate sharing of best practice.”
- “To ensure national coordination, Australian governments have established a CVE Sub-Committee under the NCTC consisting of representatives from all jurisdictions to share information, develop initiatives that are locally appropriate, and work collaboratively to counter violent extremism.”⁴⁴⁹

The states, territories, and Commonwealth each recognize that they must have the public’s confidence in the governments’ delivery of the NCTP and its *Prevention, Preparedness, Response* and *Recovery* components. Through broader actions, such as the regular review, critique, and update of its National Counter-Terrorism Strategy, along with the continuous evolution of its approach toward domestic strategies, demonstrates the commitment of the various levels of Australia’s government structure to maintain strong, cooperative, coordinated relationships as part of that effort to garner confidence from its citizens. In addition to these broader efforts, more detailed and localized

⁴⁴⁹ Commonwealth of Australia, National Counter-Terrorism Committee, *National Counter-Terrorism Plan*, 3rd ed., 12–13.

programmatic strategies—such as CVE measures delivered through the NCTP *Prevention* component—have also been implemented because of Australia’s recognition of the importance of communities and organizations as essential partners in Australia’s broader CT efforts.

D. COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM—SPECIFIC PROGRAMMATIC STRATEGIES

As noted in the previous section, CVE was formalized as a concept within the NCTP as part of its *prevention* component in 2012. However, recognition of the emerging environmental factors that could potentially contribute to self-radicalization and extremism, as well as possible CVE programmatic strategies to counter this threat, were occurring in the years leading up to the 2012 NCTP. In essence, the 2012 NCTP addition of CVE was merely validating and supporting the actions already under way.

The Australian government believes that policies that address real or perceived grievances, encourage social and economic participation, and discourage violent ideology, can mitigate extremism and self-radicalization within its borders, and further, that the best solutions to this approach are those developed within the community.⁴⁵⁰ As a result of this belief, the Australian government implemented its Resilient Communities Initiative as part of its CVE programming. This strategy recognizes that VE comes in multiple forms and involves the use of violence to achieve ideological, religious, or political goals, and “Communities are best placed to develop solutions to local problems.”⁴⁵¹ A nationally sponsored but locally centric program that effectively addressed all forms of VE was necessary. This attitude is represented through five core strategic CVE elements: 1) building community resilience (BCR) grants program, 2) resilient communities resource website, 3) CVE strategic research panel, 4) international engagement strategy—to ensure it complements international CT efforts,

⁴⁵⁰ Australian Government, *Counter-Terrorism White Paper; Securing Australia-Protecting Our Community–2010*, iv.

⁴⁵¹ Australian Government: Attorney General’s Department, “Countering Violent Extremism,” last accessed March 22, 2014, <https://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/Counteringviolentextremism/Pages/default.aspx>.

and 5) “whole of government education and communication frameworks.”⁴⁵² While all five elements of the Australian CVE initiative have application to a U.S. domestic CT strategy, the building community resilience grants program fits well within the existing U.S. programmatic grant structure. Additionally, the CVE Unit—discussed in more detail in the next section—as part of the broader CT effort, also offers itself as a program for consideration for U.S. application.

Australia’s formation of its CVE unit, its host of other CVE programs, and its oversight, placement, and delivery of its CVE programs and initiatives overall, is representative of Australia’s genuine commitment towards providing resources to its communities and together engaging in collaborative efforts to counter VE.

1. The Attorney-General’s Role in CVE Efforts and the CVE Unit

In 2008, Attorney-General Robert McClelland came to believe that the primary goal of domestic CT should be prevention and he directed the staff within his office to begin developing CT strategies focused on prevention. Unsurprisingly, the initial result was largely predicated on the UK model. During this same time period, recognition of the negative impact of terminology used to describe extremism also began to develop and this paradigm shift was an important first step in engaging communities to further CVE strategies. Previous terms, such as “Islamist extremism,” “Islamic terrorism,” and even the phrase “war on terror” were no longer to be used and were replaced with new terms, such as “violent extremism” and “extremist ideology.”⁴⁵³ This shift was an important step to demonstrate the government’s focus on actions rather than cultures or religions.⁴⁵⁴ This slight but significant shift in terminology also demonstrates respect for the diversity and culture within Australia, as well as the government’s commitment to honoring personal, political, and religious freedoms.

In 2009, the AGD established the national security policy and programs branch whose purpose was to identify and respond to weaknesses in the national domestic

⁴⁵² Australian Government: Attorney General’s Department, “Countering Violent Extremism.”

⁴⁵³ Hizb ut-Tahrir—Australia, *Government Intervention in the Muslim Community*, 122.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid.

security policy.⁴⁵⁵ In 2010, the AGD took over responsibility from the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) for focusing on countering extremism through efforts aimed at social cohesion. While the AGD continued the previous focus on community integration, it now placed a newly formed emphasis on resiliency.⁴⁵⁶

In 2010, the Australian government published the Counter-Terrorism White Paper, which acknowledged the threat of homegrown terrorism, and called for a coordinated national approach to address the threat.⁴⁵⁷ As a direct result, in 2010, the CVE taskforce—referred to as the CVE unit—was created and placed within the national security policy and programs branch.⁴⁵⁸ As part of the broader national coordinated CT effort, the CVE unit developed a CVE strategy entitled, *A National Approach to Countering Violent Extremism in Australia: The CVE Strategic Plan*, and while the full strategy remains classified, the government did release a two-page public summary version entitled, *Countering Violent Extremism Strategy*.⁴⁵⁹ The vision of the CVE strategy is to “reduce the risk of home-grown terrorism by strengthening Australia’s resilience to radicalization and assisting individuals to disengage from violent extremist influences and beliefs.”⁴⁶⁰ To achieve this vision, the CVE unit engages state and territory governments, NGOs, and community groups in pursuit of four objectives.

- Identify and divert violent extremists and, when possible, support them in disengaging from VE
- Identify and support at-risk groups and individuals to resist and reject violent extremist ideologies
- Build community cohesion and resilience to VE

⁴⁵⁵ Hizb ut-Tahir—Australia, *Government Intervention in the Muslim Community*, 122.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁷ McDonald-First Assistant Secretary National Security Law and Policy Division, *Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Migration Inquiry into Multiculturalism in Australia*, 2.

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid., 2–3.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid., 2–3, Appendix A.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid., 3.

- Achieve effective communications that challenge extremist messages and support alternatives⁴⁶¹

Through the CVE unit, Australia has developed an overarching approach that blends the ability to influence national level policy with localized community engagement, arguably the best place to observe, detect, and intervene at the earliest possible opportunity. This clear framework also allows for coherent and well-defined roles between the government and its community partners; which is a necessary element for effective partnerships.⁴⁶²

2. Building Community Resilience (BCR) Grants Program

Also established in 2010, and housed within the AGD, the BCR grants program offers grants to community organizations that wish to implement programs specifically designed to encourage and empower communities and individuals to either resist or disengage from extremist ideologies.⁴⁶³ This CVE program continues with the emerging theme in Australia at the time of empowering communities and individuals who are best positioned to counter the influence of extremist ideologies and implement CVE strategies.

The BCR program is modeled after a successful pilot program administered in New South Wales and Victoria, which focused on mentoring youth at risk of VE.⁴⁶⁴ This program, known as the Building Community Resilience Youth Mentoring Grants program, is also presently administered by the AGD and is extremely similar in overall scope and implementation design to the BCR program. The fundamental difference between the two programs is that while the youth mentoring grants program focuses

⁴⁶¹ McDonald-First Assistant Secretary National Security Law and Policy Division, *Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Migration Inquiry into Multiculturalism in Australia*, 4.

⁴⁶² European Network and Information Security Agency, *Cooperative Models for Effective Public Private Partnerships: Good Practice Guide*, 11.

⁴⁶³ Australian Government: Attorney General's Department, "Building Community Resilience Grants Program," last accessed May 12, 2014, <https://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/Counteringviolentextremism/Pages/Buildingcommunityresiliencegrantsprogram.aspx>.

⁴⁶⁴ Australian Government: Attorney General's Department, "Frequently Asked Questions about the Building Community Resilience Grants Program," last accessed May 12, 2014, <https://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/Counteringviolentextremism/Pages/QuestionsandanswersabouttheCommunityresiliencegrantsprogram.aspx#2a>.

solely on youth, the BCR program encompasses the entire range of participants—to include youth—who may be at risk of VE. For purposes of this analysis, the BCR program presents itself as a more broadly applicable program, which also encompasses the youth mentoring grants program elements. For these reasons, the youth mentoring grants program is not reviewed in this case study.

Under the BCR program from 2005–2010, Australia awarded \$4.1 million in funding for 56 BCR program community projects, and in the subsequent three years and six months—2011 to date—Australia has awarded approximately \$5 million in funding for 59 projects across Australia.⁴⁶⁵ These project awards range from \$11,000 to \$200,000 and include a diverse spectrum of programs designed to counter extremism in several communities.⁴⁶⁶ This considerable increase in the BCR program budget and its corollary grant award funding for BCR programs—that, by their very nature, require a CVE nexus—demonstrates a significant resource commitment by the Australian government towards the issue of VE.

To assist communities in understanding the components of the BCR program, the AGD provides a 13-page “Building Community Resilience Grant Program Guidelines” document that first identifies the program’s purpose and objectives, and then outlines detailed grant information covering subject areas, such as eligibility, duration, funding, project evaluation, assessment criteria, and reporting requirements.⁴⁶⁷

No clear profile exists for a violent extremist, and the BCR program is a CVE strategy that recognizes that VE comes in multiple forms and involves the use of violence to achieve not only religious goals but ideological and political goals as well.⁴⁶⁸ This

⁴⁶⁵ Hizb ut-Tahrir—Australia, *Government Intervention in the Muslim Community*, 122–123; Australian Government: Attorney General’s Department, “Building Community Resilience Grants Program.”

⁴⁶⁶ This author reviewed funded BCR grants from 2010 to 2014. See Australian Government: Attorney General’s Department, “Previous Recipients: Building Community Resilience Grants,” last accessed March 22, 2014, <http://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/Counteringviolentextremism/Pages/PreviousrecipientsBuildingCommunityResiliencegrants.aspx>.

⁴⁶⁷ Australian Government: Attorney General’s Department, “Building Community Resilience Grant Program Guidelines 2013–2014,” 2013, <http://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/Counteringviolentextremism/Documents/BCR%202013-14%20Program%20Guidelines.PDF>.

⁴⁶⁸ Australian Government: Attorney General’s Department, “Countering Violent Extremism.”

strategy also leverages the recognition that “Communities are best placed to develop solutions to local problems.”⁴⁶⁹ The BCR program is a nationally sponsored but locally centric program that contains the necessary elements to address multiple forms of ideation towards VE effectively. It recognizes that local partners are often the first to become involved in incidents and the last to disengage. Without local buy in, these programs would be less effective.

E. AREAS OF CONCERN

To a much lesser degree than in the United Kingdom but still a concern by some in Australia, has been the expansive reach of Australian terrorism legislation. As a result of the 9/11 attacks upon the United States, and the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings, Australia has introduced a number of CT measures including amendments to the crimes, telecommunications interception and surveillance legislation, and an increase to ASIO’s powers.⁴⁷⁰ Many of these terrorism related changes came in July 2002 when Australia amended Section 5.3 of its criminal code as part of the *Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002*. This act, in particular, gave domestic intelligence agencies increased powers to detain citizens under control and detention orders.⁴⁷¹ By placing terrorism language within the criminal code, Australia continued to demonstrate its long-held position that states are primarily responsible for these matters with the federal government acting in a supporting role. As noted in this chapter, Australia has enjoyed relative freedom from terrorism. The relatively nominal presence of terrorist-related activity in Australia could address the relatively low number of complaints with regard to the impacts of sweeping anti-terrorism laws. However, with the impending domestic tension mounting, and the likely increase in encounters because of the current state of affairs, the Australian government should be careful not to overstep its use of the current laws in place, which could alienate an otherwise supportive population and impede CT

⁴⁶⁹ Australian Government: Attorney General’s Department, “Countering Violent Extremism.”

⁴⁷⁰ Alex Oliver, *The Lowy Institute Poll 2013: Australia and the World-Public Opinion and Foreign Policy* (Sydney, Australia: Lowy Institute, 2013), 16.

⁴⁷¹ RAND Corporation: Center for Asian Pacific Policy, “Australia’s Security Policy and the War on Terrorism,” 1.

and community partnership efforts. Such legislation can carry the risk of actually radicalizing otherwise innocent individuals offended by government infringements.⁴⁷² This issue is of particular significance to the Australian government-Muslim community relationship since the Muslim community is projected to increase nearly 80 percent in Australia—from approximately 399,000 to 714,000—between 2010 and 2030.⁴⁷³

F. CONCLUSION

The Australian government recognizes that individuals and communities, while overwhelmingly opposed to VE, may not possess the resources to challenge and intervene when signs of extremism emerge.⁴⁷⁴ Further, it recognizes, by its words and actions, that communities are fundamental and necessary to counter the influences of radicalizers and extremists.⁴⁷⁵ These views are consistent with a 2013 Victoria University study that indicates citizens also recognize that communities are best positioned to identify and support at risk individuals, and a strong need exists for the government to support and equip communities—particularly Muslim communities—to identify and respond to the emerging threat of radicalization and extremism.⁴⁷⁶ In addition, the study indicates a majority of citizens also view the role of government is to prevent or mitigate the threat of VE through empowerment, education, and engagement of communities, most notably, to be facilitative rather than directive.⁴⁷⁷ Australia is responding well to these expectations and delivering programs that have real, tangible benefits to the citizens of Australia.

⁴⁷² Mylonaki and Burton, “An Assessment of UK Anti-Terrorism Strategy and the Human Rights Implications Associated with its Implementation,” 1.

⁴⁷³ Pew Research, “Religion and Public Life Project. The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Region Asia-Pacific,” January 27, 2011, <http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-regional-asia/>.

⁴⁷⁴ Australian Government, “Resilient Communities: Government,” last accessed May 12, 2014, <http://www.resilientcommunities.gov.au/partners/Pages/communities.aspx>.

⁴⁷⁵ Australian Government: Attorney General’s Department, “Building Community Resilience Grants Program.”

⁴⁷⁶ Tahiri and Grossman, “Community and Radicalization: An Examination of Perceptions, Ideas, Beliefs and Solutions throughout Australia,” 14.

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid.

The NCTC, NCTP, CVE unit, and Resilient Communities programs—such as the BCR grant program—together present as an excellent example of an amalgamated system of strategies that represent Australia’s philosophy in its CT approach towards the threat of self-radicalization and VE. Clearly, this threat does not appear to be diminishing anytime soon for Australia, quite the opposite. However, by providing resources through these programmatic strategies, and a feeling of community inclusion, these communities become stakeholders and partners in the greater CT effort, which is essential to the success of community-based programs.

What is most impressive is what is missing from Australia’s community-based CVE programs. Absent is a law enforcement centric, law enforcement lead community program that runs the risk of confusing the roles of community caretaker and intelligence officer, of enforcer and community police officer. This is not to say that law enforcement does not have a role in such important community-based programs. To call these community-based “policing” programs administered by law enforcement, can run the risk of labeling the community or the program as a policing problem at its core. However, the community-policing program methodology has relevance in many applications, and Australia has shown that a healthy community-based CVE strategy does not require law enforcement to be the lead agency.

Many of the unique preventive programmatic concepts implemented by Australia could blend well within a U.S. NSCT. If implemented properly, and with awareness of the cautions outlined above, an effective domestic U.S. strategy to counter self-radicalization and VE could be effectively administered at the national level and implemented at the local level.

Through case study analysis, this chapter presented an understanding of Australia’s approach, both philosophically and practically, to countering terrorism overall, and self-radicalization and VE, in particular. This evaluation process, combined with the earlier examinations of the United States and United Kingdom, now allows for the consideration of the applicability of these concepts towards the recommendations offered as part of an updated U.S. CVE strategy.

VII. CONCLUSION

The United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia possess similar historical, social, and political characteristics relative to their national security environment. Collectively, each country faces similar ongoing—as well as future—challenges in efforts to counter self-radicalization and VE within its own borders. While these common characteristics exist, a fair number of nuanced differences were also present in the analysis, which allowed an opportunity for thoughtful and deliberative case study examinations.

Using CVE as the analytical frame, the research in this thesis examined the national level governmental structures and strategies within each of these countries as they relate to the challenges associated with delivering effective programs to counter VE. The results have provided a general foundation by which recommendations for an improved and updated national level U.S. CVE strategy can be presented. This chapter presents those high-level CVE recommendations deemed most influential to the U.S. strategy, as well as offering a few conclusions derived from the analysis. Finally, this chapter closes with a discussion of opportunities for further research that were realized during the research process, and in the author’s opinion, offer great opportunity for additional contributions to the global CVE effort.

A. A RESTATEMENT—THE APPLICATION OF THE PROBLEM SPACE, HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH QUESTION

1. Problem Space

In 2011, the United States implemented two CVE companion documents entitled the *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* and the *Strategic Implementation Strategy Plan (SIP) for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*. These documents are a good start and demonstrate that federal government’s awareness of the importance of countering VE within its borders.

However, several gaps within these documents, as well as the U.S.’s conceptual approach to CVE, were identified in this research. In its current 2011 iteration, the U.S. CVE strategy does not provide a current and adequate national CVE framework; thereby, not fully leveraging the potential of community-based resources necessary to promote and support a complete engagement of CVE strategies at the local level. This observation is represented by the fact that these documents are overly vague and do not contain actual, substantial programmatic strategies, exemplified by a program lead agency, specific CVE programs or CVE approved grants, or other available resources.

2. Hypothesis

To research the problem space for this project sufficiently, the research conducted began with the hypothesis that there is an immediate need for an updated U.S. CVE strategy at the national level. More specifically, that the creation and programmatic implementation of an updated national CVE strategy will offer support for local agencies to deliver effective localized CVE programs that can generate collaboration between law enforcement and community organizations. Finally, moving the current U.S. national strategy beyond its broad descriptive and evaluative paradigm, and delivering an actionable program-based strategy, will provide the environment for the development of trusted and effective community partnerships to counter self-radicalization and VE within this nation’s borders.

3. Research Question

Next, to narrow the scope of the research, it was necessary to establish the research question. The question selected was “What are the necessary and effective components of the national U.S. CVE strategy that best prevent self-radicalization and VE in the United States?” From this established question, research was then conducted that looked for these components. This approach allowed an examination of the U.S., UK, and Australian CVE strategies and concepts to first answer the research question, and then through a comparative analysis of these strategic elements against the current U.S. CVE strategy, ascertain if the hypothesis was correct. This final chapter offers a synthesis of the research results.

B. FINAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Table 1 is presented in an effort to synthesize the analysis of those components deemed most relevant from the examinations of the CVE environment in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. These qualitative studies explored the past and present terrorism and CT environments in an effort to understand each country's migration to its current CVE philosophy, and further, how that philosophy correlates to today's CVE program engagement at the national level. While the application of CVE programs is relative for each country based upon its own model of governance, culture, and ideology, no "one-size" national CVE program fits all countries. However, looking at the resulting analysis of the most relevant CVE program attributes allows an understanding of the areas in which the United States is presently deficient at the national level, and thus, offers an opportunity for innumerable improvement.

Table 1. Comparative Analysis of Relevant CVE Program Attributes—
United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia

	United States	United Kingdom	Australia
Governance	Constitutional Republic	Constitutional Monarchy	Constitutional Monarchy
CVE Program Name	<i>Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States and Strategic Implementation Strategy Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States</i>	CONTEST	National Counter-Terrorism Plan (NCTP)
Year originally implemented	2011	2003	2002
Is the national CVE strategy regularly updated?	NO	YES 2006, 2009, 2011	YES 2005, 2008, 2012

	United States	United Kingdom	Australia
Is there a requirement that the national CVE strategy be regularly reviewed and updated?	NO	YES In addition, an annual update report on the delivery of CONTEST is also required ⁴⁷⁸	YES This must occur at least triennially
Are terms and terminologies relevant to VE and CVE defined in the document(s)?	NO	YES—While not an exhaustive list, many terms and concepts are explained in the document and footnotes	NO
Is there a defined programmatic strategy within CVE program?	NO	YES— <i>Prevent</i>	YES <i>The Resilient Communities Initiative</i>
Are assistive resource guides offered?	YES The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties offers a two page <i>Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Training Guidance and Best Practices</i>	YES A 40 page guide to assist local partners and communities in the delivery of the <i>Prevent</i> strategy	YES

⁴⁷⁸ Her Majesty's Stationery Office, *CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism—Annual Report April 2014* (London, The United Kingdom, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 2011): 7.

	United States	United Kingdom	Australia
Does the national strategy recognize formalized and universally applied CVE centric programs aimed at supporting the national CVE strategy or CVE philosophy?	NO The DHS CVE Program Overview refers to Building Communities of Trust. However, BCOT is a fusion center centric document and not a CVE specific program ⁴⁷⁹	YES <i>WRAP Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent</i> (WRAP) offers training for all front line staff across all community sectors and <i>Channel</i> Program which focuses on those most vulnerable to VE. <i>Channel</i> comes with its own 30 page guide	YES Through five core strategic CVE elements: 1. Building Community Resilience (BCR) Grants Program 2. Resilient Communities resource website 3. CVE strategic research panel 4. International engagement strategy 5. Whole of government education and communication frameworks ⁴⁸⁰ and <i>Living Safe Together: Building Community Resilience to Violent Extremism</i> ⁴⁸¹
Does the national CVE strategy formally recognize and support VE Vulnerability Assessment Frameworks?	NO	YES	YES
Do such frameworks exist?	YES The Muslim Public Advisory Council provides the <i>Safe Spaces Initiative: Tools for Developing Healthy Communities</i> ⁴⁸²	YES The UK provides the <i>Safeguarding and the Common Assessment Framework</i> (CAF) which a 22 characteristic guidepost to assist local partnerships in determining vulnerability	YES Australia— <i>The Way Forward: An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation</i> (BIRR) ⁴⁸³ *The BIRR guide also provides multiple definitions of VE related terms

⁴⁷⁹ Robert Wasserman, *Guidance for Building Communities of Trust* (Washington, DC. U.S. Department of Justice-Office of Community Partnerships, 2010), 3.

⁴⁸⁰ Australian Government: Attorney General's Department, "Countering Violent Extremism."

⁴⁸¹ Australian Government, "Living Safe Together: Building Community Resilience to Violent Extremism," accessed July 16, 2014, <http://www.livingsafetogether.gov.au/pages/home.aspx>.

⁴⁸² "Safe Spaces Initiative: Tools for Developing Healthy Communities."

⁴⁸³ Mustapha Kara-Ali and BIRR Initiative Research Team, *The Way Forward: An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation* (Australia: Department of Immigration and Citizenship under the direction of the National Action Plan Community Project Funding Program, 2010).

	United States	United Kingdom	Australia
Is CVE related training offered as part of the national CVE strategy?	YES See reference to training in the Recommendations section of this chapter	YES In addition, detailed program guides and resources are often provided	YES
Is specific caseload data universally maintained—and made readily available—as part of the ongoing analysis of the CVE program and/or its supporting programs?	NO	YES <i>Channel</i>	YES <i>BCCR</i>

The U.S. national CVE strategy is the most nascent of the three, and has yet to be updated. As reflected in Table 1, and offered as recommendations in the following section, the United States is presented with multiple opportunities for improvement. In other words, the United States could develop exponentially in the CVE realm if it candidly assesses its current national strategy, leverages the positive and negative experiences of the United Kingdom and Australia, and then implements the overarching recommendations presented in the following section.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

While the United States must develop a CVE strategy that meets its needs domestically, it cannot be developed, implemented, and conducted in the absence of the recognition that other countries—Muslim and non-Muslim majorities alike—offer several applicable and effective strategies, many of which are supported in academia and the scientific community. However, this subject area is still rapidly evolving, which requires a malleable CVE strategy. To remain a relevant tool to counter VE in the United States, the 2011 *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* and the follow-on *Strategic Implementation Strategy Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* must be re-evaluated and updated now. These documents must then be reviewed and updated on an annual basis going forward to reflect best the most current VE environment and CVE practices. This approach is essential if the U.S. government is serious about countering VE in this country and partnering with other nations to counter VE throughout the world. The

ensuing recommendations are overarching and intended to act as framework recommendations from which other more detailed objectives can be built. They are offered as a result of the analysis contained in this document, as well as the current domestic and international CVE environment in place at this time.

As a backdrop for this section, bullet points of the 2010 HSAC CVE Working Group recommendations are again presented. As a result of this thesis research, it is evident that many of these recommendations were not implemented in the 2011 CVE strategy, or at least not to a satisfactory degree. Therefore, several of these working group recommendations are still relevant today as supported by this research. In those circumstances, some of the more notable recommendations are offered as part of the supporting detail in the section following this checklist.

1. 2010 HSAC CVE Working Group Recommendations

- Develop and use common terminology
- Expand CRCL engagement efforts separate from the support of community-oriented policing
- Incorporate information-driven, community-based violent crime reduction into local preparedness efforts
- Support efforts to establish local dispute resolution capabilities
- Through policy, the DHS should utilize the philosophies based on communication, trust, and mutual respect to develop relationships with local law enforcement
- Generate threat-related information products
- Establish a communication platform to share threat-related information directly with faith-based or other communities
- Increase public awareness regarding terrorism and other homeland security related trends so that they can be demystified and incorporated into local violent crime reduction efforts
- Develop case studies

- Continue efforts to ensure that fusion centers have the capacity to receive and understand threat-related information and to share that knowledge with local authorities
- Expand availability of training and technical assistance focused on the understanding, identification, and mitigation of threats through community-oriented policing
- Improve the quality of training
- Expand the availability of training for state, local, and tribal law enforcement and DHS components⁴⁸⁴

Fully implementing each of the above recommendations in itself would improve the U.S. CVE strategic environment. However, in the broader realm, the recommendations that follow are intended to act as overarching influencers to the greater CVE strategic narrative from which objectives that are more detailed can be developed. Nonetheless, the following general recommendations are offered in the pursuit of an updated U.S. CVE strategy.

2. Identify Who Is in Charge of Counteracting Violent Extremism at the Federal Level—and Not U.S. Attorneys or the FBI

This concept seems intuitive to any program at any level, and therefore, almost unnecessary to discuss. However, according to a most recent CRS report, still today—a full three years after the delivery of the CVE strategy—this topic remains a major concern.⁴⁸⁵ In particular, the U.S. CVE strategy directs federal agencies towards multiple CVE-related activities and efforts, but is silent on which single federal agency is responsible for managing the CVE programming.⁴⁸⁶ This uncertainty affects the sense of importance of the program and reduces accountability for results.

The current strategy identifies U.S. attorneys as community-based CVE leads and suggests they are well positioned to make determinations at the local level with regard to

⁴⁸⁴ Homeland Security Advisory Council, *Recommendations, Countering Violent Extremism Working Group*, 15–26.

⁴⁸⁵ Bjelopera, *Countering Violent Extremism in the United States*, ii, 20–23.

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid.

which communities should be selected for engagement in CVE programs.⁴⁸⁷ The accuracy of this statement is questionable at best, and irrespective, this attempt at local level engagement contradicts the very notion that the federal government acts as a facilitator and support structure for local communities. The Australian CVE model does utilize a singular AGD format focusing on CVE through efforts primarily aimed at social cohesion. While this format works well within the Australian CVE model, it is an example of one program attribute that does not parlay well to the American CVE model due to the multiple numbers of U.S. attorneys at the federal level.

The FBI's mission is heavily intelligence collection oriented and appropriately designed to counter terrorism. As noted in the analysis, a significant investment in all forms of intelligence gathering is required, and while this function is both necessary and meaningful, it conflicts with the concept of community oriented policing—an arguably local police function as well—and can erode the trust necessary to engage in effective CVE efforts. This very issue was noted in the UK case study, which revealed tension and a perception of mission conflict between the Prevent and Pursue strands—community oriented vs. intelligence oriented—of the UK's national counterterrorism strategy.⁴⁸⁸ This issue was also noted within the information-sharing recommendations of the 2010 CVE Working Group report calling it a "...inherent tension between federal law enforcement investigations and local partnerships to stop violent crime."⁴⁸⁹ For these and other reasons noted in the analysis, the lead federal agency responsible for CVE program delivery should not be a federal law enforcement agency but rather an agency whose mission more closely aligns with program facilitation, guidance, and support.

In addition, the Australian program is as an excellent model to create and implement a federal level CVE unit in the United States. Such a unit can provide program oversight and ongoing evaluation, standardized training, timely execution of process and

⁴⁸⁷ Office of the President of the United States, *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, 8.

⁴⁸⁸ Innes, Roberts, and Inness, *Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers*, 5.

⁴⁸⁹ Homeland Security Advisory Council, *Countering Violent Extremism Working Group*, 17.

procedure updates based on current environmental factors and represent the U.S. VE and CVE interests on a broader academic and research level.

3. Develop An Actionable National CVE Framework

The application of CVE programming is best placed at the state and local levels. Guidance, resources, and coordination—in the form of funding, support, training, tools and structure—are best provided at the federal level.⁴⁹⁰ The 2011 U.S. CVE strategic plan states, “The Federal Government can foster nuanced and locally rooted counter radicalization programs and initiatives by serving as a facilitator, convener, and source of information to support local networks and partnerships at the grassroots level.”⁴⁹¹ This excellent statement could serve as the federal government’s CVE mission statement by ensuring CVE deliverables meet one of these mission objectives. By using these objectives, the federal government is well positioned to affect CVE efforts positively. The SIP reinforces this notion by stating, “The SIP provides a blueprint for how we will build community resilience against violent extremism.”⁴⁹²

As noted in the critique in Chapter IV, some questions remain as to whether or not the federal government is effectively following its own prescriptive statements in this regard. Ultimately, the federal government appears to be providing little federal guidance to community groups on how to engage or intervene with people who may be susceptible in radicalization.⁴⁹³ It has been established that these partnerships are critical. However, research that focuses on effective public private partnerships, in particular, suggests that “Partnerships require a clear framework specifying the roles of the public and private sectors”⁴⁹⁴ That clear framework, which outlines detailed role identification and actionable strategies is lacking from the current iteration of the U.S. CVE strategy.

⁴⁹⁰ Neumann, *Preventing Violent Radicalization in America*, 7.

⁴⁹¹ Office of the President of the United States, *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*.

⁴⁹² Ibid., 2.

⁴⁹³ Bjelopera, *Countering Violent Extremism in the United States*, i.

⁴⁹⁴ European Network and Information Security Agency, *Cooperative Models for Effective Public Private Partnerships: Good Practice Guide*, 11.

Therefore, the federal government must provide a model policy framework that agencies can adopt. Once provided, this framework—a tool kit of sorts—can then allow local agencies to build and deliver malleable community tailored CVE programs within this broader federal framework. The U.S. CVE strategy must follow the UK CONTEST model’s depth and breadth of detail. This document must be an actual comprehensive strategy, and not just an executive summary. Additionally, with the complex and ever changing VE and CVE environment, an annual or biennial review of the U.S. CVE strategy must also occur. It is evident that the 2011 strategy is already outdated. For a number of reasons, of which the changing environment is one, the strategy is not an effective strategy nor is it reflective of the current environment.

4. The Federal Government Must Re-Focus on the *Support* of Countering Violent Extremism and Not Attempt to *Engage* in Countering Violent Extremism at the Local Level

CVE Working Group member Michael Downing best described this issue when indicating that at the federal level, CVE should be considered a noun, and at the local CVE level, it should be considered a verb.⁴⁹⁵ The philosophy should be that the federal level provides the framework and the resources necessary for CVE, and the local level implements these resources within the framework. Additionally, this framework and the management of CVE resources could be provided through a CVE unit as described in Recommendation 1.

5. Define the Terms and Terminologies in Every Document

As examined in detail in Chapter II, the significant amount of terms and terminologies associated with the discourse on terrorism is cause for great confusion in understanding the overall context in which these terms are presented. Just looking at the term terrorism has long shown over 100 potential definitions.⁴⁹⁶ If the term terrorism is the foundation from which most other associated terms draw their meaning—and that

⁴⁹⁵ Downing, email message to author.

⁴⁹⁶ Schmid and Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature*, 5.

foundation is in question—then the entire discourse from which that topic is built must also be in question. At the very least, it is greatly subjected to misinterpretation.

The U.S. CVE strategy uses strongly evocative terminologies throughout its document but fails to offer any definitions or intended meanings of any terms. One clear example is the confusing use of “ideology”—a term that offers an indelible number of meanings and understandings. The U.S. strategy utilizes the term “ideology” in phrases, such as “violent ideology,” “hateful ideology,” “bankrupt ideology,” “al-Qa’ida’s ideology” and “al-Qa’ida’s violent ideology.”⁴⁹⁷ As examined in this thesis, the understanding of ideology and its role in VE and CVE strategies is one subject area that continues to evolve significantly, particularly over the last several years. The use of ideology in this manner, particularly without defining its intended meaning in 2011, may be misunderstood, and even harmful, in today’s environment. Had a definition been offered, then today’s readers of the U.S. CVE strategy could understand the context of its application three years ago. Without such a definition, readers are left to input their own interpretation, and likely, inputting the context with which they are most familiar, not the intended meaning.

This recommendation was also part of the 2010 CVE Working Group report. Interestingly, in the report, the committee specifically states, “use of various terms to describe ideologically-motivated crime (radicalization, violent extremism, etc...) causes confusion.”⁴⁹⁸ It is evident that not only was the recommendation to define terms excluded, but the concept of assuring clarity was also disregarded. The United States should follow the example of the United Kingdom, as examined in Chapter V, and include definitions of terms and explanations of terminologies and phrases, either through a dedicated appendix—which is preferred—or as footnotes within the document. The worth of a document is not defined by the fact that it exists, but rather, by the clarity of its contents. Properly defining terms and phrases is an essential component to this cause.

⁴⁹⁷ Office of the President of the United States, *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, i, 2, 7.

⁴⁹⁸ Homeland Security Advisory Council, *Countering Violent Extremism Working Group*, 18.

6. VE and CVE Training and Education

It has been articulated throughout this document that local law enforcement plays a critical role in CVE. Further, an October 2012 GAO report—which supports this notion—identifies the DHS and DOJ as having the responsibility for executing and offering CVE-related training to local agencies and their communities.⁴⁹⁹ This instruction further supports the concept that the federal level is responsible for the supporting framework and resources associated with CVE and not the programmatic delivery at the local level.

Standardized VE and CVE training has not occurred since the inception of the 2011 CVE strategy. As noted in Chapter IV, poorly designed and delivered CVE-related training can be detrimental to the relationship between law enforcement and its community.⁵⁰⁰ Nowhere was this fact more evident in the research than the discovery of literature suggesting instances of federally sponsored or federally funded CVE training that incorporated offensive and inaccurate information.⁵⁰¹ Practitioners and academics alike must jointly develop training curricula, which can offer an accurate and practical framework for better understanding VE at the practitioner level. In addition, opportunities for further education for strategists and policy makers must be made available.

To provide just a multiple number of operational objectives without putting in place any guiding structure would be ineffectual and short-lived. These five overarching recommendations have been selected in an effort to provide a broad but essential CVE framework. This framework can then act to guide the way forward in the development of a CVE programmatic structure that can continuously operate in changing and challenging environments. It is not the objectives themselves, but rather, the process of moving

⁴⁹⁹ Government Accountability Office, *Report to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Countering Violent Extremism: Additional Actions Could Strengthen Training Efforts*, 2.

⁵⁰⁰ Homeland Security Advisory Council, *Countering Violent Extremism Working Group*, 24.

⁵⁰¹ Government Accountability Office, *Report to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Countering Violent Extremism: Additional Actions Could Strengthen Training Efforts*, 2.

concepts to action, which will ensure a most successful U.S. CVE strategy that, in turn, offers the greatest opportunity to protect the American people and this nation.

D. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The goal of this research was to offer a straightforward framework to further the United States in its pursuit of a relevant and well-timed domestic CVE strategy. While research associated with this topic is clearly “still emerging yet seemingly ubiquitous”—an ostensibly contradictory association of terms—this work strives to present applicable, evidence-based information. In the process of doing so, several additional questions and opportunities for further research became readily apparent. Several of these areas were only touched on in this thesis as supportive evidence for an updated U.S. CVE strategy and are deserving of a much more in depth analysis in their own right. Doing so would most certainly contribute to the broader homeland security discipline.

This work merely provides a foundation from which others may build on to further the analysis and literature on the larger discipline of homeland security. It is the intent of this author that this research serves as a launching point for others to move these issues forward through future research. This section identifies some of these areas and explains their connection to CVE research.

One opportunity for additional research, which offers itself as an interesting sociological examination, is the pursuit of an evidence-based theory explaining the transformation of Americans’ pre-9/11 perspective of terrorism to the uniquely American held perspective of terrorism in the post-9/11 environment. Certainly, 9/11 was an iconic and tragic event. Nonetheless, it was an event not a directive for behavior, and stands as the great anomaly in U.S. terrorism history. Why then have Americans—politicians, media, and urban and rural populations alike—taken on this perspective of terrorism that arguably has shaped U.S. policy, strategy, and politics? In some ways, U.S. policies and strategies—CVE included—might be a manifestation of this perspective, while at the same time, not be in the best interest of Americans or national security. Utilizing Grounded Theory Research as a qualitative approach to inquiry, or some other appropriate methodology, research can be offered that may suggest how to “change the

paradigm rather than change the policy” as a strategy to combat terrorism and counter VE.⁵⁰²

With respect to CVE in particular, this research did not examine effective marketing strategies associated with delivering programmatic CVE strategies to local communities. Nor did it examine the familiarity of the term or concept of CVE through a survey mechanism or other research design to determine which—and at what level—Americans are familiar with CVE. This research has shown that CVE is highly contextualized, and successful CVE strategies are rooted in their communities. Further analysis that focuses on multi-agency implementation strategies along with developing stakeholder buy-in are also important factors to the overall success or failure of such programs. These additional areas of research would complement this thesis by building an efficient delivery platform for a newly updated CVE strategy. In the broader perspective, such research could not only benefit the U.S. CVE environment, but also the greater U.S. policy environment as well.

A critical area for additional research is the use of the Internet and its associated media platforms as a mechanism for recruiting individuals towards radicalization and VE. This thesis focused on the need for an updated U.S. CVE strategy. However, throughout the entire research process, the topic of the Internet and its relationship to self-radicalization was prevalent in much of literature. This topic is important for CVE and one that must receive more attention in the U.S. CVE strategy. The evolution of this issue—as a component of rapidly changing technology—is arguably more important to CVE than any other aspect at this time.

Just as critical to the implementation of effective CVE strategies is a better understanding of the topic of youth violence and its role in VE. While this phenomenon has broader implications beyond just terrorism, understanding its role in terrorism—many of the CVE programs mentioned in this research focus on youth—may offer a better understanding of the role age plays in the allure towards VE, particularly for males.

⁵⁰² For an explanation of Grounded Theory Research, as well as other qualitative research methodologies, see as an example: John Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2007), 62–63.

Further, examining the correlation between age (youth) and ideology, and their roles as motivators towards terrorism—or lack thereof—may debunk myth and confusion surrounding the nexus between religious ideology and terrorism. While this nexus may currently present itself as more of an international version of youth violence, understanding the psychology of this process can assist in the formation of both domestic and international prevention strategies.

These topics will likely remain as prevalent themes in the ongoing discussion of terrorism, and are therefore, deserving of ongoing rigorous examination. Similar to the research conducted in this thesis, inquiry into each of these important subject areas are likely to generate its own set of additional questions and opportunities for further research.

E. CONCLUSION

One of the many strengths of the United States is its pluralistic society that welcomes and embraces divergent thoughts and ideologies. On occasion, Americans see examples of thoughts and ideologies that “mainstream” society may view as radical, which causes them to misunderstand or misread the intention, to disagree with overtly or otherwise, not accept. Nonetheless, the societal fabric of the United States encourages Americans to embrace the notion of these non-violent radical beliefs and place them above their own personal objections, which suggests the United States is willing to tolerate this radicalism as a fundamental right of all. At the same time, Americans are as equally intolerant of any violence that may be associated with these radical beliefs. This belief as well has been woven into the fabric of American society.

While overarching attributes and ideologies exist within every distinct group, at the localized level, specific groups—such as the Muslim community—are also markedly diverse throughout the country. Their ethnicity, national origin, as well as sectarian and political lines, further divides Western Muslim communities.⁵⁰³ Therefore, CVE programs must recognize these distinct localized differences—sometimes as a nuance and

⁵⁰³ Carolyn Warner and Manfred Wenner, “Religion and the Political Organization of Muslims in Europe,” *Perspectives on Politics* 4, no. 3 (September 2006): 457–479.

sometimes as a chasm—and pursue programmatic strategies that are highly localized, engaging, genuine, collaborative, and long lasting. Communities must not just accept such programs; they must embrace them as a valuable resource that adds significance to their pursuit of a common goal to help those in their community that may be vulnerable to VE.

The programmatic framework and tools used in the United States to combat illegal gang activity is a good parallel and can continue to be followed. However, the primary role in CVE implementation and operation—the highly localized and contextualized work of countering VE—may not best rest with law enforcement, particularly at the federal level. The U.S., UK and Australian governments have all done well to incorporate existing intervention models with which at-risk communities are familiar. These models allow for the utilization of a common framework and language. To utilize law enforcement, U.S. attorneys or the FBI as the *primary* or *lead* authority, rather than as a supporting partner, suggest that CVE is a criminal justice effort and not a social effort. A more holistic approach that utilizes the federal government as a supporting framework—legislation, funding, training, resources, education, and ongoing CVE research—is the area in which best to focus CVE efforts at the federal level. Downing and Mayer support this notion when stating,

Community outreach remains a vital tool. Federal grant funds should also be used to create robust community outreach capabilities in higher-risk urban areas. Such capabilities are key to building trust in local communities, and if the United States is to thwart “lone wolf” terrorist attacks successfully, it must do so by putting effective community outreach operations at the tip of the spear.⁵⁰⁴

While a refocus is in order, the current CVE strategy should not be discounted. These types of programs do fit well into the existing community-oriented policing model as an effective partnership strategy. This approach is correct; however, it must be just that, a partnership. Putting the law enforcement branch of local, state, and federal

⁵⁰⁴ Michael Downing and Matt Mayer, “Preventing the Next “Lone Wolf” Terrorist Attack Requires Stronger Federal–State–Local Capabilities,” Backgrounder #2818, *The Heritage Foundation*, June 18, 2013, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/06/preventing-the-next-lone-wolf-terrorist-attack-requires-stronger-federalstatelocal-capabilities>.

governments in charge of countering a person’s ideology, beliefs, or desires is akin—using the drug analogy—to law enforcement conducting surveillance on drug counseling centers or other social sections of communities as a prevention methodology. The United States has learned this approach does not effectively work because inherently this method does not address—as discovered with the war on drugs in the 1980s—the underlying root cause of addiction. As a methodology, codified within its strategy, the United Kingdom also learned this difficult lesson from its earlier versions of CONTEST between 2003 and 2009, and the United States would do well to learn from these experiences.

In the United States, as a whole, the religious societal sector is structured as a large-scale collective of identities that function independent of the state.⁵⁰⁵ According to authors Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, in viewing this unique “religious identity-state” relationship from a security perspective, it is “[E]xtremely difficult to establish hard boundaries that differentiate existential threats from lesser threats.”⁵⁰⁶ They add that changes to security in this realm can be viewed as invasive, threatening, and even heretical, due to the conservative nature of religious identity.⁵⁰⁷ Law enforcement should be mindful of this concern and acknowledge the unique distinction between CVE and its more traditionally accepted criminal justice roles. The 2010 HSAC CVE Working Group appears to concur on this point, and cautions that discussions on law enforcement crime reduction efforts should be separated from academic and policy discussions on radicalization and CVE until a more thorough understanding of these concepts is developed.⁵⁰⁸ Simply overlaying a crime reduction framework without ongoing and thoughtful analysis can be counterproductive to the CVE effort. This viewpoint supports the observations offered by Buzan, Waever, and Wilde regarding community concerns of securitization by law enforcement.

⁵⁰⁵ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 23.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁸ Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Recommendations.”

Law enforcement should be one part of the overarching communal process to counter VE by participating in a supporting partnership role, not as the lead or directive agency. Strategic programs led and administered by non-LE organizations—particularly religious, health, and human services related organizations—would generate trust and provide greater opportunities for the production of successful strategies designed to counter the terrorist narrative and prevent VE in the United States.

It is evident from the examination of the literature and observing the multiple acts of terrorism that have—and continue—to occur throughout the world, the global influence of VE is not in decline.⁵⁰⁹ In the past, CT strategies have focused on the use of physical, hard power capabilities designed to defeat the organizational structures and assets of these terrorist groups using physical, hard power methods.⁵¹⁰ However, while effective, these efforts cannot occur to the exclusion of arguably more impactful soft power strategies designed to defeat the initial draw to VE.

CVE strategies, while continuing to evolve and take shape, are proving themselves effective in the struggle against terrorism. The United States must continue to look toward other countries for emerging CVE practices, and thereby, allow its own CVE strategy to evolve continuously and effectively. More importantly, if the United States genuinely engages in partnerships with other countries to continue the discourse and study of VE, and soft power strategies to counter VE, then it can contribute to the greater global effort to rid the world of the attractions to VE. While no doubt an audacious goal, it must be pursued. It is in that spirit that this modest research is presented.

⁵⁰⁹ Ungerer, “Beyond bin Laden: Future Trends in Terrorism,” 34.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF REFERENCES

Ackerman, Spencer, and Noah Shachtman. "Muslim Rappers. 'Google Ideas': Inside the Flawed U.S. Campaign to Fight Militant Memes." *Wired Magazine*, October 9, 2012. <http://www.wired.com/2012/10/cve/all/>.

Allard, Tom. "Al-Qaeda Terrorist Threat to Australia." *The Sidney Morning Herald*, February 1, 2014. <http://www.smh.com.au/national/alqaeda-terrorist-threat-to-australia-20140131-31sui.html>.

ASIS: Foreign Intelligence. "Overview of ASIS." Accessed May 4, 2014. <http://www.asis.gov.au/About-Us/Overview.html>.

Association of Chief Police Officers. "Channel—Protecting Vulnerable People from Being Drawn into Terrorism." Accessed April 23, 2014 <http://www.acpo.police.uk/ACPOBusinessAreas/PREVENT/Channel.aspx>.

———. "National Channel Referral Figures." Accessed April 22, 2014 <http://www.acpo.police.uk/ACPOBusinessAreas/PREVENT/NationalChannelReferralFigures.aspx>.

Australia.gov.au. "Australia's Federation." Accessed May 2, 2014. <http://australia.gov.au/about-australia/our-government/australias-federation>.

———. "Our Government." Accessed May 2, 2014. <http://australia.gov.au/about-australia/our-government>.

———. "Our People." Accessed May 4, 2014. <http://australia.gov.au/about-australia/our-country/our-people>.

Australian Government. "Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee." *Australian National Security*. Accessed May 4, 2014. <http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/WhatAustraliaisdoing/Pages/Australia-New-Zealand-Counter-Terrorism-Committee.aspx>.

———. "Living Safe Together: Building Community Resilience to Violent Extremism." July 16, 2014. <http://www.livingsafetogether.gov.au/pages/home.aspx>.

———. "National Terrorism Public Alert System." *Australian National Security*. Accessed May 4, 2014. <http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Securityandyourcommunity/Pages/NationalTerrorismPublicAlertSystem.aspx>.

———. "Resilient Communities: Government." Last accessed May 12, 2014. <http://www.resilientcommunities.gov.au/partners/Pages/communities.aspx>.

———. *ASIO Report to Parliament 2012–2013. Australian Security Intelligence Organization*. Australian Government. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia. 2013.

———. *Counter-Terrorism White Paper; Securing Australia-Protecting Our Community–2010*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia. 2010.

———. *Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia’s National Security*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2013.

Australian Government: Attorney General’s Department. “Building Community Resilience Grants Program.” Last accessed May 12, 2014. <https://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/Counteringviolentextremism/Pages/Buildingcommunityresiliencegrantsprogram.aspx>.

———. “Building Community Resilience Grant Program Guidelines 2013–2014.” 2013. <http://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/Counteringviolentextremism/Documents/BCR%202013-14%20Program%20Guidelines.PDF>.

———. “Countering Violent Extremism.” Last accessed March 22, 2014. <https://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/Counteringviolentextremism/Pages/default.aspx>.

———. “Frequently Asked Questions about the Building Community Resilience Grants Program.” Last accessed May 12, 2014. <https://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/Counteringviolentextremism/Pages/QuestionsandanswersabouttheCommunityresiliencegrantsprogram.aspx#2a>.

———. “Previous Recipients: Building Community Resilience Grants.” Last accessed March 22, 2014. <http://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/Counteringviolentextremism/Pages/PreviousrecipientsBuildingCommunityResiliencegrants.aspx>.

Australian Human Rights Commission. “Australia and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.” Accessed May 4, 2014. <https://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/australia-and-universal-declaration-human-rights>.

Australian Institute of Criminology: Australian Government. “Australian Crime: Facts and Figures: 2011.” Last modified March 3, 2012. http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/facts/1-20/2011/7_resources.html.

Australian Police Force. “About the Australian Federal Police.” Accessed May 4, 2014. <http://www.afp.gov.au/about-the-afp.aspx>.

———. “AFP Staff Statistics.” Accessed May 4, 2014. <http://www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/facts-stats/afp-staff-statistics.aspx>.

Baird, Zoe, and Jim Barksdale. *Nation at Risk: Policy Makers Need Better Information to Protect the Country. The Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age*. New York: The Markle Foundation, March 2009.

Baker, Peter, and Stephen Farrell. "Obama Dedicates 9/11 Memorial Museum." *New York Times*. Last modified May 15, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/16/nyregion/obama-dedicates-9-11-memorial-museum.html?_r=0.

Berman, Gavin, and Aliyah Dar. "Police Service Strength. Library House of Commons." Last updated July 25, 2013. <http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-papers/SN00634/police-service-strength>.

Bjelopera, Jerome P. *Countering Violent Extremism in the United States*. CRS Report No. R42553. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 19, 2014.

Borum, Randy. "Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories." *Journal of Strategic Security* 4, no. 4 (2011): 7–36. Accessed July 10, 2014. <http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1139&context=jss>.

Brandon, James, and Lorenzo Vidino. "European Experiences in Counterradicalization." *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point*, June 21, 2012. <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/european-experiences-in-counterradicalization>.

Brandon, Susan, and Andrew Silke. "Near and Long Term Psychological Effects of Exposure to Terrorist Attacks." In *Psychology of Terrorism 2007*, edited by Bruce Bonger et al. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Breckenridge, Jim. "Overview of Module 6: Radicalization and Terrorism in a Global Context—A Discussion between Jim Breckenridge and Fathali Moghaddam." *U.S. Naval Postgraduate School—Center for Homeland Defense and Security*. June 19, 2014. https://www.chds.us/coursefiles/NS4133/video/breckenridge_ali_breckenridge_ali_01.html.

———. "The Psychology of Terrorism." Lecture, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, July 9, 2014.

Bubalo, Anthony. "Next-gen jihad in the Middle East." *Lowy Institute for International Policy*. March 2014.

Bucci, Steven. "The Immediate Aftermath of Boston: No Time to Stand Still." *The Heritage Foundation*. no. 3918. April 18, 2013. <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/boston-act-of-terror-reinforce-homeland-security-policies>.

Butler, Adrienne, Allison M. Panzer, and Lewis R. Goldfrank, ed. *Committee on Responding to the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism. Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism: A Public Health Strategy*. National Research Council. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2003.

Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

Canna, Sarah, Carly St. Clair, and Abigail Chapman. "Neurobiological and Cognitive Science Insights on Radicalization and Mobilization to Violence: A Review." *NSI: Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Team*, June 7, 2012.

Carter, Chelsea J. "Nidal Hasan Convicted in Fort Hood Shootings; Jurors Can Decide Death." *CNN*. Last updated August 23, 2013. <http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/23/justice/nidal-hasan-court-martial-friday/index.html>.

Chalk, Peter, Richard Warnes, Lindsay Clutterbuck, and Aidan Kirby. *Considering the Creation of a Domestic Intelligence Agency in the United States: Lessons from the Experiences of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom*, edited by Brian Jackson. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009.

Chatterji, Manas. "Understanding Terrorism: A Socio-Economic Perspective—Forward." In *Conflict Management. Peace Economics and Development*, vol. 22, edited by Manas Chatterji. United Kingdom: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2014.

Cole, Matthew, and Robert Windrem. "Al Qaeda Announces New English-Language Terror Magazine." *NBC News*. Last updated March 9, 2014. <http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/al-qaeda-announces-new-english-language-terror-magazine-n48531>.

Collaborative International Dictionary of English-Free Dictionary, The. "Ideology." Accessed June 22, 2014 <http://www.freidictionary.org/?Query=ideology>.

Commonwealth of Australia. National Counter-Terrorism Committee. *National Counter-Terrorism Plan*. 2nd ed. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2005.

———. *National Counter-Terrorism Plan*. 3rd ed. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2012.

Commonwealth States and Territories of Australia. *Agreement on Australia's National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2002.

Communities and Local Government Committee. House of Commons. *Preventing Violent Extremism: Sixth Report of Session 2009–10*. London: The Stationery Office Limited, March 2010.

Cragin, Kim. *Understanding Terrorist Motivations. Testimony Presented before the House Homeland Security Committee. Subcommittee on Intelligence. Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment on December 15, 2009*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009.

Crawshaw, Colonel Michael (ret.). “The Evolution of British Counter Insurgency (COIN).” *Ministry of Defence Joint Doctrine Publication*. December 21, 2012. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-evolution-of-british-coin>.

Crenshaw, Martha. “A Welcome Antidote.” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 17, no. 4 (2005): 517–521.

Creswell, John. *Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2007.

DeAngelis, Tori. “Understanding Terrorism.” *American Psychological Association* 40, no. 10 (November 2009): 60. <http://www.apa.org/monitor/2009/11/terrorism.aspx>.

Deardorff, R. Brad. *The Roots of Our Children’s War: Identity and the War on Terrorism*. Williams, CA: Agile Press, 2013.

Department of Defense: Australian Government. “About ASD: Signals Intelligence Role.” Accessed May 4, 2014. <http://www.asd.gov.au/about/rolesigint.htm>.

———. “About; Defense Intelligence Organization.” Accessed May 4, 2014. <http://www.defence.gov.au/dio/about-us.shtml>.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Australian Government. “About Australia.” Accessed May 4, 2014. http://www.dfat.gov.au/facts/sys_gov.html.

———. “The Land and Its People.” Last accessed May 18, 2014. <http://www.dfat.gov.au/aib/the-land-and-its-people.html>.

Department of Immigration and Border Protection. Australian Government. “Fact Sheet 8-Abolition of the ‘White Australia Policy.’” Last accessed May 18, 2014. <http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/08abolition.htm>.

Downing, Michael, and Matt Mayer. “Preventing the Next “Lone Wolf” Terrorist Attack Requires Stronger Federal–State–Local Capabilities.” Backgrounder #2818. *The Heritage Foundation*, June 18, 2013. <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/06/preventing-the-next-lone-wolf-terrorist-attack-requires-stronger-federalstatelocal-capabilities>.

Eby, Charles. “The Nation That Cried Lone Wolf: A Data Driven Analysis of Individual Terrorists in the United States Since 9/11.” Master’ thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. <https://www.hndl.org/?view&did=710310>.

eMediaMillWorks. "Text: President Bush Addresses the Nation." *The Washington Post*. September 20, 2001. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html.

European Network and Information Security Agency. *Cooperative Models for Effective Public Private Partnerships: Good Practice Guide*. Heraklion, Crete, Greece: ENAISA, 2011.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. "Definitions of Terrorism in the U.S. Code." Accessed June 22, 2014. <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism-definition>.

———. "Terrorism." Accessed June 22, 2014. <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism>.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. "Recommendations." *CVE Working Group*. Last accessed June 7, 2014. http://www.fema.gov/txt/government/grant/bulletins/373_cve_recommendations.txt.

Gaines, Larry, and Victor Kappeler. *Homeland Security*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2012.

Georgia, Holmer. "Countering Violent Extremism: A Peacebuilding Perspective." Special Report 336. *The United States Institute of Peace*, September 2013. <http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Transnational/CVEUSIP.pdf>.

Gerwehr, Scott, and Kirk Hubbard. "What Is Terrorism: Key Elements and History." In *Psychology of Terrorism 2007*, edited by Bruce Boeniger et al. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Global Counterterrorism Forum. "Framework Documents." September 27, 2013. <http://www.thegctf.org/web/guest;jsessionid=E704E5B67C648E079F4E9EC54B76AF1C.w142>.

GOV.UK. "Ministry of Defence. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) Series." Last update September 3, 2013. <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ministry-of-defence/series/joint-doctrine-publication-jdp>.

Government Accountability Office. *Report to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. United States Senate. Countering Violent Extremism: Additional Actions Could Strengthen Training Efforts*. GAO-13-79. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2012.

Her Majesty's Government. *Channel: Protecting Vulnerable People from Being Drawn into Terrorism. A Guide for Local Partnerships*. London, The United Kingdom: Her Majesty's Government, August 2012. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118194/channel-guidance.pdf.

———. *Channel: Vulnerability Assessment Framework*. London, The United Kingdom: Her Majesty's Government, October 2012.

———. *Delivering the Prevent Strategy: An Updated Guide for Local Partners*. London, The United Kingdom: Her Majesty's Government, August 2009.

———. Secretary of State for the Home Department. *Prevent Strategy*. London, The Stationery Office Limited on Behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office, October 2010.

Her Majesty's Stationary Office. *CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism—July 2011*. London, The United Kingdom: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 2011.

———. *CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism—Annual Report April 2014*. London, The United Kingdom: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 2011.

Hizb ut-Tahir—Australia. *Government Intervention in the Muslim Community*. Sydney, Australia: Media Office of Hizb ut-Tahir in Australia, November 2013.

HM Government. *Channel: Protecting Vulnerable People from Being Drawn into Terrorism. A Guide for Local Partnerships*, October 2012.

Hoffman, Bruce. "American Jihad." *The National Interest Online*, April 20, 2010.

———. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.

Homeland Security Advisory Council. *Countering Violent Extremism Working Group (CVE)*. Washington, DC: Homeland Security Advisory Council, Spring 2010.

Hometown Australia. "History of Australia." Accessed July 14, 2014. <http://www.hometownaustralia.com/index.php/41-general/11-history-of-australia>.

Hudson, Rex. "The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?" *Federal Research Division, Library of Congress*, September 1999.

Hussein, Rashad, Speaker. Panel Discussion Topic: Muslim Public Affairs Council. "Online Radicalization: Myths and Realities." Sponsored by New America Foundation. Safe Spaces Initiative. Accessed May 29, 2014. <http://www.mpac.org/safespaces/>.

Innes, Martin, Colin Roberts, and Helen Inness. *Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers*. Cardiff, Wales: Universities' Police Science Institute, Cardiff University, March 2011.

Issacharoff, Samuel, and Richard H. Pildes. "Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights during Wartime." [Draft Manuscript: July 18, 2003]. Last accessed February 28, 2014. <http://web.archive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100809215300/http://www.lawandsecurity.org/documents/samfinal.pdf>.

Jenkins, Brian. *Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States since September 11, 2001*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010.

Johnston, Kyle. "CONTEST 3: Progress for Transparency and Evaluation." *RUSI*. July 14, 2011. <http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref%3AC4E1EEF67D24BE/#.UxZMaqSYbIU>.

Kara-Ali, Mustapha, and BIRR Initiative Research Team. *The Way Forward: An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation*. Australia: Department of Immigration and Citizenship under the direction of the National Action Plan Community Project Funding Program, 2010.

Kean, Thomas. 9/11 Commission et al. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*. 1st. ed. Authorized ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. Inc., 2004.

Khalil, Lydia. "U.S. Counter-Radicalisation Strategy: The Ideological Challenge." *Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, January 11, 2012.

Kruglanski, Arie, and Shira Fishman. "The Psychology of Terrorism: "Syndrome" Versus "Tool" Perspectives." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 2 (2006): 193–215. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546550600570119>.

Lawler, John. "The Bali Bombing: Australian Law Enforcement Assistance to Indonesia." *Police Chief Magazine*. Accessed May 4, 2014. http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=354&issue_id=82004.

Legislation.gov.uk. "Terrorism Act 2006." April 22, 2014. <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/section/1>.

Leonard, Herman B. "Dutch," Christine M. Cole, Arnold J. Howitt, and Philip B. Heymann. "Why Was Boston Strong? Lessons from the Boston Marathon Bombing." *Harvard Kennedy School and Harvard Business School*, April 2014.

Lucaccioni, Cassandra. "61st Terrorist Plot Against the U.S.: Terry Lee Loewen Plot to Attack Wichita Airport." Issue Brief #4110 on Terrorism. *The Heritage Foundation*. December 18, 2013. <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/12/terry-lee-loewen-terrorist-plot-in-wichita-kansas-airport>.

“Majalah Jihad Al-Qaeda Berbahasa Inggris Baru. Resurgence.” YouTube video. Posted by Arrahmah Channel, March 12, 2014. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y4n1HHPHxV4>.

Malcolm X. “February 14, 1965 Speech at the Ford Auditorium. Detroit, Michigan.” May 27, 2014. http://www.malcolm-x.org/speeches/spc_021465.htm.

McCants, Will, and Clinton Watts. “U.S. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment.” *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, 2012. https://www.fpri.org/docs/McCants_Watts - Countering_Violent_Exremism.pdf.

McDonald, Geoff—First Assistant Secretary National Security Law and Policy Division. *Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Migration Inquiry into Multiculturalism in Australia*. Australian Government: Attorney General’s Department, March 2, 2012.

Merriam Webster. “Doctrine.” Accessed September 11, 2013. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/doctrine>.

———. “Dogma.” Accessed September 11, 2013. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dogma>.

———. “Extreme.” Accessed June 22, 2014. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/extreme>.

———. “Ideology.” Accessed June 22, 2014. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ideology>.

———. “Radical.” Accessed June 22, 2014. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/radical?show=0&t=1404078073>.

———. “Radicalize.” Accessed June 22, 2014. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/radicalize>.

———. “Terrorism.” Accessed June 22, 2014. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/terrorism>.

Metcalfe, Andrew. Deputy Secretary—Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and Co-Chair of the National Counter-Terrorism Committee. “FOREWORD: Counter-terrorism in Australia.” *The Australian Journal of Emergency Management* 20, no. 2 (May 2005). <http://www.em.gov.au/Documents/Counter-terrorism%20in%20Australia.pdf>.

MI5 Security Service. “History of Terrorist Threat Levels.” Last accessed February 28, 2014. <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/the-threats/terrorism/threat-levels.html#history>.

Ministry of Defence. “Development. Concepts and Doctrine Centre.” Last accessed February 28, 2014. <https://www.gov.uk/development-concepts-and-doctrine-centre>.

———. “Development. Concepts and Doctrine Centre—What We Do.” Last accessed February 28, 2014. <https://www.gov.uk/development-concepts-and-doctrine-centre#what-we-do>.

Moghaddam, Fathali. “Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations.” *The American Psychological Association*, 2008.

———. *From the Terrorist’s Point of View: What They Experience and Why They Come to Destroy Us*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006.

Morag, Nadav. *Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. Inc., 2011.

Muslim Public Affairs Council. “White House’s Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism: Supports MPAC’s Core Issues & Initiative.” August 3, 2011. <http://www.mpac.org/programs/government-relations/white-houses-strategy-on-countering-violent-extremism.php>.

Mylonaki, Emmanouela, and Tim Burton. “An Assessment of UK Anti-Terrorism Strategy and the Human Rights Implications Associated with its Implementation.” *Journal on Terrorism and Security Affairs* 6 (2011): 1.

Nasser-Eddine, Minerva, Bridget Garnham, Katerina Agostina, and Gilbert Caluya. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review. *Australian Government Department of Defense*. Edinburgh, South Australia: Counter Terrorism and Security Technology Centre, 2011.

National Counter-Terrorism Committee: Council of Australian Governments. “Ten Year Anniversary Report.” July 25, 2012. <http://www.coag.gov.au/sites/default/files/NCTC%20Ten%20Year%20Anniversary%20Report.pdf>.

National Security Agency. “Public Law 99-433: The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, section 603, subsection 104-Annual Report on National Security Strategy, 99th Session of the United States Congress, October 1, 1986.” Last accessed May 24, 2014. http://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic_heritage/60th/interactive_timeline/Content/1980s/documents/19861001_1980_Doc_NDU.pdf.

Neumann, Peter. *Preventing Violent Radicalization in America*. Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center: National Security Preparedness Group, June 2011.

Neumann, Peter R. *Options and Strategies for Countering Online Radicalization in the United States. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*. London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation King's College London, 2013.

O'Brien, Lauren. "The Evolution of Terrorism since 9/11." *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* 80, no. 9 (September 2011). Accessed May 29, 2013. <https://www.hsl.org/?view&did=686969>.

Obama, President Barack. "Remarks of President Barack Obama." Accessed May 31, 2013. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-barack-obama>.

Office of Homeland Security. Office of the President of the United States. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America—July 2002*. Washington, DC: Office of Homeland Security, Office of the President of the United States, July 2002.

———. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America—October 2007*. Washington, DC: Office of Homeland Security, Office of the President of the United States, October 2007.

Office of the President of the United States. *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*. Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States, August 2011.

———. *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*. Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States, December 2011.

———. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America—September 2002*. Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States, September 2002.

———. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America—March 2006*. Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States, March 2006.

———. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America—May 2010*. Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States, May 2010.

———. *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism—February 2003*. Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States, February 2003.

———. *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism—September 2006*. Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States, September 2006.

———. *The National Strategy for Counterterrorism—2011*. Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States, June 28, 2011.

Office of the Press Secretary: The White House. “Fact Sheet: National Strategy for Counterterrorism.” June 29, 2011. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/29/fact-sheet-national-strategy-counterterrorism>.

Oliver, Alex. *The Lowy Institute Poll 2013: Australia and the World-Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*. Sydney, Australia: Lowy Institute, 2013.

Omand, Sir David. “Securing the State: National Security and Secret Intelligence.” *Center for Complex Organizations; Prism Magazine* 4, no. 3 (May 2013).

_____. Security & Intelligence Coordinator. Cabinet Office. “National Resilience Priorities for UK Government” (Text of Speech Given to Royal United Services Institute—RUSI—July 1, 2004). *RUSI*. Last accessed March 2, 2014. <http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C40AB913E66BA2/#.UxOvfKSYbIU>.

One World-Nations Online. “History of Australia.” Accessed May 4, 2014. <http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/History/Australia-history.htm>.

Parliament of Australia. “The Australian Constitution.” Accessed May 2, 2014. http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/Constitution.aspx.

Patel, Faiza. “Testimony for The American Muslim Response to Hearings on Radicalization (presentation to the United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security).” June 20, 2012. <http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/testimony-%E2%80%9C-american-muslim-response-hearings-radicalization>.

Perl, Raphael F. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: Background and Issues for Congress*. CRS Report No. RL34230. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007.

Pew Research. “Religion and Public Life Project. “Number of Muslims in Western Europe.” September 15, 2010. <http://www.pewforum.org/2010/09/15/muslim-networks-and-movements-in-western-europe/>.

_____. “Religion and Public Life Project. The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Region Asia-Pacific.” January 27, 2011. <http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-regional-asia/>.

Police UK. “UK Police Forces.” Last accessed February 25, 2014. <http://www.police.uk/forces/>.

Ramakrishna, Kumar. “From Global to Micro Jihad: Three Trends of Grassroots Terrorism.” *S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies*. May 7, 2013. <http://rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0882013.pdf>.

RAND Corporation: Center for Asian Pacific Policy. “Australia’s Security Policy and the War on Terrorism.” 2003. <http://www.rand.org/international/capp/events/03/australwot.html>.

Ranstorp, Magnus, ed. *Understanding Violent Radicalisation: Terrorist and Jihadist Movements in Europe*. New York: Routledge, 2010.

Reaves, Brian. “Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies: 2008.” *U.S. Department of Justice: Office of Justice Programs-Bureau of Justice Statistics*. July 2011. <http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cslea08.pdf>.

Reese, Shawn. *Defining Homeland Security: Analysis and Congressional Considerations*. CRS Report No. R42462. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 2013.

Reicher, Stephen. *The Determination of Collective Behavior*. ed. Henry Tajfel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

“Safe Spaces Initiative: Tools for Developing Healthy Communities.” *Muslim Public Affairs Council*, 2014.

Schmid, Alex P., and Albert J. Jongman. *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988.

Secretary of State for the Home Department. *Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy*. London: Her Majesty’s Government: The Stationery Office Limited on Behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, July 2006.

Sedgwick, Mark. “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 4 (2010): 479–494.

Smith, Paul. “A Critical Assessment of the US National Strategy for Counterterrorism: A Missed Opportunity?” *Real Instituto Elcano*, July 9, 2011.

———. “Counterterrorism in the United Kingdom: Module II: Policy Response.” *Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security*. Last accessed March 3, 2014. https://www.chds.us/coursefiles/comp/lectures/comp_CT_in_the_UK_mod02_ss/player.html.

Snider, Don M. *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision Second Edition*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, The Strategic Studies Institute, March 15, 1995.

Soufan Group, The. “Assessing the UAE-Based Center on Countering Violent Extremism.” February 18, 2013. <http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-assessing-the-uae-based-center-on-countering-violent-extremism/>.

Springer, Nathan. “Patterns of Radicalization: Identifying the Markers and Warning Signs of Domestic Lone Wolf Terrorists in Our Midst.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009. <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi/tr/fulltext/u2/a514419.pdf>.

St. George’s House Consultation and Quilliam Foundation. “Countering Violent Extremism Post Arab Spring.” November 14–16, 2013. http://www.stgeorgeshouse.org/index.php/download_file/562/226/.

Stationery Office Limited. The. *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty*. London: The United Kingdom: The Stationery Office Limited on Behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, October 2010.

Stevenson, Leslie, and David Haberman. *Ten Theories of Human Nature*. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Tahiri, Hussein, and Michele Grossman. “Community and Radicalization: An Examination of Perceptions. Ideas, Beliefs and Solutions throughout Australia.” Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit. *Victoria Police and Victoria University*, September 2013.

Tajfel, Henri. Preface to *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*. Edited by Henri Tajfel. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Temple-Raston, Dina. “White House Unveils Counter-Extremism Plan.” *NPR*, August 3, 2011. <http://www.npr.org/2011/08/04/138955790/white-house-unveils-counter-extremism-plan>.

Trethewey, Angela, Steven Corman, and Bud Goodall. “Out of Their Heads and into Their Conversation: Countering Extremist Ideology.” *Arizona State University Consortium for Strategic Communication*, September 14, 2009.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. *The Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2012–2016*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, February 2012.

U.S. Department of State. Office of the Historian. “Milestones: 1945–1952. National Security Act of 1947.” Last accessed May 24, 2014. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/national-security-act>.

UK National Archives. “Ministry of Defence—Performance Report 2001/2002: Defence Policy.” Last accessed February 28, 2014. <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20131205100653/http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm56/5661/chap03.htm>.

Ungerer, Carl. “Beyond bin Laden: Future Trends in Terrorism.” *The Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, December 2011.

United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. “Public-Private Partnerships for the Protection of Vulnerable Attacks.” January 2009. https://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctif/pdfs/web_protecting_human_rights.pdf.

United States Agency International Development (USAID). “The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency Policy.” 2011. http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/VEI_Policy_Final.pdf.

Vidino, Lorenzo. *Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010.

Vidino, Lorenzo, and James Brandon. *Countering Radicalization in Europe*. London, UK: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence: King’s College London, 2012.

Warner, Carolyn, and Manfred Wenner. “Religion and the Political Organization of Muslims in Europe.” *Perspectives on Politics* 4, no. 3 (September 2006): 457–479.

Wasserman, Robert. *Guidance for Building Communities of Trust*. Washington, DC. U.S. Department of Justice-Office of Community Partnerships, 2010.

Wilson, Scott, Greg Miller, and Sari Horwitz. “Boston Bombing Suspect Cites U.S. Wars As Motivation. Officials Say.” *The Washington Post*. April 23, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/boston-bombing-suspect-cites-us-wars-as-motivation-officials-say/2013/04/23/324b9cea-ac29-11e2-b6fd-ba6f5f26d70e_story.html.

Zuckerman, Jessica. “Forty-Fourth Terrorist Plot against the U.S. Marks Need for Continued Vigilance.” *The Heritage Foundation*, no. 3446 (January 9, 2012): 1–2. <https://www.hsl.org/?view&did=697386>.

Zuckerman, Jessica, Steven Bucci, and James Carafano. “60 Terrorist Plots since 9/11: Continued Lessons in Domestic Counterterrorism.” *The Heritage Foundation*, July 31, 2013.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California